Chapter 14 Chapter Thirteen Bloodshed on the North Han River

When the Volunteers successfully retreated northward, people would never have imagined that a disaster was coming to them!risk!The Three Corps was cut off by the enemy.The most precious time related to the fate of the 180th Division disappeared in Chaos' brain.Army Commander Wei Jie saw the 180th Division besieged and tried his best, but there was still nothing he could do.Soldiers collapsed under the tracks of enemy tanks one by one... Zheng Qigui finally realized soberly: It's over!The 180th Division will be written off from the formation sequence of the Volunteer Army.The commander of the 60th Army back then lamented how...

After the end of the five battles, our Volunteer Army and the main force of the Korean People's Army were ordered to withdraw northward. At this time, the biggest problem facing our army is that the logistical support cannot keep up.Due to the enemy's aerial bombardment, transportation was inconvenient, and the ammunition and food supplies needed by the troops were in serious difficulties.Under such harsh war conditions, volunteer soldiers regard the interests of the motherland and the people as the highest interests, highly carry forward the spirit of revolutionary heroism and the spirit of international communism, in order to destroy more enemies, they would rather go hungry I don’t want to be “hungry” with guns, and every time I march to war, I always “have more bullets and then more, and less provisions and then less”.However, even so, the food and ammunition brought by the troops barely lasted 7 to 10 days.

After repeated defeats, the U.S. Li Army began to turn its attention to the rear supply of the Volunteer Army.After studying the rear supply problem of our volunteer army, Li Qiwei, commander of the US Eighth Army, formulated a new tactic in the name of "Saturday Offensive": when our army was attacking, he relied on his cars and tanks to deliberately fight Withdrew sideways to consume our army's ammunition.And about a week later, when our army was short of food and ammunition, he used his mechanized troops to stick our army tightly like a magnet.In this regard, Li Qiwei euphemistically called it "magnetic tactics".

At this time, the five battles had just been fought, and our volunteer army was retreating northward in a large scale, so Li Qiwei focused on this opportunity, with a ferocious and smug smile on his face: OK!The opportunity to implement "magnetic tactics" has come. On the morning of May 23, Li Qiwei concentrated the strength of 13 divisions from 4 armies, led by a "task force" composed of motorized infantry, tanks, and artillery, and with the support of a large number of aviation and long-range artillery, he began to plan. , Crazy counterattack with deployment. Originally, the transfer of our volunteers to the north was an initiative to return to the division in victory. However, at this time, because the commanders at all levels underestimated the scale and situation of the enemy's planned violent counterattack, and our army was the division after the victory, the whole Paralyzed thinking prevailed throughout the army, which led to the lack of careful organization and planning of the troops' northward withdrawal.To make matters worse, because the troops did not arrange alternate cover, the radio station of the Third Corps was blown up by enemy planes, and the troops under it lost command for 3 days, and there was chaos on the central front of the Third Corps.In addition, some commanders lacked the knowledge of modern arms, and did not pay attention to destroying bridges when deploying cover troops at the front, and did not use firepower to block the road well. As a result, once the enemy broke through our front, they could drive straight in and advance deep into me within 3 days 50 to 80 kilometers!

A grim situation emerged. On May 24, Zhisi Headquarters received a report: Our 12th Army Headquarters and its 2 subordinate divisions, the main force of the 27th Army and the 180th Division of the 60th Army were cut off by the enemy. The area south of the "March 8th" line has been surrounded by the enemy on three sides... On the night of the 26th, the Sixtieth Army Headquarters. The 60th Army is also an old unit of the North China Military Region, and was temporarily assigned to the Third Corps after entering the DPRK. At this moment, Army Commander Wei Jie felt very heavy.Prior to this, he had just learned that the 180th Division was besieged.The 180th Division was attacked on three sides, and the North Han River was behind it. It was really a last stand, and the 180th Division was in a critical situation!No, the 180th Division must break out of the encirclement!Wei Jie didn't want to think too much, and immediately instructed the radio operator to send a report to the 180th Division: "It is planned to order the 181st Division to rescue you from the east of Huachuan. Make your department resolutely break through to the northwest..."

After the 181st Division received Wei Jie's order at 23:30 that night, it immediately issued a deployment to the regiments to assist the 180th Division.However, at this time, the telephone line from the 181st Division to the regiments was cut off, so they had to pass orders to the regiments on foot.Due to the dispersal of the troops and the heavy rain, the troops received the departure order as late as 2:30 on the 27th, and did not arrive at the Hwacheon, Woncheon-ri, and Kyunju-ri lines 4 hours later.However, it was too late, the enemy had already occupied this area before me. The 181st Division organized troops to attack from the front, but it was impossible. At this point, the plan of the 60th Army to assist the 180th Division went bankrupt.

