Chapter 68 Why is the decision-making of the Volunteer Army efficient?

The pursuit stopped. Stopping is not the purpose.Stopping is only valuable if it can better eliminate the opponent; otherwise, it loses the meaning of stopping. In a telegram to Mao Zedong, Peng Dehuai offered the opinion of the Volunteer Army Headquarters: Before the United Nations Army could figure out the full intentions and strength of the Volunteers, they stopped attacking and hid their troops in order to paralyze the enemy, let the enemy go deep, and then annihilate them. Mao Zedong replied that he fully agreed, and made it clear that the operational policy of the second campaign was: lure the enemy to go deep and look for opportunities to wipe out the enemy.

That is to say, the key to dealing with MacArthur and the United Nations Army is one word: lure. According to the theory of decision-making, the fewer decision-making levels, the fewer decision-makers, and the better the decision-makers understand the actual situation, the more efficient and correct the decision-making will be.This is what is often said now, a flat decision-making management system. In the early days of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, the decision-making mechanism of the Chinese side well reflected three characteristics: First, there are few levels of decision-making.Basically, there are three levels to the end: one is the army and below cadres, mainly making decisions on the battlefield; the second is Peng Dehuai and the Volunteer Army Command, the middle level is mainly making campaign decisions and direct command; the third is Mao Zedong and the Central Military Commission, the supreme military and political commander , mainly responsible for strategic decision-making and campaign decision-making.These three levels are over in one go.

It's not like now, when it comes to big things, you have to hold meetings at various levels to study, and each leader gives instructions, from provinces to cities, counties to townships, and then to the village center, and the implementation depends on the villagers. Second, the number of decision-makers is small.On the surface, the highest decision-making level is the Central Committee and the Central Military Commission, but the real military decision-maker is only one person: Mao Zedong.The middle level, the headquarters of the Chinese People's Volunteers, actually has a very small number of people, and many deputy commanders have gone to the front line. Sometimes there are only two or three people, and even Peng Dehuai alone makes decisions.

This is a spectacle in the history of Chinese and foreign wars.Napoleon had a big team in making war decisions; Stalin basically had everyone in the headquarters.However, when the Chinese and American troops fought against each other on the Korean battlefield, in such a big war, the highest decision-making was basically a very few people such as Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai. Third, the decision-making information is real.These decision makers of the Chinese army are well versed in the battlefield situation and rarely confuse information, which plays an important role in efficient and correct decision-making.