Chapter 45 8. "Warring is a big problem"

After conquering Yixian, it is time to prepare to attack Jinzhou, and the highlight of the Northeast battlefield is about to begin. In order to facilitate the command, Lin Biao decided to move his headquarters from the Shuangcheng of Heilongjiang, where he had lived and been stationed for more than two years, to the front. On September 30, an ordinary train departed from Shuangcheng, and the field army headquarters and political department staff led by Lin Biao were all on board.For the sake of secrecy, the train arrived at Harbin first. Luo Ronghuan got on the train at a freight station, then drove southeast, and then suddenly went north to Qiqihar after arriving at Lalin Station.The train turned south again at Ang'angxi Station, passed through Baicheng, and arrived at Zhengjiatun Station in Zhangwu. This is a small station, the time is October 2, and the goal ahead is Fuxin.

Chief of Staff Liu Yalou ordered the train to stop at Zhengjiatun Station, and asked the communication personnel to set up radio stations in the field to communicate with the central government and various troops.It was here that the radio station received an "Enemy Situation Bulletin" from the central government, and only then did it know that the situation in the Northeast had undergone new changes. The "Enemy Situation Bulletin" reported the following situation: Since Gu Zhutong was in Shenyang and could not let Wei Lihuang execute Chiang Kai-shek's order to immediately aid Jin, Chiang Kai-shek decided to aid Jin, and Wei Lihuang could not act immediately , Chiang Kai-shek decided to personally conduct the command.He arrived in Peiping on September 30, accompanied by officials including Yu Jishi, Director of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Presidential Office, Zhou Zhirou, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Gui Yongqing, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and Guo Chan, Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Service Command Abbreviation, equivalent to the General Logistics Department of our army), a discerning person can tell at a glance that there is a big move to mobilize troops.Chiang Kai-shek ordered Fu Zuoyi to deploy the three main armies in North China to rescue Jinzhou.Fu Zuoyi could not disobey, but he also said that the North China Corps of the People's Liberation Army was attacking Chasui and could not draw out so many troops. In the end, he decided to draw out only five divisions. Division, independent ninety-five division boarded a ship from Tanggu, Tianjin to Huludao.Chiang Kai-shek also decided that Yantai would no longer defend Yantai with troops. Two divisions of the 39th Army originally stationed in Yantai were also transported to Huludao by sea to join the 54th Army originally stationed in Huludao. Corps", with the cooperation of the air force and navy, attacked from Jinxi to the east to rescue Jinzhou.According to this plan, the Kuomintang troops in North China moved quickly to support the Northeast. On October 2, Chiang Kai-shek flew to Shenyang again. Knowing that Wei Lihuang might not obey completely, he bypassed Wei Lihuang and directly commanded the New First Army, New Third Army, New Sixth Army, Seventy-first Army, and Forty-ninth Army. The army and three cavalry divisions formed the "Westward Corps", commanded by Liao Yaoxiang. Starting from Shenyang, they first attacked the Zhangwu and Xinlitun areas in the west, cut off the logistics supply line of the Northeast Field Army, and then attacked south. The Dongjin Corps in North China jointly attacked the People's Liberation Army that besieged Jinzhou and lifted the siege of Jinzhou.According to Liao Yaoxiang's later recollection, Chiang Kai-shek's purpose was not only to aid Jin, but also wanted to "give the Communist Army an annihilating blow" and conduct a "strategic decisive battle" here. On October 6, Chiang Kai-shek took the "Chongqing" warship to Huludao to make specific deployments, and asked his subordinates to attack Tashan and Jinzhou with the determination to "kill themselves and become benevolent".

The above situation was fully understood only after the war. Of course, Lin Biao could not understand such details and accuracy from the "Enemy Situation Bulletin" at that time.However, the fact that the enemy wanted to add several divisions to Huludao aroused Lin Biao's great concern.What Lin Biao was most worried about was that our army surrounded Jinzhou, and the enemy army surrounded our army from the north and south. This situation finally appeared.In Lin Biao's own words, "only one table of food was prepared, but two tables of guests came", and he couldn't cope.As a result, Lin Biao wavered again when he finally made up his mind to resolutely attack Jinzhou, and immediately sent a telegram to the central government, re-raising the possibility of going back to attack Changchun.However, he let the train carrying the headquarters continue to move in the direction of Fuxin.That is to say, he just wavered and has not stopped attacking Jinzhou.

