Chapter 61 1. Du Yuming went to the Northeast again

Just when Changchun was about to be peacefully liberated, Du Yuming, who had left Shenyang dejectedly as early as July 8, 1947, returned to Shenyang. Du Yuming left the battlefield in Northeast China at that time. There were reasons why he suffered consecutive defeats and felt uncomfortable, and there were also factors that caused him to become ill and needed treatment.After nearly a year of medical treatment and recuperation in Shanghai, his body basically recovered. In June 1948, Chiang Kai-shek let him go to the battlefield again.Not long after he took office, Jinan was besieged, and Chiang Kai-shek asked him to relieve the siege of Jinan. He quickly mobilized the Second Corps, the Sixteenth Corps, and the Thirteenth Corps to reinforce Jinan.Before all the reinforcements had moved in, Jinan had already fallen into the hands of our East China Field Army.When he was commanding the aid corps to turn around and turn to Xuzhou, Shangqiu and other places, on October 15, Chiang Kai-shek suddenly called him and asked him to stop commanding the troops, wait at Xuzhou Airport, and fly to Shenyang together.After a while, he disagreed again, and another special plane came to pick him up to Shenyang.He didn't know what was going on, but he had to go anyway.In the afternoon, he arrived in Shenyang.Almost at the same time as he arrived in Shenyang, Jinzhou was completely conquered by our Northeast Field Army.

Just before Du Yuming arrived in Shenyang, Chiang Kai-shek also arrived in Shenyang. Chiang Kai-shek went to the northeast to make the final deployment when the war situation in the northeast was very critical.What Chiang Kai-shek could do at this time was to write two personal letters in Shenyang, and send planes to Zheng Dongguo and Fan Hanjie, the two deputy commanders of the Northeast "Suppression General" who were trapped in Changchun and Jinzhou, because both of them had reached the most critical juncture. .Chiang Kai-shek's order to Zheng Dongguo was to break through as soon as possible, and the order to Fan Hanjie was to be able to abide by the rules, but not to break out of the siege.

When Du Yuming arrived in Shenyang, Chiang Kai-shek didn't tell him why he wanted him to come to Shenyang, nor what he wanted him to do, and he didn't even appoint him a position.But Du Yuming, who has followed Chiang Kai-shek for many years, knew in his heart that it must be that Lao Jiang was too dissatisfied with the war situation in the Northeast, and Wei Lihuang, the military chief in the Northeast, wanted him to come again in this defeat where no one could recover. Presided over the Northeast military, clean up the mess.Therefore, when Chiang Kai-shek told him the content of the two letters sent by plane just now and asked for his opinion, he did not make any statement, but said: "At present, the situation between the enemy and ourselves is unclear, so it is difficult to express opinions." It is clear: Changchun has no possibility of breaking through, and if it does not stand out, it will be wiped out soon, and Jinzhou is in a dilemma.More importantly, the defense and abandonment of the capitals of Changchun and Jinzhou are related to the overall situation of the war in the Northeast. Chiang Kai-shek did not even go through the cutscenes to ask Wei Lihuang for advice, so he directly ordered and leapfrogged the command. The battle in the Northeast will be even more difficult in the future.However, there is one thing he understands. It is a foregone conclusion that Chiang Kai-shek will abandon him and use him.In the future, this mess in the Northeast battlefield will only be supported by him and Liao Yaoxiang.Therefore, he didn't want to talk more with Chiang Kai-shek, he just wanted to talk to Liao Yaoxiang, because Liao Yaoxiang was his old colleague and subordinate after all.