The 180th Division was in danger of running out of ammunition and food, and was in a dilemma. Zheng Qigui, who had just been promoted from the director of the division's political department to division commander before the war, had no choice but to face the immediate situation of the troops. In fact, when the 180th Division was just cut off by the enemy, if Zheng Qigui could calmly organize his troops to actively break through, the current situation could be completely avoided.The situation at that time was only that the enemy's motorized infantry surpassed the front of the 180th Division, there were no enemies behind or in the middle, and it was completely possible to stand out at night.However, Zheng Qigui misjudged the situation and did not act decisively. At the critical moment, he hesitated to send a message to the 60th Army Command to ask: Can we retreat to the Bukhan River?The reply from the Army Command was: Receive the instructions of the Corps and order your troops to defend on the spot south of the North Han River to cover the retreat of the wounded.

At that time, there were as many as 8,000 wounded who had not been transferred by the Volunteer Army! Zheng Qigui at this time has always strictly adhered to the unique principles of the party's political cadres: the orders of the superiors are everything, and violations of the orders of the superiors are never allowed.Obviously, he lacks the ability and courage that a military commander should have, especially the ability to adapt to changing situations.As a result, the most precious time related to the fate of more than 10,000 people in the 180th Division disappeared forever in his chaotic brain.

Facing the impact of the enemy's powerful artillery fire, the 180th Division was scattered.So far, the troops have had no food for 3 days, and only rely on the wild vegetables on the mountain to satisfy their hunger.And many people are poisoned after eating by mistake because they can't distinguish the poisonous wild vegetables... Some fighters began to desert.The enemy used the captured personnel of the 180th Division to shout to the 180th Division's position on the plane to persuade them to surrender. The headquarters of the 180th Division began to burn documents and codebooks, and the division, the 538th Regiment, the 539th Regiment, and the 540th Regiment also began to burn documents...

Zheng Qigui instructed the operator to send the last telegram to the army headquarters: The 180th Division will disperse to break through and fight on their own.Afterwards, the radio station was destroyed, and the weapons were thrown at the passing Bukhan River... Night came in the desolate rain.The trumpeter blew the bugle for the last time, and the sobbing and low-pitched sound of the horn echoed over the 180th Division's position.Zheng Qigui informed the 180th Division to disintegrate automatically, and the officers and soldiers voluntarily united and divided into multiple groups to search for a way out in various directions.