However, since the telegrams from the headquarters of the Northeast Field Army to the Central Committee were sent jointly in the names of Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou, Luo and Liu had also seen this telegram before it was sent.After the telegram was sent, the more Luo Ronghuan thought about it, the more he felt that it was wrong, the more he felt that it was a mistake. At this moment when the overall strategy has been determined and the war has started, the vacillation at this time will have serious consequences.Therefore, Luo Ronghuan and Liu Yalou went to find Lin Biao and had an in-depth discussion. After Lin Biao also admitted that the telegram sent was inappropriate, the three of them sent a telegram to the central government again, saying, "We plan to attack Jinzhou, as long as we are fully prepared, then If we launch a general offensive, it is still possible to wipe out the Jin enemy, at least one or most of them. At present, it would be a waste of time to go back and attack Changchun. If we don’t attack Changchun, the enemy will also break through automatically. I can regain Changchun, and Can wipe out one part of the enemy."At the same time, in this telegram, he also put forward his own opinions on how to deal with the two-sided attack that the enemy may launch.

Mao Zedong was very angry about Lin Biao's first telegram. Within two hours, Mao Zedong sent two telegrams, once again clearly expressing his unshakable attitude towards the Northeast War situation: "Concentrate the main force and quickly take down Jinzhou. The plan should not be changed." "We don't dare to fight Jinzhou, but want to go back to fight Changchun. We think this is very inappropriate." "We firmly believe that you should not shake the established policy at all. If you lose Jinzhou, don't fight and go to Changchun."Even, Mao Zedong issued a death order, "You should concentrate your energy and strive to capture Jinzhou within ten days, and concentrate the necessary forces to attack Jinzhou and annihilate the four or five enemy divisions that came to aid from Jinxi."It was not until Mao Zedong received the second telegram from Lin, Luo, and Liu that he felt relieved.He said in a reply on October 4: "It is very good and comforting that you are determined to win the championship."

This was a no-nonsense episode that occurred when the war had already begun. As stated in the report to the Central Committee of the Northeast Bureau drafted by Luo Ronghuan later, it was "our determination to attack Jinzhou was once shaken."Although for the entire battle situation, as later generations commented, it was "near danger but not dangerous", but Mao Zedong spoke highly of Luo Ronghuan's role and method in handling this major event. After Luo Ronghuan passed away in 1963, Mao Zedong wrote the poem "Diao Luo Ronghuan Comrade": I remember when flying on the grass back then, every time the Red Army went against each other.

The Long March is not a day of embarrassment, and the battle is a big problem. Anyone who is familiar with Mao Zedong knows that Mao Zedong wrote a poem mourning for a subordinate who passed away. This is the only poem Mao Zedong wrote in his life, which can be said to be an exception.The first two lines of the poem recall the deep friendship they have cooperated with for many years in the Autumn Harvest Uprising, Sanwan adaptation, Jinggangshan base area, and Ruijin anti-encirclement and suppression.The third sentence refers to the critical moment when Zhang Guotao split the Red Army during the Long March. Luo Ronghuan was the acting director of the Political Department of the Third Red Army at that time, and led the Fourth Division and Ten Regiments as the guard, protecting the safety of the Party Central Committee.However, Mao Zedong believed that this major event was "not an embarrassing day", but only "war brocade is a big problem".From this poem, we can see Mao Zedong's high evaluation of the great strategic significance of the Liaoshen Campaign, and Mao Zedong's high evaluation of Luo Ronghuan's role in handling this major event: question."

The opinions of the Central Military Commission and the headquarters of the Northeast Field Army finally reached a complete consensus, and the decisive battle will inevitably proceed resolutely and smoothly.As Mao Zedong said in his October 4th telegram: Some differences of opinion between us and you before that are gone now.According to your deployment at 9 o'clock on the 3rd, I hope you will boldly let go and implement it resolutely, and strive to conquer Jinzhou first, and then attack Jinxi.