There were two major events that Du Yuming could not have imagined at the time: (1) when Chiang Kai-shek was talking to him in Shenyang, Jinzhou had been completely conquered by our Northeast Field Army; (2) also when he was talking to Chiang Kai-shek, Changchun The 60th Army is negotiating the details of the uprising with the siege troops of the Northeast Field Army. At this time, Liao Yaoxiang was not in Shenyang, but in Xinlitun, which he had just captured. For several months, there have been obvious differences between Chiang Kai-shek and Wei Lihuang on the issue of whether to let the large corps in the Shenyang area go west to aid Jinzhou.Chiang Kai-shek believes that Jinzhou is important. As long as Jinzhou is defended, the connection between North China and Northeast China will be guaranteed, and the sea channel of Huludao will be preserved. In the future, no matter from land or sea, they can still enter the Northeast. There is still hope.Therefore, Chiang Kai-shek asked Wei Lihuang to form a powerful westward corps with Shenyang's army to aid Jinzhou in the west.Wei Lihuang believed that although Jinzhou was important, it should be mainly supported by North China, because the passage from North China to Jinzhou had always been in the hands of the Kuomintang.If we want to aid Jinzhou from Shenyang to the west, we have to cross several large rivers, and these areas have already been occupied by the Chinese Communist army. The progress cannot be smooth, and it is likely to be surrounded and eaten.The defense of Changchun is already very difficult. If the defenders of Shenyang are withdrawn, it will be difficult to defend. If Changchun and Shenyang fall, there is nothing left to defend in the northeast.If he, the commander-in-chief of the Northeast "suppression general", is asked to preside over the Northeast military and defend the Northeast when the main force is taken away, it is tantamount to embarrassing him, making him responsible for the loss of Changchun and Shenyang, and helping Chiang Kai-shek Can't bear the big crime of the Northeast.Under the circumstances that this disagreement could not be resolved for a long time, Chiang Kai-shek insisted on going his own way and insisted on following his own plan. Regardless of the existence of Wei Lihuang, he directly ordered the establishment of the Westward Corps on October 3, and ordered Liao Yaoxiang, the commander of the Ninth Corps, to be the commander. , led Shenyang's New First Army, New Third Army, New Sixth Army, Forty-ninth Army, Seventy-first Army, as well as cavalry brigades, artillery, armored vehicles and other troops, a total of more than 110,000 people, on October 8 in Juliuhe, Xinmin The area was concentrated and attacked westward on the 12th.In this way, Chiang Kai-shek put the most important and final burden on the Northeast battlefield on Liao Yaoxiang.

Since the railway has already been cut off by our army, and the vast area between Shenyang and Jinzhou has been completely controlled by our army, the progress of Liao Yaoxiang's large troops is not smooth.However, since the main force of our army was placed in the Battle of Jinzhou at this time, the Liao Yaoxiang Corps still captured Zhangwu on the 13th.On the day Du Yuming arrived in Shenyang, on October 15, Liao Yaoxiang captured Xinlitun, another important stronghold near Zhangwu.On this day, Jinzhou had already been conquered, and the so-called aid to Jin had lost its practical significance.

On the morning of October 16, Du Yuming, Deng Wenyi, director of the Political Work Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense, who was sent by Chiang Kai-shek to the northeast to understand the situation, and Hou Teng, director of the Second Department of the Ministry of National Defense, arrived in Xinlitun and met with Liao Yaoxiang and several army commanders.Since all contact with Jinzhou had been cut off at this time, everyone present estimated that Jinzhou had fallen.What's next?Some advocated withdrawing to Shenyang, while others advocated advancing to Yingkou.If Yingkou can be captured, the army can be withdrawn to the interior by sea. Liao Yaoxiang holds this view.According to Du Yuming's original consideration, as long as Jinzhou can defend for a while, attack Jinzhou from both sides of Shenyang and Huludao, and possibly relieve the siege of Jinzhou, the battle can still be fought.Now that Jinzhou has been lost, the only way to go is to withdraw from Yingkou, because it can still preserve some strength. If it is necessary to return to Shenyang at this time, it will still be a slow suicide.However, the plan to withdraw from Yingkou is tantamount to giving up the entire Northeast, and Chiang Kai-shek will not agree to it at present.

On October 18, Chiang Kai-shek came to Shenyang to study the Northeast War situation again.Chiang Kai-shek still insisted on marching westward to Jinzhou. At the meeting, Wei Lihuang's chief of staff, Zhao Jiaxiang, strongly stated that it is not appropriate to attack Jinzhou at present. And Bao Shenyang's plan.Du Yuming did not make a clear statement, but he was inclined to Zhao Jiaxiang's opinion in his speech.Chiang Kai-shek had no choice but to say "you study and study" and left Shenyang for Peiping.Liao Yaoxiang couldn't get an order to advance or retreat, so he had to put an army of 110,000 in the Xinlitun area on standby.

On October 19, Chiang Kai-shek held another military meeting in Beiping to study the war situation in Northeast China.In addition to Wei Lihuang and Du Yuming who rushed from Shenyang, Fu Zuoyi, the commander-in-chief of the North China "suppression general", also participated.The meeting lasted for four or five hours, but Chiang Kai-shek and Wei Lihuang still couldn't unify their opinions. Du Yuming still preferred Wei Lihuang, and Fu Zuoyi didn't express his opinion.Under such circumstances, Du Yuming proposed a compromise plan, that is, the Liao Yaoxiang Corps would still attack forward, if it could capture Jinzhou, it would capture Jinzhou, and if it could not, it would turn to Yingkou. Come down to cover a possible retreat of Liao Yaoxiang's corps to Yingkou.This plan was reluctantly agreed by Chiang Kai-shek.Chiang Kai-shek wanted to formally appoint Du Yuming to his position and ask him to go to the northeast immediately.Du Yuming refused for a long time with various excuses, but at Chiang Kai-shek's insistence, he accepted Chiang Kai-shek's announcement on the afternoon of the 20th that he would serve as the deputy commander-in-chief of the Northeast "Suppression General" and the commander of the Jire-Liaoning Border Region.Chiang Kai-shek also decided that Du's headquarters should be located in Huludao, and his task was to command Liao Yaoxiang's troops to march westward to Jinzhou and the troops in Huludao to go north to Jinzhou, attack from north to south, and recover Jinzhou.If Jinzhou is really unable to attack, then consider withdrawing from Yingkou.

