Chapter 12 Chapter 11 Attack from outside, break the enemy's key attack

One day in late May 1947, the Nanjing Officer Training Corps. In the third study class, Chiang Kai-shek said: "After the death of Master Zhang (Lingfu), I immediately ordered the front (Yimeng Mountain) troops to stop attacking, and at the same time called all the generals to conduct a thorough review, conduct a thorough study, and completely correct our troops. Style and habits, and re-determine our strategy and tactics. We must wait until our entire army has been revived before we can make further plans.” Then, Chiang Kai-shek said like an oath: "The battle of Yimeng mountainous area is a battle of life and death for our revolutionary soldiers. To restore the decline and seize victory, we must start from this battle."

In order to save the war situation in Shandong, Chiang Kai-shek appointed the Japanese war criminal Ningji Okamura as an advisor, and held several military conferences in Nanjing, Xuzhou, and Linyi to review the war situation and study countermeasures. Three or four divisions overlapped and advanced alternately", and the front-line commander was replaced. Fan Hanjie, the deputy commander-in-chief of the army, was transferred to the front line in Central Shandong for unified command, and the offensive corps was reorganized. It was mobilized in front of less than 50 kilometers from Laiwu to Mengyin, arranged in a square formation, equipped with mountain combat equipment, artillery, and engineers, and hoarded a large number of combat materials at various key points, preparing to launch a new offensive.

On May 22, 1947, Wujiawan, Jingbian County, Shaanxi Province (now part of Anzhai County). In a simple farmhouse, Mao Zedong smoked one cigarette after another, deep in thought. Hu Zongnan aggressively pushed into Yan'an.The Party Central Committee and Mao Zedong took a long-term view, and in order to achieve the goal of liberating the whole of China and to achieve the final victory, they decided to withdraw their troops from Yan'an. At 5 o'clock in the afternoon on March 18, 1947, Mao Zedong personally led the Central Committee of our party to withdraw from Yan'an calmly, leaving an empty city to Hu Zongnan, the ambitious Communist Party leader.

Chiang Kai-shek and Hu Zongnan's attack on Yan'an had been expected by the Party Central Committee and Mao Zedong, and they had been mentally prepared. In 1940, Mao Zedong pointed out that even if Yan'an fell, he would still stick to the border area.Everyone is going to live a life of guerrilla warfare, the most difficult life, but also the most vivid life. In August 1945, Mao Zedong said: "Now Chiang Kai-shek is already sharpening his knife, so we must also sharpen our knife. All in all, we must be prepared, and with preparation we can properly deal with various complicated situations."

In the second half of 1946, although the enemy did not aggressively attack the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, like other liberated areas, while actively preparing for war, the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region evacuated the government agencies, schools, factories, hospitals, and the elderly, weak, and disabled in Yan'an. To the liberated areas east of the Yellow River. In July 1946, when the civil war had just begun, Mao Zedong clearly stated: "The temporary abandonment of certain places and cities is not only inevitable, but also necessary. The temporary abandonment of certain places and cities is for the purpose of achieving final victory."

In September, Mao Zedong put forward the strategic thinking of "taking the annihilation of the enemy's vital forces as the main goal, rather than taking conservation and seizing places as the main goal." On the eve of the withdrawal of the Party Central Committee from Yan'an, Mao Zedong pointed out more clearly: "If people lose land, they will gain; These are the two experiences, now and in the future.” During the transfer, the Party Central Committee was divided into three committees: Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Ren Bishi and other comrades formed the CPC Central Committee’s Front Enemy Work Committee, including the CPC Central Committee’s Revolutionary Military Committee and the People’s Liberation Army Headquarters, referred to as the Front Committee.The former committee remained in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and continued to exercise the functions and powers of the Party Central Committee, the Central Military Commission and the People's Liberation Army Headquarters.Comrades such as Liu Shaoqi and Zhu De formed the Working Committee of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, referred to as the Working Committee.The working committee moved to the east of the Yellow River to carry out the work entrusted by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, such as land reform, party consolidation, pre-support production and other daily work of the Party Central Committee.Comrades such as Ye Jianying and Yang Shangkun formed the Rear Working Committee of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, referred to as the Rear Committee.The rear committee also went to the east of the Yellow River to carry out the work entrusted by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.Radio stations, newspaper offices, factories, schools, hospitals, etc. are all managed by the leaders of the rear committee.

