Chapter 55 2. Lin Biao wants to "siege Changchun for a long time"

As early as the summer of 1948, Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan and other leaders of the Northeast Bureau had a discussion with the central government about whether to fight Changchun and how to fight Changchun. On May 29, in its report to the Central Committee, the Northeast Bureau put forward for the first time the strategy of "long-term siege and long siege" for Changchun.The report said: Judging from the enemy's combat power, military strength, and fortifications, our army's attack on Changchun will pay the most heavy casualties, and the battle may still be unable to be resolved in the end.This kind of battle is definitely not possible to win with a fierce attack, but must be captured house by house and fort. Twenty or thirty people are unable to continue the offensive; while the enemy can still maintain half of the city, making it impossible for me to attack.At that time, suppressing firepower and fighting for consumption in the city will inevitably lead to a natural cessation of attack and withdrawal, causing serious damage to the strength and morale of the troops.This result is very unfavorable to me. ...We have repeatedly considered over the past few days, and after discussions with the Standing Committee of the Northeast Bureau, we also took into account that the confidence expressed by the heads of the various divisions and divisions in attacking Changchun is not very high. Therefore, we propose to change our determination to attack Changchun hard, and instead attack Changchun with a part The troops have been trapped for a long time.

Both Mao Zedong and Zhu De disagreed with the above opinions, and raised many questions about the above opinions. On June 5, Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou put forward three possible plans to deal with Changchun in their telegrams to the Central Committee: one is to attack, but there is no certainty; Break through and escape; the third is to implement long-term siege and aid with part of the main force.Their proposition is of course the third option. After the Liaoshen Campaign was over, looking back at the above-mentioned opinions of the Northeast leaders such as Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou, it really seemed too cautious and too cautious.This kind of care and prudence was brought to them by the lessons of the two Siping battles and the bloody battle with Changchun in May (in late May, Dongye tried to attack Changchun with two columns, and only captured Dafang Although they were at the airport and several strongholds outside the city, they failed to conquer the strong fortifications of Changchun. Although they eliminated more than 5,000 enemies, they also suffered more than 2,000 casualties).They are the highest command of the Northeast Field Army. After suffering several losses, they do not fight uncertain battles and do not allow the troops to suffer too much loss. This attitude is completely understandable.The grasp and confidence in fighting big cities and large-scale tough battles were fully established after the practice of the Jinzhou Campaign.However, if we compare the telegrams between Lin Biao and Mao Zedong at that time, we can see that Mao Zedong was a head ahead of Lin Biao in terms of observation, judgment and grasp of the overall situation.However, under the specific circumstances at that time, it was precisely out of consideration of the above-mentioned ideological activities of the leaders of the Northeast Bureau that although Mao Zedong and the Central Military Commission did not quite agree with their opinions, they still stated in the telegram on June 7 that "basically Agreed" to their plan.Therefore, the "long siege and long siege" of Changchun became a decision proposed by the Northeast Bureau and approved by the Central Military Commission.

Once the decision is made, it must be resolutely implemented.In order to facilitate the command of the war in North Manchuria, the Northeast Field Army established the First Front Command Post (renamed the First Corps on August 24) in April 1948, with Xiao Jinguang as the commander, Xiao Hua as the political commissar, and Chen Bojun as the deputy commander. Tang Tianji was the deputy political commissar and director of the Political Department, and Xie Fang was the chief of staff. In June, the East Field Headquarters decided that the First Command Post would carry out the task of besieging Changchun. The First Command Post was called the Northeast People's Liberation Army Front Line Siege Command Post.The siege troops used to be dominated by the First Column and the Sixth Column. After June, the Dongye headquarters withdrew the two divisions of the First Column and the Sixth Column to rest (later the First Column went to the Shenyang area, and the Sixth Column went to the Beining line to fight Jinzhou) , with the 34th and 35th Divisions of the 12th Column, the 18th Division of the Sixth Column, the Sixth Division, the Seventh Division, the Eighth Division, the Ninth Division, the Tenth Division, and one artillery regiment, a total of about 140,000 people The siege troops (after the Liaoshen decisive battle began, the siege troops consisted entirely of eleven independent divisions and one cavalry division), under the command of Xiao Jinguang and Xiao Hua, according to the order of the East Field Headquarters "to make Changchun a dead city" Changchun carried out an all-round tight encirclement and blockade.In the instructions jointly issued by Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, Liu Yalou, and Tan Zheng, the specific deployment of the blockade of Changchun is as follows:

(1) Designate a blockade area within 50 miles around Changcheng City. In this area, except for those necessary for military affairs, free passage of people, vehicles and horses should be prohibited.Those who must pass will be made by the county government and issued to the people with a residence permit (military personnel who go out will be issued by the regiment headquarters) for credential inspection. (2) After announcing the severance of commercial relations with Changchun City and the strict prohibition of food, firewood, and other means of living in Changchun (the headquarters will issue a notice), all those who smuggle the above-mentioned materials across the border in an attempt to help the enemy will be detained and the designated agency ( The place belongs to the county, and the army belongs to the regiment) to be confiscated.However, those who hold certificates and the goods they transport flow to our district must be allowed to pass, and they are not allowed to stay in trouble for any reason.Those who have excuses to blackmail or do not follow the prescribed procedures for confiscation must be strictly investigated.