In this way, Du Yuming returned to the northeast battlefield.Chiang Kai-shek believed in Du Yuming and believed that Du Yuming could carry out his orders.However, Du Yuming understood some truths in the repeated debates in the past few days.He believed that Chiang Kai-shek’s decision to regain Jinzhou was not based on tangible and intangible combat elements such as the enemy’s situation, terrain, the comparison of enemy and our forces, and morale to determine his strategy and tactics. On the contrary, it was first based on his subjective and idealistic judgment.There are four problems that Du Yuming understands: one is that in 1946, Jiang set the policy that Jinzhou should be number one and that Jinzhou must be followed, and he will never change it; Further assistance from the United States; third, Jiang Tai believed in the combat effectiveness of several of his "ace troops" and underestimated the rapid growth of the Northeast Field Army; fourth, Jiang believed that Mao Zedong's battle was not about the gains and losses of one city and one place based on empiricism. Defending the city has never been interested. As long as a fierce attack is launched, Jinzhou's Northeast Field Army will retreat.Du Yuming’s above-mentioned understanding was stated in his later memoirs, and it may not have been so clear at the time, but he has already seen from the specific battle situation in Northeast China and the situation introduced by Wei Lihuang that it was obviously inappropriate for Chiang Kai-shek to be stubborn.However, he was Chiang Kai-shek's favorite student and trusted general (during the entire Liberation War, Du Yuming went to the Northeast to participate in the war before the deputy commander-in-chief of Xuzhou's "Suppression General" had not announced his dismissal, and was directly appointed as the "Northeast" The personnel arrangement of the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the "Suppression General" is just one example), he had to accept the appointment given to him by Chiang Kai-shek, and carry out the tasks given to him by Chiang Kai-shek.Du Yuming said in his memoirs: "Anyway, the country belongs to him, and the army belongs to him. If he wants to lose it, he will throw it away, and if he wants to send it away, he will send it away. If I insist on my opinion and fail to retreat from Yingkou, I will beheaded." sin. As his subordinate, I had no choice but to accept his appointment."

On the afternoon of October 20, 1948, Du Yuming went to Shenyang and commanded the army to fight against our Northeast Field Army for the second time. Du Yuming couldn't think of it at the time, Chiang Kai-shek couldn't think of it at the time, and Liao Yaoxiang didn't pay attention to it at the time (he thought of it at the time, but didn't pay much attention to it, but after he was defeated, he knew it very deeply). After capturing Xinlitun on October 15th, they stopped operations, waited for the result of the dispute between Chiang Kai-shek and Wei Lihuang, and waited for Du Yuming to be re-elected. They waited until October 20th for a new order, wasting five whole days of the most precious time. .The five days when Jiang Wei argued and Liao Yaoxiang stopped military operations were the most precious gift Chiang Kai-shek gave to the Northeast Field Army, which allowed the Northeast Field Army to prepare for the annihilation of Liao Yaoxiang.If it weren't for these precious five days, the Liao Yaoxiang Corps, which had already made plans to retreat from Yingkou, might have slipped away from Yingkou.Has Chiang Kai-shek, who has been in charge of the army for many years, not thought of this issue at all?No, Chiang Kai-shek is not such a poor military strategist. At this time, Chiang Kai-shek made a big empiricist mistake. He believed that the troops of the Northeast Field Army in the Jinzhou area had just fought a big battle, and the casualties were not small. The next big move can only be made with additional time, and he believes that Mao Zedong will not stick to Jinzhou.Therefore, he believes that it is possible for Liao Yaoxiang to take Jinzhou from the west.He didn't expect that in the past few days, our Northeast Field Army had already arranged a big bag to encircle and wipe out Liao Yaoxiang's corps.

Many years later, Liao Yaoxiang wrote in his memoirs: After five days of quarreling, Chiang Kai-shek was forced to abandon his plan, because none of the three people in charge of direct command of the Northeast Army (Wei, Du, and Liao) agreed with his plan, and finally adopted the above-mentioned decision to retreat directly to Yingkou.History proves: it was too late.