After Mao Zedong led the front committee to Wangjiawan, he continued to command the national liberation war.The Northwest Field Corps dealt a heavy blow to the south of Hu Zong, who was attacking northern Shaanxi, and made his heavy troops fall into a dilemma; the Northeast Democratic Alliance Army has begun to counterattack; the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Field Army wiped out more than 35,000 enemies in the Zhengtai Battle, and isolated Shijiazhuang; The Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army launched a counterattack in southern Shanxi and northern Henan, liberating more than 30 counties and forcing the Kuomintang Army to retreat to a few data points; new offense.

Now, the development of the national war situation is extremely beneficial to the people.Thinking of this, Mao Zedong drafted a telegram for the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China to the East China Field Army: "The annihilation of the 74th Division cost more, but it is of great significance. It proves that fighting in the current area, as long as you don't rush and don't divide your troops, you can use various methods to break the enemy's attack and win a decisive victory. Fighting in the current area is therefore I am the most beneficial, and the enemy is the most disadvantageous. At present, all battlefields in the country except Shandong have taken offensives, but the significance of all these offensives is to help Shandong, the main battlefield, break the enemy's attack. The role of the people's struggle that is expanding day by day under Jiang's administration is also the same. The same is true for Liu and Deng's attack next month. Shandong's combat method is to concentrate all the main force in the area north of the line of Jinan, Linyi, and Haizhou. If there are no casualties, annihilate the enemies on the line one by one. The day the line is broken is the time of the overall victory, and all operations will be relatively smooth after that.”

On May 28, Northwest Slope Village, Yishui County, Shandong Province. The East China Field Army Front Committee is holding a meeting of cadres above the regiment.Rao Shushi made a report on preparations for a counteroffensive to meet victory, and Chen Yi made a report on the Shandong war situation and military issues.The meeting emphasized that the Kuomintang has concentrated its troops in Shandong. Although it has increased the burden on the military and civilians in East China, it has created favorable conditions for counter-offensives in other battlefields. At present, except for Shandong and northern Shaanxi, our army has turned to counter-offensive, and the Kuomintang is on the eve of collapse. Although the battle situation in Shandong has improved after the Battle of Menglianggu, it has not yet taken the initiative. The enemy is actively preparing for another large-scale attack. We must continue to fight on the inside and prepare for a fierce battle.

The meeting earnestly summed up the experience and lessons of the Menglianggu Battle, emphasizing that we must continue to resolutely implement the policies of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China and Mao Zedong on mobile warfare and annihilation warfare, guard against arrogance and impetuosity, completely crush the key offensives of the Kuomintang army, strive for a change in the battle situation, and cooperate with other battlefields for counter-offensive operations. And create conditions for yourself to turn into a counterattack. Chen Yi and Su Yu planned to launch an attack on the enemy in the Laiwu area on June 11 in order to more effectively cooperate with the counter-offensive in various battlefields across the country, support the struggle in central China, and promote the rapid arrival of the national counter-offensive and revolutionary climax. Army and the reorganized 85th Division, and mobilized the reorganized 25th Division, 75th Division, and 11th Division, seeking to annihilate part or most of them during the movement, so as to recover the grain-producing areas of Xintai and Laiwu Plains, and open up links with southern Shandong The connection created favorable conditions for a major counter-offensive.After the troops moved in, they gave up the plan because they found out that the enemy was prepared and the defense was tight, and continued to rest and wait.

