Chapter 11 Chapter IX The Battle of Nanchang

Before the Battle of Wuhan, the Japanese base judged that after capturing Wuhan, controlling the heartland of China, annihilating the main force of the Chinese army, capturing Guangzhou, and cutting off China's international supply lines, the Nationalist government could be forced to surrender.But the reality is contrary to its wishes.After the fall of Wuhan, the main force of the Chinese army was neither wiped out nor the Nationalist government surrendered. The battlefield behind enemy lines in North China had been opened up, and guerrilla warfare was widespread.At this time, the army used by the Japanese army to invade China has reached 24 divisions and 1 flying group; in Northeast China, there are also 9 divisions for defense against the Soviet Union; in Japan, there is only 1 guard division group.With the current force, it is no longer able to launch a large-scale advance.Therefore, in the "Guidelines for War" formulated by the Japanese base camp on November 19, 1938 and the "Proposal for Handling Incidents in China" formulated on December 6, it was decided to abandon the strategy of quick battles and adopt a strategy of protracted operations. Under the principle of "not expanding the occupied area", use local limited offensives, strategic bombing, and cut off China's international supply lines to attack the national government's will to resist the war; and use powerful troops to annihilate the rear guerrilla forces to maintain "law and order" in the occupied areas; China's manpower and resources, "use China to control China", maintain the occupation of China; at the same time strengthen the political offensive, support the puppet regime, and seek to end the war.Based on the above principles, the "Guidelines for the Army's Operations in China" formulated by the Japanese Army's General Staff Headquarters stipulated that in North China, "to ensure the main lines of communication" and "to carry out large-scale mopping operations in the occupied areas."For this reason, in Central China, "6 divisions were retained, and the rest were transferred to North China", while South China was "replaced with garrison troops one by one, and the main force was transferred to North China"; In addition to public order, "combat troops deployed in the Wuhan area, in coordination with the navy, ensured the traffic from Yuezhou to the lower reaches of the Yangtze River, and used the three towns of Wuhan and Jiujiang as bases to destroy the enemy's attempts to resist the war. The combat areas were roughly set as Anqing, Between Xinyang, Yuezhou, and Nanchang"; in southern China, "with the purpose of intercepting China's supplies, deploy a minimum force."

After the Battle of Wuhan, Chiang Kai-shek, chairman of the Chinese Military Commission, held military meetings of senior generals in Nanyue, Hunan and Wugong, Shaanxi, to review the gains and losses of the previous War of Resistance, analyze the enemy's situation, and believed that the second phase of the War of Resistance in the future would be to turn defense into offense and turn defeat into period of victory.In order to adapt to the requirements of the war situation, the operational policy was re-determined, the various theaters were re-divided, the deployment of troops was adjusted, the formation of the army was sorted out, and the command level was simplified.The corps and regiments were abolished, and the army was used as the strategic unit. From the headquarters to the army, there were only two levels in the middle: the theater and the group army.The infantry division was gradually changed from 2 brigades and 4 regiments to 3 regiments.At the same time, the camps of Hunan, Guangxi, Shanxi, and Gansu were merged, and two camps in Guilin and Tianshui were reorganized to uniformly command the operations of the two battlefields in the north and the south. On January 7, 1939, the military policy of the "National Army's Second Operation Guidance Plan" issued by the Military Commission is: "The national army should strengthen the forces in the enemy-occupied areas with one part, and actively launch extensive guerrilla warfare to contain and consume the enemy. The main force should be deployed on the key lines of Jiangxi, Hunan, Jiangxi, Xiangxi, Yuehan, Pinghan, Longhai, western Henan, and western Hubei, and try to maintain the current situation. When it is necessary, it should also be near the current ground line to contain the enemy as much as possible , gain more time, and launch a large-scale offensive after the training of new combat power is completed."

Nanchang is the capital of Jiangxi. It is located in the south of Jiujiang, between the Ganjiang River and Poyang Lake, and adjacent to the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Railway in the south. It is one of the important strategic bases of the Ninth Theater.During the Battle of Wuhan, the 11th Army of the Japanese Army had the task of attacking Nanchang.However, because its 101st and 106th divisions were frustrated when they advanced along Nanxun Road, especially the 106th division was almost wiped out in Wanjialing, so they failed to complete the task and were stopped on the north bank of Xiushui.Based at Nanchang Airport, the Chinese Air Force often attacked Japanese naval ships sailing in the Yangtze River near Jiujiang, posing a great threat to the rear supply and communication lines of the Japanese army in Jiujiang and Wuhan.After the Japanese army captured Wuhan, in order to cut off the communication lines from Zhejiang, Anhui, and Jiangxi via Zhegan Road to the rear, and relieve the threat to Jiujiang and Yangtze River waterways, they occupied Nanchang Airport to shorten their strategic bombing voyage to southern China, and decided to attack again In Nanchang, the 101st and 106th Divisions are still the main attacking forces.Due to the heavy losses of these two divisions, they had to rest and replenish before they could fight, so they planned to launch an offensive along Nanxu Road in March 1939.