(3) In order to oppose the population evacuation policy of the enemy in Changshi, the people coming out of Changshi must be blocked, and those who can be blocked back must be blocked back, so that the population of the hostile city cannot be evacuated in large numbers and quickly, and its reduction can be achieved Difficulty with food.However, the troops should be warned that they should only dissuade the people who leave the city, and must not beat or shoot. (4) In order to implement the above-mentioned blockade policy, checkpoints should be set up at all large and small crossings to implement interrogation and martial law.Except for those in charge of the army, it is necessary to organize the people to guard against martial law, so that enemy spies, profiteers and counter-revolutionaries have no room to take advantage of.The detailed rules for martial law and interrogation are stipulated by the local army in conjunction with the local government.

(5) Advise residents in the frontier areas of the blockade to store surplus food and materials that are not needed for the time being, so as not to be snatched by the enemy. The instructions from the Higashino Headquarters are very clear and firm.Under such a blockade, the life of the enemy in Changchun will of course only become more and more difficult, and Changchun will inevitably be trapped by our army as a dead city. From June 15th to 20th, our siege command station held a meeting of cadres above the division level in Jilin to fully deploy and study the siege mission. The siege of Changchun is by no means a simple passive siege, but the basic policy of the Central Committee and the Northeast Bureau of "prolonging the siege, launching political offensives and economic struggles, so that they will run out of ammunition and food, and then attack when the hearts of the people are shaken" must be earnestly implemented, Combine military siege, economic blockade and political disintegration.The siege is for future attacks, for better attacks.Therefore, under the leadership of the Northeast Bureau, the military-civilian joint struggle committee jointly organized by the siege troops and the Jilin Provincial Party Committee did a lot of work during the siege.Among them, the most important thing is to carry out a broad and powerful political offensive at the same time as the siege, and put forward slogans such as "oppose the Kuomintang army to grab food and catch people, the people of Changchun unite, and cooperate with the People's Liberation Army to liberate Changchun", through slogans, leaflets (besieged city) The army successively distributed more than 1 million leaflets) and shouted at the enemy to instill it into the hearts of the people in Changchun.Political commissar Xiao Hua of the Siege Command Center also used the famous saying of ancient military strategists at the political work conference, "Attack the mind is the top, and the city is the bottom; the heart is the top, and the military is the bottom" to educate everyone that we must use a strong political offensive to serve the people. Military action clears the way.To this end, the siege command also organized two psychological assault weeks.

Since our army could not enter the city, shouting at the enemy was the main form of attacking the enemy at that time.From the beginning, my siege troops used general shouts like "Welcome to surrender" and developed them into targeted shoutouts that really have a psychological effect, such as "August Mid-Autumn Festival is coming, your parents and wives are looking forward to your return home." Harvesting crops", "There is no food and grass in Changchun, no rescue soldiers outside, only a dead end".In view of the fact that the 60th Army came from Yunnan, the siege troops specially organized the Yunnan soldiers who originally revolted from the 184th Division to speak in Yunnan dialect, such as, “My fellow villagers in Yunnan, we were all deceived by Chiang Kai-shek to be cannon fodder. We are all Children of the working people, stop working hard for Chiang Kai-shek, you are welcome to come here, you will be rewarded for bringing weapons, and you will be given travel expenses if you are willing to go home.”These slogans played a big role at that time.

Not only shouted to the soldiers, but also repeatedly broadcast a letter written by Zheng Dongguo's wife Chen Zelian in Shanghai on the radio of our army: Gui Ting (press: Zheng Dong Guo Zi Gui Ting): Over the past few months, for your safety, people can't forget it all the time, and they can't sleep or eat.In Guiting, it is not the years that make people weak and haggard, but sorrow.I've been in terrible shape for months, and I'm much thinner than before!Gui Ting, is it important that you are trapped in this lonely city?I can't get any real situation, which makes me very anxious.Today I read in the newspaper that the Changchun airport has fallen again, and the situation in Changchun is critical.I think if the central government doesn't give you an idea, you have nothing to do.What's wrong with you?Are you better now?You are so careless.You are doing it regardless of your life, what is it for?It hurts me to think about it all.I am so miserable, what else can I say!God blesses you to be safe, and you should be very safe, because you have always been kind to people and have a better heart, so you should be rewarded with good things.When the autumn wind blows, people are even more worried!

The impact of such broadcasts is hard to overestimate.As a Kuomintang soldier who surrendered to our army said: "I can bear to talk about other things, but when I mention 'home', my heart is broken..."