On June 22, the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China sent a telegram to Chen Yi, Su Yu, and Tan Zhenlin: "It is reported that Jiang ordered Du Yuming to stand firm for two months because of the crisis in the Northeast. Once Shandong is resolved, he will send air aid to the Northeast. The Shandong war is still the key to the overall situation. Your combat policy remains the same. It is advisable to attack when you are sure of victory. As long as you are sure of victory, you can fight either the main enemy or the secondary enemy. On the 24th, Chen Yi and Su Yu judged that the Kuomintang army's large-scale offensive was about to begin, and decided to move the main force to the southeast. They planned to besiege the more isolated enemy's right-wing 7th Army and the Reorganized 48th Division, attract reinforcements from the Reorganized 9th Division and the 57th Division, and annihilate them. Of. After the troops were transferred to the east, the enemy's 7th Army quickly shrank southward on the line of Baitabu and Linyi.On the 25th, the nine reorganized divisions of the main attack group of the Kuomintang army in Laiwu and Mengyin committed all their strength to the east, and on the 28th they occupied the front lines of Lucun, Dazhangzhuang, and Puli.At the same time, the reorganized 45th Division, 54th Division, and 8th Army of Jinan, Qingdao, and Weixian also cooperated with Mingshui, Gaomi, and Linqu respectively. In view of the concentration of Jiang's troops, it was difficult to divide and attack for a while. Chen Yi, Su Yu, and Tan Zhenlin agreed on the policy of sending troops from all walks of life to advance behind the enemy. On the 29th, they ordered Chen Shiju and Tang Liang to lead the third, eighth, and tenth columns to Laiwu and Tai'an. , Dawenkou line, carry out the task of destroying the enemy's 85th Army or part or most of the enemy's 12th Army; order Tao Yong's column to advance westward from the Linmeng Line to wipe out Feng Zhi'an's regiment, and then go northwest, west, or South, depending on the situation.That night, all the above ministries took action. On May 29, the Central Military Commission called to put forward the operational policy under the new situation, and hoped that Chen, Su, and Tan would provide opinions for decision-making.The Military Commission's telegram states: "Jiang's army had no way out, and was forced to adopt Hu Zongnan's tactics in northern Shaanxi, concentrating 9 divisions to advance towards us at a front less than a hundred miles away. This kind of tactics is useless except to avoid annihilating and harassing the residents, and its shortcomings are It is because the two wings and the rear are extremely empty, so give me a chance to fight freely. You should go out of southern Shandong in 2 to 3 columns, attack Feixian first, and then attack Zou, Teng, Lin, and Zao. The aim is to wipe out one brigade of the enemy. The main goal is to wipe out the enemy, not to cut off its support. There is no need to control the Linmeng section, and it is a waste of troops. In addition, you must use two columns at the right time to capture through the silk-spinning mouth Tai'an, sweeping all places to the west and south of Tai'an, also aims to wipe out the enemy's vital forces by maneuvering back and forth. Leaving 4 columns on the front to monitor the enemy, so that the two routes out can be easily obtained. The above policy is because the enemy's front is absolutely concentrated. Therefore, we should no longer continue to adopt the policy of concentrating our forces, but we should adopt the policy of attacking the far rear in separate routes, and it is also acceptable for them to send out two lines of troops, or use two columns to go out of Lunan, or three columns to go out of Luxi." This instruction of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China changed the policy of asking the East China Field Army not to divide troops and insist on destroying the enemy inside the line on May 22.Chen Yi, Su Yu, and Tan Zhenlin conducted research immediately. They agreed that although the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China only mentioned the enemy's situation in front of Shandong, since the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army is about to attack, the battle situation must have a major development.In response to the actions of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army, cutting off the Jinpu line, attacking the rear of the Kuomintang army, annihilating the enemy's vital forces, and breaking the hostile Shandong attack, it was decided to immediately implement the three-way division of troops proposed by the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, and reported to the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China. Specific deployment: "(1) Chen Shiju and Tang Liang led the third, eighth, and tenth columns (also known as Chen Tang Corps), first entered the Boshan area, and then advanced to Luxi; (2) Ye Fei and Tao