In order to ensure the success of the offensive, during the preparation period, Okamura Ningji, the commander of the 11th Army, sent the Chief of Staff Miyazaki and others several times to take planes to reconnoite the terrain and the defensive system of the defenders, the status of fortifications, the deployment of troops, and the location of heavy weapons. etc. Based on this, the point of crossing the river (repairing the river), the route of march, and the direction of the main outburst are selected.In order to increase the intensity and speed of the attack, Neiji Okamura changed the previous method of assigning field heavy artillery and tanks to each division and using them separately, and the army used them in a centralized manner and unified command; at the same time, he changed the distribution of tanks in the infantry battle formation. Go straight forward, cover and guide the traditional tactics of infantry attacks, organize the tanks into a tank group, and at a distance of 2 days in front of the first-line troops, with the support of aviation, conduct long-distance detours, break through the defense line of the defenders, and open the way for the troops tactics.The artillery directly supporting the offensive of the 101st and 106th divisions was commanded by the commander of the 6th Field Heavy Artillery Brigade, Sumida Laishiro, and was subordinate to the 10th, 13th, 14th, and 15th Field Heavy Artillery Wings, and the 101st, 101st, and 15th Field Artillery Battalions. The 106th Regiment, the 11th Regiment of Independent Mountain Artillery and the 2nd Battalion of Siege Heavy Artillery have a total of 170 artillery pieces. In addition, the 2 divisions also have 112 artillery pieces and 8 mortar squadrons attached to the regiment , a total of more than 300 doors.The chariot group is commanded by the captain of the 5th battalion, Hiroyoshi Ishii. It has 2 chariot groups and 1 reserve team, with a total of 135 chariots.In order to make it easier for the two divisions in the main attack direction, Okamura Ningji also ordered the 16th Division in Anlu, Hubei, the 9th Division in Yueyang, and the 22nd Division in Hangzhou to attack Nanchang. , to attack the Chinese army in front of them respectively, so as to create the illusion of the Chinese army and disperse the troops, so as to reduce the pressure on the main attacking troops.In addition, order the 6th Division in Ruoxi, the naval forces in Poyang Lake, and the 116th Division, each with a force, to attack Anyi and Sandu Towns in the east and west of Ruoxi respectively at the beginning of the attack on Nanchang. and the Duchang area along the east bank of Poyang Lake to carry out attacks in order to cope with the main attack direction.Deploy the 101st Division to cross Xiushui from Yongxiu, and attack Nanchang along the railway and the west side of the railway; the 106th Division crosses Xiushui from Aicheng and Qiujin in the northwest of Yongxiu, and crosses Fengxin to the west of the 101st Division. Cross the Ganjiang River to the south of Mijie, detour to Nanchang from the south, and cut off the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Railway.

After the re-division of the Ninth War Zone, the commander-in-chief is still Chen Jia, but because he is also the head of the Political Department of the Military Commission, Xue Yue acts as his deputy.The units they belong to are: the 19th Group Army (Luo Zhuoying, governing the 79th, 49th, 70th, 78th, and 32nd Armies), the 31st Group Army (Tang Enbo, governing the 13th, 18th, 92nd, 37th, and 52nd Armies) Army), the 1st Group Army (Long Yun, under the jurisdiction of the 58th, the new 3rd, and the 60th Army), the 27th Group Army (Yang Sen, under the jurisdiction of the 20th Army), the 30th Group Army (Wang Lingji, under the jurisdiction of the 72nd Army), the 20th The group army (Shang Zhen, under the jurisdiction of the 54th, 53rd, and 87th armies), the guerrilla commander-in-chief of the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi border area (Fan Songfu, under the jurisdiction of the 8th and 73rd armies), and the theater directly under the 74th army (Wang Yaowu).A total of 52 infantry divisions are the main combat force.Before the start of the Battle of Nanchang, the deployment of troops defending Nanchang was as follows: Luo Zhuoying, commander-in-chief of the 19th Army, commanded 11 divisions including the 70th, 49th, 79th, 32nd and Ding 5th Divisions, east of Ruoxi, Xiu The south bank of the water stretches from the west bank of Poyang Lake, defending side by side from west to east. In the theater, Wang Lingji, commander-in-chief of the 30th Army, commanded 6 divisions including the 72nd, 73rd, and 78th Army. Xiushui on both sides, defending from the west of Ruoxi to the east.