Division commander Zheng Qigui and deputy division commander Duan Longzhang led hundreds of people to break out from the northeast.Supporting their bodies suffering from hunger, cold and exhaustion, they slipped step by step and crossed hills and walked into a long and deep ravine. touch in front of you. It was almost dawn, and the rain was still falling.They finally walked out of the ditch mouth, and there was a small forest in front of them. Looking at the flat land in front of them, Zheng Qigui let out a long breath, and then shuddered—his whole body had been drenched by rain for some time. Got soaked.At this time, an instinctive desire to survive came back to his heart, and he was full of energy. He greeted everyone, and walked towards the woods with big strides... Suddenly, a low roar of motors sounded from the woods. Before Zheng Qigui came back to his senses, dozens of tanks had rushed out of the woods, and then the tanks fired.The rumbling tanks rushed left and right with the rattling sound of the tracks turning, and soldiers collapsed under the tracks of the tanks one by one... Zheng Qigui was desperate, he screamed and ran to the depths of the woods like crazy, at this moment, Zheng Qigui realized soberly: It's over, everything is over!The 180th Division will soon disappear from the formation of the Volunteer Army. ... As of May 30th, Zheng Qigui, the commander of the 180th Division, Duan Longzhang, the deputy commander, and some scattered personnel have returned to the team, a total of less than a thousand people! A reorganized division with a total of 11,000 people, the 180th Division lost more than 10,000 troops in this campaign, and more than 5,000 of them were captured!This is the most captured volunteers in the Korean War. For this, Peng Dehuai was very sad and very angry.Afterwards, he lost his temper at a meeting of leaders above the military level held at the headquarters of the Volunteer Army, and confronted Wei Jie, the commander of the 60th Army: "You Wei Jie, how did you become the commander of the army? When you ordered the troops to retreat, you knew that you would pass the telegram. , why not arrange it?" "Also, your 180th Division could have broken through. Why did you say you were surrounded? The enemy just passed in front of you. What's the big deal? The enemy passed by during the day, but we were still there at night. The world!... How can you smash the radio station and burn the password like you?!" For this, Peng Dehuai himself felt deeply guilty.When he summed up the defeats in the later stages of the five battles, he once said: "Hong Xuezhi once gave me his opinion on how to play the fifth battle, but I didn't accept it. Now it seems that Hong Xuezhi's opinion is correct." The guilt was palpable.From this, we have seen Marshal Peng Dehuai's uprightness and his courage to face up to himself. Indeed, under the ever-changing conditions of modern warfare, it is very necessary to sum up experience and learn lessons in a timely manner according to the balance of forces between the enemy and the enemy and changes in the battlefield situation.For this reason, many years later, when Wei Jie seriously summed up the battle, he shared some of his understandings frankly: 1. The operational motivation of the campaign is good. I want to destroy more of the enemy's vital forces and occupy more areas, which is conducive to peace talks. However, in combat guidance, I have the idea of ​​underestimating the enemy and paralyzing it. I have not implemented the principle of measuring the enemy and using troops to determine the objectives and tasks of the campaign It exceeded the combat capability of the Volunteer Army. At that time, the enemy army was equipped with mechanized equipment, fast maneuvering, strong firepower, and absolute air supremacy, while our army was still inferior in equipment. The troops moved on two legs, and a replenishment of ammunition could only last about 7 days. To deal with enemy armored tanks, In addition to explosives, a company has only a few rounds of Molotov grenades, and the number of artillery at all levels is very small. Under the situation of such a disparity in strength, our army should not be too large in each battle. It is bound to disperse the firepower of the troops, and the depth is large, and the material support and maneuverability of the troops are bound to be insufficient. The campaign was launched too early, the counterattack was too wide open, and the troops leaped far away from the rear, failing to seek advantages and avoid disadvantages. In the second stage, we failed to achieve the expected goals, failed to know ourselves and the enemy, misjudged the enemy's attempts, did not consider our difficulties enough, did not consider the most difficult and complicated situation, did not conceive more combat plans, and prepared more. The method of dealing with the enemy by hand is specifically reflected in the early stage of the battle. There is no accurate analysis of the enemy's retreat. We only see the enemy's superficial retreat and fail to see through the enemy's retreat. Therefore, commanders at all levels lack multi-handed preparation.For example, when the 180th Division was ordered to cover the transfer of the wounded to the south of the North Han River, the enemy had already launched an attack. The division thought that the enemy was "taking offense as defense" and did not adjust its deployment in time to cope with the new situation.Furthermore, combat units are not adequately prepared for changes in targets. Our three corps participated in five battles, which was the first time they fought against the US army in North Korea. On the one hand, the troops entered North Korea in a hurry and were not prepared in all aspects; Therefore, they are very uncomfortable with the maneuvering speed of the enemy's mechanized troops, and cannot judge the enemy's intentions according to the new situation in battle, and make correct decisions to deal with them.It is impossible to quickly switch combat styles, unable to quickly concentrate forces, and strive to take the initiative. 2. The deployment of troops is scattered, and there is no strong reserve team at all levels. During the battle, our counterattack troops deployed on the front line, pushed forward flatly, did not form fists in the counterattack, and did not focus on blocking. Stamina, there is no oil to add after the troops are exhausted. On May 23, when the enemy took advantage of our army's transfer to counterattack across the board, our army was once passive across the board.At the beginning of the battle, the 60th Army was the left-wing echelon of the Corps. After the second phase of the campaign was launched, the Corps divided the three divisions of our army into three divisions under the command of the Corps, the Twelfth Army, and the Fifteenth Army. There is no mobile force in the middle, and combat operations are greatly affected.When blocking the enemy's northern invasion, although the three divisions were ordered to return to the establishment, their positions were scattered and far apart. Objectively, the entire army could not adjust its deployment according to the new situation. The entire army was still deployed on the 30-kilometer front. Lack of toughness, when the 180th Division was besieged, the remaining two divisions were still in the northeast of Chuncheon. The mountains were high and the roads were narrow, making it difficult to move and rescue in time.If the 180th Division and the 179th Division can be quickly transferred to the area north of the North Han River to organize defenses side by side when the battle is over and the evacuation is over, the 181st Division can be used as the second echelon, and at the same time strengthen ties with friends and neighbors, the situation will be favorable much.When the 180th Division was surrounded, the Third Corps did not have any mobile forces and could not reinforce the 60th Army to rescue the 180th Division.The Corps' defense area itself is also in a very dangerous situation and cannot provide support. 