Yong led the first column The first column and the fourth column (also known as the Yetao Corps), which had already gone south, crossed the Linmeng Highway and marched towards the south of Shandong; (3) The Field Army Command led the second, sixth, seventh, and ninth columns and the special forces column , Gathered on both sides of the Yishui-Yuezhuang highway, each with a small force to fight against the enemy who invaded the east, and the main force is waiting to attack." Due to time constraints, the troops began to act on July 1.This is Huaye's "July Division". The "July division of troops" was carried out hastily, and many problems did not have time for careful planning.It was the rainy season at that time, and the Huaye troops went through another difficult and tortuous process. On July 2, the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China sent a telegram to Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin: "I have learned from the telegram that the layout is very good." It also instructed the Chen Tang Corps to "cross Laiwu and go directly to Tai'an and its north-south line. After they succeed, they will recover Feicheng and Dong'e , Pingyin, Ningyang, Hanshang, Jining, and directly contact Liu Deng. After that, we should prepare to go out of Luxi, and cooperate with Liu Deng to hit the Longhai Road and go out of the Huaihe River to start a new situation." "We must attack the north and south of Tai'an and its west and southwest regions with swift action within seven or ten days, and open the way to join forces with Liu and Deng." Afterwards, the Central Military Commission decided that the two columns of Ye Fei and Tao Yong would also advance to the southwest of Shandong.In this way, the division of troops by Chen, Su, and Tan became the beginning of Huaye's troops carrying out the mission of attacking outside lines. The Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army forcibly crossed the Yellow River on June 30, and launched an attack on the enemy in the southwest of Shandong with a thunderous force. The five columns of the East China Field Army, which attacked the enemy's rear in southern and western Shandong, also launched a campaign to wipe out more enemies, wipe out the enemy's isolated strongholds, open up new battlefields, mobilize the enemies in central Shandong to return to aid, and cooperate with the Shanxi-Hebei-Luyu Field Army to fight. Be aggressive. On July 7, the third, eighth, and tenth columns of Huaye launched an attack on the section from Wande to Dawenkou on Jinpu Road, conquered Tai'an on the 8th, and recovered Jieshou, Wande, Dawenkou, and Pingzhou on the 10th. In Yin, Feicheng and other places, a total of nearly 800 people including the 15th Brigade of the 73rd Division were wiped out. On July 7, Huaye's first and fourth columns wiped out more than 6,000 people from the 38th Brigade of the 59th Division of Feixian County. On the 8th, the Fourth Column annihilated most of the 37th Brigade of the 77th Division in Tiopi Mountain south of Feixian County, and captured more than 1,000 officers and soldiers below the brigade commander. On the 9th, the first column recovered Zaozhuang, Yixian and other towns, forcing the Kuomintang Army's 3rd appeasement zone to retreat along the canal.At this time, the enemy in Central Lu continued to slowly advance eastward and northward, and occupied Donglidian on the 8th, and then attacked Yishui. At this time, the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army was violently expanding its achievements from Yuncheng to the south.The first and fourth columns of the East China Field Army have advanced towards Zou County and Gen County, approaching Jinpu Road; the tenth column has attacked Ningyang; The situation that the east and west of the folder canal echoed seriously threatened the enemy's rear bases Yanzhou and Xuzhou. Chiang Kai-shek had to change the combat policy of attacking east and defending west, and on the 12th he personally ordered the withdrawal of the 5th and 7th armies and the reorganization of the 85th, 83rd, 57th, 55th, and 48th divisions from the Luzhong area. , and the reorganization of 1 brigade each of the 20th and 75th divisions. Since the 13th, they have been diverted to the west in an attempt to cooperate with the defenders at various points in the rear. Qufu area, and then rescue the southwestern Shandong.The reorganized 11th, 25th, 64th, and 9th divisions were left in the Luzhong area, sticking to the key points they occupied, and waiting for an opportunity to commit another crime. In this way, the strength of the Kuomintang army in Luzhong was mobilized and dispersed, and the plan to defeat the main force of the East China Field Army in Luzhong went bankrupt. At that time, there were 4 divisions remaining in Luzhong, and their distribution was as follows: Hu Lian's 11th Division was stationed in Nanma, Huang Baitao's 25th Division was in Donglidian, Wang Lingyun's 9th Division was in Yishui, and Huang Guoliang's 64th