Chapter 103 As soon as the pursuit stopped, Li Qiwei launched a big counterattack

According to Peng Dehuai's vision, after the three consecutive punches of the volunteer army, the United Nations army was so heavy that although they would not be beaten to the ground, they must have been beaten staggeringly and fainted. The rapid retreat to the vicinity of the 37th parallel is the proof. Therefore, it is estimated that after the Volunteer Army quickly withdraws, there is no possibility of the United Nations Army counterattacking in the short term. This time exceeded Peng Dehuai's expectations. Less than 15 days after the volunteers stopped attacking and began to rest, Li Qiwei turned passive into active and attacked the volunteers hard.

Li Qiwei told the generals of the United Nations Army: "The volunteers stopped attacking, that is, they have no strength to attack. Now, it is our turn to attack!" Li Qiwei ordered: "United Nations Army, raise the spirit of American soldiers, throw away the mystery and fear of the Chinese, counterattack! Counterattack! Big counterattack!" Li Qiwei is indeed a great military strategist with insight. Without definite information, he predicted the actual difficulties of the Volunteers. This is also the first correct judgment made by the commander-in-chief of the United Nations Army on the Chinese army since China sent troops.

Although Peng De had a premonition, he was caught off guard. Peng Dehuai expected it, but not so soon. Mao Zedong did not expect so soon. Li Qiwei's punch came here. If Peng Dehuai hadn't had a tough temper and didn't listen to Lazovayev at the time, the war might have ended in a different way. Because if you persist for another two days, the strength of the volunteer army will be completely exhausted, and even the basic defense force will be gone.At that time, if the United Nations forces attack violently again, the volunteers will only have to be beaten, just like the Korean People's Army when the United Nations army landed in Incheon.

From January 25 to April 21, 1951, within three months, the Volunteers were forced to fight the fourth battle they had to fight. The fourth battle was the only defensive battle that the Volunteers were forced to fight in the first five battles.This battle made Peng Dehuai very passive. At this time, Peng Dehuai was facing the most difficult situation since the beginning of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea.Because the strength of the Volunteer Army is basically exhausted, while the United Nations Army is just the opposite.The combat troops of the Volunteer Army are extremely fatigued and have just entered the rest period. There are very few front-line troops, and the Korean People's Army has only 280,000 people.At this time, the frontline combat troops of the "United Nations Army" had reached 230,000.This is only in terms of numbers, and the preparation gap in terms of military strength and logistical support is even greater.

The point is, General Ridgway did the right thing at the right time this time. He chose to take the initiative. Some scholars believe that the passiveness of the Volunteers in the Fourth Battle and the subsequent war results were due to problems in Mao Zedong's judgment and decision-making. Their point of view is: After several major battles, the Americans were beaten to the vicinity of the 37th parallel without making clear the strength of the Chinese army, and they were already beaten, so they wanted to make peace with the Chinese.At that time, it was in China's best interest to make peace. If so, China would be able to end the war under the best conditions.However, Mao Zedong underestimated the strength of the Americans. He didn't want to make peace, didn't want to talk, and continued to fight. He wanted to drive the United Nations army into the sea and out of the whole of Korea. Li Qiwei's tactics were figured out, and the Americans woke up from their dizziness.

In this way, it will be much more difficult for China to seek peace. In this way, the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea took two years longer, and the Volunteers paid more than a hundred thousand lives. There are not a few scholars who hold this view, including some well-known experts on the history of the Cold War. In my opinion, this is hindsight. This kind of hindsight understanding is somewhat biased, and does not conform to the epistemological law of spiral upwards of understanding, improvement, and re-understanding. Because, as long as a person, no matter how great he is, his cognition must be based on judgment based on facts, and strategists are no exception.

In the first confrontation between the Chinese and American armies, they fought three battles. The American army was defeated and the Chinese army won; In the face of reality, Mao Zedong realized that it seemed that the Americans were not so difficult to fight.Since it is not so difficult to fight, at least it can be fought, why not continue to fight, drive the Americans into the sea, and liberate the entire North Korea. Of course, reality is not equal to objectiveness, and what happens in reality is not equal to objective situations; Objectivity requires a full and comprehensive understanding of reality;

To understand, one needs time, and the other needs information. Due to the lack of time and conditions, although Mao Zedong and the Central Military Commission in Beijing were very cautious about the US military and made various estimates of the battle situation, they were not completely clear about its combat capabilities after all. Judgment and quality are not entirely clear. In particular, the course of the war seemed to prove that the operational goal of defeating the US military could be achieved with hard work.Although Peng Dehuai and the Volunteer Army Command are more cautious in their acquaintance, they basically hold this view.

Therefore, it is inevitable that the option that the Americans want to make peace on the 38th parallel will be rejected and excluded. But the United Nations Army headed by the United States is too powerful after all. When Li Qiwei figured out the strategy and tactics of the Chinese army and came up with a pragmatic response strategy, especially when the Volunteer Army's attack was weak and suddenly launched a large-scale attack, he beat the Volunteer Army. One was caught off guard. For the Volunteers, facing this situation, not only is it temporarily impossible to attack, but it also seems impossible to repel the enemy and defend Seoul and Incheon.

At this time, Chinese leaders such as Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai began to realize that the real tiger of the US army was indeed very powerful. In the dim cave at the headquarters of the Volunteer Army, Peng Dehuai, after painful thinking, unfolded the paper, and wrote a telegram to Mao Zedong with a very good understanding, pointing out: "The third battle has a certain degree of reluctance, and this battle has more Great reluctance, if the main attack is blocked, the situation in the Korean War may temporarily turn passive." Changjiang Yonghui, deputy commander of the 38th Army, also believed in his memoirs that since the Chinese army faced the modernized U.S. military for the first time, Chinese soldiers "have insufficient understanding of the role played by the enemy's modern equipment in the war."

This statement is in line with reality. It's easy to talk about how to fight on the initiative.In a passive situation, and suddenly faced with a passive situation, how to turn passive into active will really test the level and ability of the commander. The time has come to test Peng Dehuai and other Chinese army generals.