On March 18, 1939, the Japanese artillery group began test firing and fire reconnaissance. At 16:30 on the 20th, artillery preparations began, and about 2 hours of rapid attack shooting and sabotage shooting were carried out. The 106th Division was led by Qiulu, and the 101st Division was led by Tujiabu. The 76th Division of the 79th Army, the 105th Division of the 49th Army, and the 142nd Division of the 32nd Army fought fiercely all night. By 7 o'clock on the 21st, they occupied a beachhead about 2 kilometers deep and covered the engineers to erect the pontoon bridge. At about 8 o'clock, the chariot group passed the pontoon bridge, and the 106th division attacked the Wuguling defenders. At 21:30 on the 22nd, the vanguard went out to Fengxin and occupied the Liaohe Bridge outside the South Gate.The sudden attack of the chariot troops prevented the city defenders from withdrawing the 38 artillery pieces deployed on the outskirts of the city, and retreated in a hurry.Due to the exhaustion of fuel, after the plane dropped the fuel, the chariot group continued to go south, and after reaching Gulougang, it turned eastward and arrived at the Ganjiang Bridge in the west of Nanchang City on the 26th.The 106th Division of the Japanese Army occupied Anyi on the 23rd after the Chariot Group. The main force turned eastward via Fengxin and Dacheng. After crossing the Ganjiang River, after fighting, they occupied the railway south of Nanchang; their 111th Brigade turned from the south of Fengxin to the west to attack Gao'an.The main force of the 101st Division of the Japanese Army detoured through Wanjiabu and Huangxi to Shengmi Street in the southwest of Nanchang, and crossed the Ganjiang River on the 26th; its 101st Brigade passed through Cigu and Lehua along the Nanxun Railway, and arrived in Nanchang City on the 26th. The north bank of the Ganjiang River in the northwest. On the 27th, the 101st Division of the Japanese Army and the Chariot Group attacked Nanchang from north to south.The troops of the 32nd Army of the Defenders withdrew to Jinxian and Linchuan.Nanchang was occupied by the Japanese army.

After the Japanese army broke through the Xiushui position, the Ninth War Zone ordered the 1st Army and the 74th Army, which controlled the Liuyang, Liling, and Changsha areas, to reinforce Nanchang. Arriving at Huibu and the area east of Gao'an on the 27th, they encountered the 111th Brigade of the 106th Division of the Japanese Army, and Yudi implemented defense.After several battles between the Japanese 111th Brigade and the 51st Division of the 74th Army, Gao'an was occupied on April 2. The 6th Division of the Japanese Army, which was in charge of supporting the Nanchang operation, crossed Xiushui from Ruoxi on March 21.The main force attacked Wuning, and its 36th brigade attacked Yangzhou.The 30th Army Group defending the Wuning area used the mountains to fight tenaciously.The progress of the Japanese army was difficult, and it was only on the 23rd that they entered the area of ​​​​Xinning Town, about 4 kilometers east of Wuning.Its 36th Brigade entered Jing'an on the 27th after a fierce battle with the 19th Division of the defenders in Yangzhou on the 24th.Because the battle in Nanchang was over, and its main force was blocked east of Wuning, it quickly returned and turned to attack Wuning. On the 29th, the 6th Division captured Wuning, and after fierce fighting, until April 5th, its 36th Brigade entered the south bank of Xiushui in Wuning.