Division was in Dazhangzhuang and other places west of Donglidian.In addition, Li Mi's 8th Division under Wang Yaowu was stationed in Linqu to cooperate with the operation. Chen Yi and Su Yu led the Huaye headquarters to Sanchadian between Nanma and Linqu. They had 4 columns, and they had an advantage against any division of the Kuomintang army in front of them alone. On July 10, Chen Su ordered all the columns to advance towards Donglidian and wipe out Huang Baitao's 25th Division.When the troops started to move, there was heavy rain and flash floods, and our army was unable to move.However, the enemy's 25th Division and the 64th Division quickly approached, and the Donglidian battle could not be fought. Seeing that Nanma's enemy reorganized 11th Division was relatively isolated, Chen and Su ordered the columns to turn around and encircle Nanma with the second, sixth, and ninth columns, and the seventh column was responsible for blocking aid in the south. Nanmadi is located in the mountainous area of ​​Zhongshan, a small basin.There are mountains on three sides, small hills on the east, a pass leading to Boshan on the highlands in the north, and the Yi River flows south of Nanma.This place is good for defense but not good for large forces.The 11th Division reorganized by the Kuomintang is one of the "five main forces", and the division commander Hu Lian is a scheming commander. The annihilation of the 74th Division shocked him a lot. Although the 11th Division was also very powerful, Hu Lian was still careful and cautious in everything. When the Kuomintang army began to move in June, the 11th Division went from Laiwu to Dalu Village.Hu Lian felt that the terrain of Lu Village was unfavorable, with mountains on all sides and a small basin in the middle.Only by occupying the high mountains on all sides can Lu village be kept. Otherwise, tens of thousands of troops will be crushed in the village and unable to use it. Hu Lian considered again and again, and asked his superiors to move to Nanma.After arriving in Nanma, he was even less eager to move forward. Instead, he spent more than 20 days vigorously building fortifications, striving to protect himself first. Hu Lian led 4 regiments of the 11th Division to station in Nanma, and the other two brigades stationed in Beima, Gaozhuang, Beiliujiazhuang, Wujiaguanzhuang and other places respectively.They used the villages and hills they controlled to build dense bunker groups, and barbed wire fences, deer villages and other obstacles were set up on the periphery of each bunker group. On July 17, the four columns of the East China Field Army's internal line marched in separate routes according to the scheduled deployment. On the way, they encountered heavy rain and their actions were hindered. On the morning of the 18th, the 26th Division of the Ninth Column attacked the highlands south of Xiadoufu Valley, and the main force of the column captured Jingshan Spring.The sixth column controlled the positions of Jiuding Mountain and Fenghuang Mountain, and the main force advanced to the line of Chongxi Guanzhuang and Buxiazhuang.The second column entered the north-south line of Dabu Village. After fighting all day on the 18th, the enemy's main force retreated to the main position to resist, except for a group that stood firm on the outskirts of Lishan and Matougu.After the ninth, sixth, and second columns seized the outer positions, they launched fierce attacks on Gaozhuang, Beibudong, Matougu, Guquanzhuang, Wujiaguanzhuang, Shiqianshan and other places. When our army stormed Nanma, Hu Lian asked Xuzhou for help.The Kuomintang High Command urgently summoned the 25th Division and the 64th Division to dispatch 4 brigades to reinforce Nanma. On the 19th, the enemy's 25th and 46th divisions arrived at the Yujiagu and Niuxingu lines south of Nanma, and were blocked by our Seventh Column. Huang Baitao was punished by Chiang Kai-shek for his poor command during the Battle of Menglianggu, and this time he has to take the blame and make meritorious service.Before the attack, he ordered artillery fire to bombard our hilltop position. After the infantry began to attack, the artillery fire hit our army deep.The enemy took turns to charge, using 3 battalions of troops on a hill, the first batch was defeated, and the second batch was dispatched immediately.The enemy army not only attacked during the day, but also sent small troops to attack at night, so that our army could not get a rest. Under the powerful offensive of the enemy, Qizong fought bravely and tenaciously, and all the ammunition replenished in Menglianggu was poured on the enemy. Under the cover of superior firepower, the Kuomintang defenders, relying on dense bunker groups, stubbornly resisted and fought repeatedly, and the battle was extremely fierce.The offensive verticals had a lot of ammunition failure due to moisture, and the equipment for attacking the fortifications was insufficiently prepared, resulting in heavy casualties.From the war to the 