3. Failure to choose a good blocking position and implement key defenses.An enemy with inferior equipment resisting superior equipment must have a good position to rely on.When our army shifted from counterattack to defense, it failed to arouse sufficient awareness of this and lacked experience, which gave the enemy an opportunity to take advantage of.The 180th Division stopped the enemy in the south of the North Han River and fought against the water. The terrain conditions were extremely unfavorable, and they failed to guard the road with elite troops, allowing the enemy to break through the defense line and drive straight in.When a certain regiment of the 181st Division defended the Fuzhu Mountain position, it did not focus on the main peak of the highland for defense. As a result, the main peak was occupied by the enemy, and the enemy was condescending, and our troops were forced to withdraw. Fourth, the organization and command are not strict, and the coordination with friends and neighbors is out of balance.In the five battles, the organization and command of the troops were not taken care of, and the formation of the troops was chaotic, which had an extremely adverse impact on the combat operations of the troops. At the end of the second phase of the campaign, the Corps ordered our 60th Army to take defense. When the order was received, our troops were quite scattered, and there were no combat troops in the army. Although the divisions were ordered to return, they could not be gathered in a short time. The 181st Division was more than 120 kilometers away from the military headquarters, and it took several nights to return to the construction. The 180th Division was counterattacked by the enemy in the direction of Gapyeong, and it was trapped and unable to return to the construction. At the same time, the Corps did not return the division. The task of transporting the wounded was assigned directly by the Corps to the division.The Corps lost contact with the armies for three days from the 23rd to the 26th, and only the retreat route of the 179th Division was consistent with the army headquarters.As soon as the division arrived near the military headquarters, the enemy tank troops had already arrived in Hwacheon.At that time, the military headquarters ordered the division to block the enemy's northward invasion along the road in the hilly area north of Mapingli, which defeated the enemy's spirit, but the 179th Division also suffered heavy casualties.Later, President Peng said in a meeting at the headquarters: "The 60th Army is flexible and can use the 179th Division in this area to block the enemy. Otherwise, the enemy will insert the Chuncheon highway behind Wonsan Port, and the consequences will be even worse. serious." Practice has proved that in the battle of large corps, the cooperation of neighbors is very important. On May 23, when the 180th Division was attacked by the enemy, the neighboring troops suddenly retreated without prior notice, exposing the flanks of the 180th Division even more. The unfavorable situation of being attacked by the enemy and fighting with one's back. 5. There is no guarantee of communication and communication, and the command is often interrupted.Throughout the campaign, the communications could not be kept smooth. The reasons were, firstly, that the communication organization was not perfect, the equipment was outdated, and the technology was not high; They are used together, so that important tasks are issued and emergency reports are not smooth. The communication of the radio stations of the divisions was also interrupted many times. Some lost contact all day long, some telegrams were not sent, and some received telegrams and could not be translated in time, resulting in command failures, delayed fighters, and caused passivity. Sixth, the logistical support capability is poor, and the combat operations of the troops are greatly restricted.During the battle, the enemy completely controlled the air, and bombed and closed our communication lines. During the battle, our army went far ahead (the 60th Army moved 200 kilometers forward at the farthest), far away from the rear, it was difficult to supply, and it was difficult to evacuate the wounded. The troops usually It can only maintain the combat capability for 7 days, which brings great difficulties to combat operations and blocking the enemy's counterattack.The enemy is very clear about our situation.In the previous stage, they retreated and lured me forward, and then counterattacked after our ammunition was exhausted.This profound lesson must be remembered.When the 180th Division broke through to the north, some troops ran out of ammunition and food, ate wild vegetables and weeds, poisoned and starved to death. 7. The main leaders of the 180th Division were in distress and panicked, and their command was improper.After the division was besieged, the majority of cadres and soldiers performed well. Many commanders and fighters showed heroism of being brave, tenacious, resolute and brave, fighting hard, not afraid of sacrifice and fighting the enemy to the end.However, the main cadres in charge of the division were politically shaken, panicked, greedy for life and afraid of death, lost the troops, and fled alone. Regarding the responsibility for the loss of the 180th Division in the five battles, the head of the Military Commission Headquarters has long come to a conclusion. In October 1952, Premier Zhou said to me in person: "Comrade Wei Jie, you are not responsible for the failure of the 180th Division." Mr. Peng also said at the party committee of the Zhisi Division: "In the five battles, the 60th Army The handling of the situation was correct." Nevertheless, I always feel the need to make a serious memory of this real situation. I have experienced 43 battles and 525 battles in my life.There are lessons from success and lessons from failure.It is of great significance and the responsibility of a veteran to truly recall and summarize the experience and lessons that the 180th Division exchanged for their blood and lives in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea and leave them to future generations. As the commander of the 60th Army at that time, Wei Jie's focus may be more practical and specific.Whether right or wrong, here, we do not make rash comments.However, the above information provided by Wei Jie will definitely give us new enlightenment for our comprehensive understanding of the disaster that the 180th Division encountered.