In early April 1939, the Military Commission ordered the theaters to launch the "April Offensive" (also known as the Spring Offensive) to harass and contain the Japanese army, and ordered the Ninth Theater and the Third Theater to plan a counterattack against Nanchang.The forces used are the 1st, 19th, and 30th Army Groups of the Ninth Theater and the 32nd Army of the Third Theater, a total of about 10 divisions, under the unified command of the 19th Army Commander-in-Chief Luo Zhuoying. On April 17, Chiang Kai-shek telegraphed his "Strategy of Nanchang Plan" to Bai Chongxi, director of the Guilin camp, and asked for opinions.Its combat policy is: "Attack the enemy along the Nanxun line with the main force first, really cut off the enemy's contact, and then take a direct attack on Nanchang. The timing of the attack is scheduled to start on April 24." The main content of the deployment of its troops is: Order 1 The Group Army (Gao Yinhuai) and the 74th Army of the 19th Group Army (Yu Jishi) advanced to the Nanxun Railway between Xiushui and Nanchang via Fengxin and Dacheng areas, completely disrupting traffic, cutting off enemy reinforcements, and jointly attacking Nanchang; order the 19th The 49th Army of the Group Army (Liu Duoquan) advanced to Gao'an one by one and became the general reserve; ordered the 32nd Group Army (Shangguan Quxiang) to attack Nanchang from the east of the Ganjiang River with 3 divisions, and organized 1 regiment of troops, Attack Nanchang by means of a surprise attack.Order the 30th Army (Wang Lingji) to attack Wuning. On April 18, Bai Chongxi called Chiang Kai-shek again and put forward his own suggestions on the deployment of troops, with slight changes, emphasizing surprise attacks.He also believed that "the attack time should be advanced and implemented as soon as possible, and it must be around the 22nd at the latest." At this time, the deployment of the Japanese army in Nanchang was as follows: the 101st Division defended the areas between Nanchang, Xiangtang, and Gao'an; the 106th Division Guard the area between Anyi, Fengxin and Jing'an; part of the 6th Division guards Wuning.

On April 21, troops from the Ninth Theater were the first to move.The 1st Army attacked Fengxin with the 184th Division of the 60th Army and the New 10th Division of the 58th Army, and monitored the Japanese army in Jing'an with the New 11th Division of the 58th Army; Each of the 49 armies crossed the Jinjiang River in the north and attacked Dacheng and Shengmi Street.After fierce fighting until the 26th, the Japanese army retreated to Fengxin, Qiuling, and Xishan Longevity Palace. The 19th Army captured the strongholds of Dacheng, Gao'an, and Shengmi Street, but it was difficult to make progress thereafter.The attack was blocked, and the troops of the two armies failed to advance to the Nanxun Railway as planned.

The 32nd Group Army of the Third Theater crossed the Fuhe River to attack Nanchang on April 23 with the 16th, 79th, 5th and 10th Reserve Divisions of the 29th Army.After fierce fighting until the 26th, Shiyi Street (Nanchang South) was conquered, and Nanchang was approaching. On the 27th, the Japanese army concentrated the main force of the 101st Division to launch a counterattack. With the support of heavy artillery fire and aviation firepower, the two sides launched a bloody battle in the southeast and southern suburbs of Nanchang, repeatedly competing for the villages in the area.Duan Langru, the commander of the 79th Division, changed the offensive deployment on the night of April 28 due to heavy casualties, and reported to the army and the group by telegram.The commander-in-chief of the 32nd Army Group changed the plan without authorization, and was dismissed for investigation with the approval of the Third Theater. On May 1, Chiang Kai-shek issued an order: "...Duan Langru delayed the military plane, and the army will rectify the law. He Ping (the commander of the 16th Division) will do his best. It is limited to capture Nanchang before May 5, and the commander-in-chief of Shangguan should go to the front Supervise the battle." On May 2, the 102nd Division regained Xiangtang and then conquered Yi Street in Shishi. The 16th Division once captured Shatanbu, but was captured again under the counterattack of Japanese reinforcements.Shangguan Yunxiang then put the 26th Division into battle and launched another attack on May 4.The battle lasted until the evening of the 5th, when the 5th Reserve Division attacked the outer positions of the city and destroyed the barbed wire fence.Due to the intensive fire attack, the casualties were heavy, and they were unable to continue the attack.The 152nd Regiment of the 26th Division broke into Xinlong Airport at dawn on the 5th and destroyed 3 Japanese aircraft; the 155th Regiment rushed to the railway station at 9:00 on the 5th, but was blocked by Japanese fire and counterattacks. On May 6, the main force of the 106th Division of the Japanese Army, supported by aviation, artillery, and tanks, attacked the 29th Army on the outskirts of Nanchang and Liantang.At 17:00, the 29th Army was surrounded, Liu Yuqing, the commander of the 26th Division, was wounded, Chen Anbao, the commander of the 26th Division, and Xie Beiting, the commander of the 156th Regiment, died.According to the actual situation on the battlefield, Xu Zhixu and Liu Yuqing, chief of staff of the 29th Army, saw that it was impossible to complete the task of capturing Nanchang. In order to prevent the troops from being wiped out, they decided to break out of the siege at Zhongzhouwei and Shiyi Street.A regiment of the 5th Reserve Division entered the city in plain clothes, but was also forced to withdraw because there was no follow-up troops to respond.