20th, only Beibudong, Matougu, Beiliujiazhuang, Shagouzhuang, Laopohe and other places were captured. On the morning of the 21st, Huang Baitao's 25th Division broke through the 750 Heights of the 60th Regiment of the Seventh Column, and the Seventh Column transferred to the second-line defense. That night, the East China Field Army planned to organize another attack. In the east, Li Mi's 8th Army invaded Linqu from Changle and Weixian areas, threatening the rear of the East China Field Army and supporting the Nanma defenders.It is difficult to wipe out the enemies trapped in the Nanma area in a short time.In order to gain the initiative, they withdrew from the battle that night, and each column moved to the southwest and south of Linqu for rectification. The Nanma battle was a fierce battle, and the four columns of Huaye suffered heavy casualties, so they should have rested for a period of time.However, the enemy's 8th Army occupied Linqu and blocked our army's rear passage to the north of the Jiaoji line, posing a threat to the liberated area.Su Yu learned that the enemy's 8th Army had just arrived in Linqu, and there were only general fortifications, and the main force had not yet arrived. He could take advantage of its unstable foothold and annihilate it to boost the morale of our army.So he ordered the second, sixth, and ninth verticals to besiege Linqu City, and the seventh vertical to block the aid. The ministries are scheduled to launch a battle on the 24th. Linqu is an ancient city surrounded by mountains on three sides. Rivers such as the Yi River and the Mi River flow by the city. Usually the water is shallow and you can wade everywhere.However, when heavy rains and flash floods occur, traffic is blocked. On the afternoon of the 24th, when various parts of the road entered, there was another downpour, mountain torrents broke out, the river rose sharply, and the movement of the troops was hindered. That night, part of the Second Column attacked the South Pass of Linqu City; a division of the Ninth Column went straight to Longgang from the north of Linqu City, and the main force launched an attack at dawn on the 25th and broke into the North Pass; the Sixth Column also attacked Longgang and Ngushan. With the cooperation of the 27th Division of the Ninth Column, the enemy defending the area was annihilated, cutting off the enemy's retreat in the direction of Weixian. On the 25th, the second and ninth columns attacked the city; the sixth column attacked and wiped out the enemies in the northeast periphery of Linqu, and the 19th Division of the seventh column attacked Qushan. On the 26th, the Nine Columns occupied Sushan, the commanding height outside the city, and the battalion commander defending the enemy fled back to the city, where he was shot dead by Li Mi.The 5th Division of the 2nd Vertical broke into Nanguan that day and blasted many places on the city wall.Due to the rain and humidity, the explosive package failed.An assault even exploded 5 times, and the explosive package did not ring. Under the urging of the Huaye Command, the 5th Division organized another assault at night, blasting the city wall open, and the 14th Regiment quickly rushed into 7 companies.However, because the firepower points on both sides were not cleared, they were quickly blocked by enemy firepower.The second column broke into the city and was surrounded by the enemy and was in trouble. Li Mi used two regiments of the Kuomintang army to carry out a counter-assault. Seven companies of our army fought for 3 hours. Most of them suffered casualties due to the exhaustion of ammunition. The Sixth Column and the 27th Division of the Ninth Column cooperated to capture the strongholds of Longshan and Zhaihushan in the northeast of Linqu, and wiped out part of the enemy. At this time, the 9th Division and the 64th Division of the Kuomintang Army's reinforcement troops began to reinforce Linqu, and fought fiercely with the Seventh Column.In order to resolve the battle as soon as possible, Su Yu ordered the Seventh Column to strengthen the blocking force and transferred the Sixth Column to participate in the siege. At that time, the Mi River swelled rapidly, and the river swelled rapidly. The six verticals ventured on foot, and many personnel and equipment were washed away by the rapids and submerged. They did not reach the west of the Mi River until the night of the 28th. On the evening of the 29th, the second, sixth, and ninth columns launched a general offensive with all their strength. Although they fought bravely, they failed to break through the city wall due to damp ammunition, insufficient preparation of attacking equipment, and insufficient coordination.The direction of blocking aid was also due to insufficient troops, and the east-west line of Sanchadian was breached by the enemy, making it difficult to buy time to ensure the safety of the siege troops.In addition, the troops have been fighting continuously for half a month, and they are very tired, with heavy casualties. At the same time, affected by flash floods, it is extremely difficult to send food and supplies forward and transport the wounded.Therefore, the East China Field Army was determined to withdraw from the battle. In the Battle of Linqu, although more than 7,000 people from the 8th Army of the Kuomintang Army were annihilated, the expected goal of annihilating the enemy was not achieved. The battles of Nanma and Linqu were two fortified battles organized and carried out by the East China Field Army's interior troops on the eve of turning into a strategic offensive.These two battles played a certain role in cooperating with the strategic offensive of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army and the operations of the field army's outside troops.However, due to many subjective and objective reasons, the predetermined campaign determination was not realized. Although more than 18,000 Kuomintang troops were wiped out, more than 21,000 people were killed and injured, which became a war of attrition. On the evening of the 30th, each column moved to the north of Jiaoji Road and Zhucheng area, trying to rest and replenish for another battle. Several battles in July were not fought well, and Su Yu felt heavy.He analyzed the gains and losses of several battles, and believed that the combat operations after the "July division" mobilized and dispersed the enemy, disrupted the enemy's deployment of maintaining the "key attack" on Shandong, and cooperated with Liu Deng's army's strategic actions in southwestern Shandong. This is a strategic victory; however, a few battles failed to achieve the intended operational objectives, resulting in battles of attrition, which cost a lot. We should carefully sum up experience and lessons, and as the commander in charge of the campaign, we should blame ourselves. On July 30, while the troops were on their way to transfer, Chen Yi, Su Yu, and Tan Zhenlin sent telegrams to Zhang Yunyi, Rao Shushi, and Li Yu, and reported to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Liu Bocheng, and Deng Xiaoping, reporting that they had abandoned Linqu. , after review, report in detail.” At the beginning of August, the Huaye command organization was transferred to the Yidu area. Chen Yi, Su Yu, and Tan Zhenlin discussed together how to sum up experience and lessons and write a report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.Chen Yi and Tan Zhenlin proposed that Su Yu draft the telegram draft of the preliminary summary of the Nanma and Linqu campaigns. On August 4th, Su Yu drafted a telegram on the preliminary summary of the battles of Nanma and Linqu to report to the Central Military Commission, blaming himself. Chen Yi was very disturbed by this.He always believes that if the battles are not fought well, each other is responsible, and Su Yu cannot bear the responsibility alone. At this time, Chen, Su, and Tan had researched and determined that Tan Zhenlin would organize a command organization to lead the second and seventh columns to Jiaodong for rest.Before departure, Tan Zhenlin took the time to write a letter to Su Yu, talking about his views on the battle, and asked Chen Yi to forward it.Chen Yi read the letter in front of Tan Zhenlin, and prepared to exchange views with the three of them.However, due to the imminent move of the headquarters, no time can be arranged. That night, the field army headquarters arrived at Guodian via Linzi Xiguan and Suozhen.Chen and Su had a long talk all night after dealing with other urgent official duties. On August 6, Chen Yi sent a telegram to the Central Military Commission and the East China Bureau, discussing his views on the failed battles and his evaluation of Su Yu.Telegram says: "I think our party has created not many outstanding military strategists in the past 20 years. Recently, Su Yu and Chen Geng have emerged one after another. They have a bright future and will march forward side by side with Peng (Dehuai), Liu (Bocheng), and Lin (Biao). The great harvest of our party and the people. The two battles were not completely victorious, and they shared the responsibility for each other, so it is not a disease. Tan and I based this point of view, and studied each other's lessons, and Su also agreed....Su has always been responsible for the guidance and deployment of our campaigns, In the past, the victors used this method. In the recent battles, I did not foresee them in advance, and there was no way to save them. Afterwards, we should be responsible together, so we can learn lessons so that we can fight again. Military defeats are unavoidable, and humbly accepting them will be even more important. The basis of great victories." On August 11, Mao Zedong drafted a telegram for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to Chen Yi, Su Yu, and Rao Shushi. He believed that Chen Yi's telegram on August 6 "sees exactly what he sees, and he fully agrees with it." Obstructing strategic tasks, the current overall situation is favorable."