After Chiang Kai-shek gave the order to capture Nanchang on May 5, Xue Yue, acting commander of the Ninth War Zone, believed that since the defense of Nanchang had not been supplemented after the war and the weapons and equipment were far inferior to the enemy's troops, the weapons and equipment had an absolute advantage. It is also impossible to capture Nanchang according to the subjectively determined time when the enemy conducts offensive operations based on the fortifications.But he did not dare to directly put forward different opinions to Chiang Kai-shek, so he called Chen Cheng on May 3 to state his views.He said: "The attack on Zha Nanchang and Fengxin began on April 23rd, and it has been eleven days. Because our army's equipment is not as good as the enemy's, and the enemy's heavy weapons, mechanized troops and aircraft, etc. It is possible to cooperate with the enemy's army in combat everywhere, so it is difficult to attack and destroy the enemy's solid positions. The commissioned telegrams were repeatedly issued: Our army's combat strategy is to consume the enemy, not to be consumed by the enemy, to avoid the real and attack the weak, and achieve the purpose of protracted resistance. Therefore, the attack on Nanchang this time was based on the principle of consuming the enemy and avoiding the real and attacking the weak. We set up an ambush in advance, adopted the method of surprise attack, and attacked from all sides, hoping to take back Nanchang with the most rapid and flexible means. At present, it has been protracted and it is impossible to attack the fortifications. , It is impossible to attack the emptiness. Although the enemy's situation is weak, but it is difficult to achieve the task if it wants to capture Nanchang before May 5. In addition to strictly ordering all ministries to overcome all difficulties and continue to attack fiercely, I would like to talk to the committee on the phone. Elaborate the above situation as Chen Ming." Chen Cheng forwarded the full text of Xue Yue's telegram to Chiang Kai-shek on May 5.In fact, Bai Chongxi, director of the Guilin camp, also believed that the order to conquer Wuchang within a limited time was unrealistic. On May 5, he also called Chiang Kai-shek and He Yingqin, tactfully putting forward different suggestions.He said: "Our army's attack on the enemy must be taken by surprise before it can be effective. Now that the enemy in Nanchang is prepared, and our army has been attacking for ten days, we have also done our best. In order to worry about morale and my highest strategic principle According to the plan, I plan to ask Nanchang to continue the siege with one-third, and organize two-thirds separately. Outside, we will still promote active strategies..." The central idea of ​​the two telegrams is "Use the spear of the son to attack the son. Shield", using the reason that the combat guidance does not conform to the strategic policy, I hope that Chiang Kai-shek will change his order to conquer Nanchang within a time limit.After Chiang Kai-shek received two telegrams and learned of the death of Commander Chen Anbao and the heavy casualties of the attacking troops, he issued an order to stop attacking Nanchang on May 9.At this time, the Japanese army was also unable to fight back due to heavy losses.The Battle of Nanchang ended. In the battle of Nanchang, the Chinese army could neither hold Nanchang in defense nor take back Nanchang in counterattack, but its military and political influence has a positive side.The Battle of Nanchang made the whole world—especially the Japanese military authorities realize that although the Japanese army occupied the three towns of Wuhan, they could neither force the Nationalist government to surrender, nor wiped out the main force of the Chinese army, let alone destroy the resistance of the vast number of Chinese soldiers and civilians. will.The Chinese army not only continued the war of resistance, but also began to carry out counter-offensive within the scope of the campaign. This is a new development since the July 7th Incident.It is a pity that because some senior generals are out of touch with theory and practice, or lack excellent strategic and tactical qualities at all, they have made many mistakes in combat guidance and command, such as misjudging the enemy's situation and terrain, choosing The main defense direction of the Japanese army (Nanxun Railway) is far from the main assault direction of the Japanese army (the Xiushui area). Some armies (79th Army, 49th Army, etc.) deployed a division as the front line, with a defense front as long as 15 kilometers. , and the main force of the army is deployed at the 1 day's journey behind the front line, which violates the spirit of taking the army as a strategic unit and the commander of the army should directly command the battle.Another example is that the combat plan emphasized the capture of Nanchang by means of a surprise attack, but the actual operation became a battle of fortified positions; the plan was to advance to Nanxun Road, completely destroy traffic, and cut off the enemy's reinforcements. In fact, the three divisions were used as isolated strongholds of several Japanese troops far apart. As a result, no troops were able to enter Nanxun Road, so that while the enemy was exhausted, he was exhausted too much.This was not inevitable.