Chapter 26 5. Chen Yun came to Qidaojiang

Although the Battle of Xinkailing was won, the situation in South Manchuria became more and more serious.On the one hand, most of the main force of our army has gone to North Manchuria, and the number of troops in South Manchuria is insufficient. Including local troops, the total number is less than 60,000.In addition, the base area has not yet been consolidated and is still shrinking, so it is quite difficult to replenish the source of troops and provide logistical support.On the other hand, the enemy's military strength is very strong. According to his policy of "attacking from the south and defending from the north", Du Yuming concentrated his troops in South Manchuria for use, which put a lot of pressure on me.

When our army wiped out the enemy's 25th Division in Xinkailing, the 52nd Army of the Kuomintang Army not only occupied Andong and Fengcheng, but the 71st Army also occupied Huanren and Tonghua.Tonghua is an important rear base that our army managed painstakingly after entering the Northeast. The fall of Tonghua had a great negative impact on our army's activities in South Manchuria.Under the continuous attack of the Kuomintang army, our southern Manchurian base continued to shrink. By mid-November, only Linjiang (now Hunjiang District, Baishan City, Jilin Province), Changbai, and Mengjiang (to commemorate the Northeast Anti-Japanese Heroes) were left next to the Yalu River. General Yang Jingyu (later renamed Jingyu County) and Fusong were four impoverished counties that did not have a good job and mass base.The severe winter is approaching, and the troops are about to encounter a more difficult situation.

At this time, Chen Yun, who had been in charge of the work in North Manchuria for a long time after entering the Northeast, offered to go to South Manchuria, and Xiao Jinguang, the deputy commander-in-chief of the Northeast Democratic Alliance Army, also asked to go to South Manchuria.After being researched and approved by the Northeast Bureau, the two of them left Harbin on October 27, 1946, and took North Korea via Mudanjiang. As soon as Chen Yun and Xiao Jinguang arrived in South Manchuria, they immediately held a meeting to announce the instructions of the Central Committee and the Northeast Bureau on persisting in the struggle in South Manchuria, and announced the decision of the Northeast Bureau: to establish the Northeast Bureau's South Manchurian Sub-bureau, and to impose strict regulations on the party, government and military work in South Manchuria. Unified leadership.Chen Yun served as the secretary of the Nanman Branch Bureau, Xiao Jinguang served as the commander of the Liaodong Military Region, Chen Yun concurrently served as the political commissar, and Xiao Hua served as the deputy commander and deputy political commissar of the Liaodong Military Region.

At that time, South Manchuria was indeed very difficult and difficult. It was freezing cold, food and clothing were scarce, the troops were seriously downsized, ammunition could not be replenished, the masses had not yet been mobilized, and the base area was greatly reduced. About 100,000 people in the military region, the Liaoning Provincial Party Committee and the Anton Provincial Party Committee, the main force and the local army were compressed into the forest that was only 100 kilometers in length and width.Most cadres and masses in the party and army plan to move to North Manchuria, and have no confidence to continue to persist in South Manchuria.

After some investigation and research, a meeting of cadres above the division level was held on December 11 in Qidaojiang (southeast of today's Tonghua, Jilin Province), chaired by Xiao Jinguang.Xiao Jinguang proposed "to focus on military anti-Qing campaigns, use powerful guerrilla corps to go deep into the enemy's rear, carry out extensive guerrilla warfare, and disrupt the enemy's campaigns. Restoring political power in the vast rural areas, delaying and attacking the enemy's new offensive, concentrating the main force on appropriate positions, and preparing Destroy part of the enemy's attack and cooperate with guerrilla warfare".However, the majority of cadres do not understand or agree, and their thinking cannot be unified.Xiao Jinguang had no choice but to send someone to invite Chen Yun to the meeting.

On the 13th, Chen Yun came to the venue in a heavy snowstorm and discussed with everyone all day.Chen Yun pointed out the seriousness of the situation in South Manchuria, and even pointed out the problems existing in the work in South Manchuria. He compared the current situation in South Manchuria to "a bean oil lamp in a precarious situation."He also likened the Kuomintang army in the entire Northeast to a cow headed towards North Manchuria, and South Manchuria to a cow's tail.He said: If we hold the ox by the tail, the ox will not be able to fight wildly; if we let go of the ox's tail, the ox will go on a rampage.Therefore, we must hold fast to this bull tail and persist in the struggle in South Manchuria.Of course it was difficult, but if we retreated to North Manchuria and crossed the Changbai Mountains in the harsh winter, the troops would inevitably lose a lot, not to mention that the main force would still have to fight and sacrifice when they arrived in North Manchuria.After the main force is gone, the local troops may be completely insecure.If we persist in South Manchuria, although there will be some sacrifices, we can hold back the enemy, attack the enemy, and contribute to the overall situation, not to mention that we are fighting "back to sofa" (referring to North Korea and the Soviet Union).Since many leading cadres of the Three Columns and Four Columns were commanders and fighters of the Red Front Army during the Agrarian Revolution, Chen Yun compared the experience and lessons of the five anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaigns, and encouraged everyone to use Mao Zedong's anti-"encirclement and suppression" tactics to attack the enemy. Take the initiative to hit the enemy's rear.Chen Yun's analysis was far-sighted and realistic. Most of the cadres headed by Xiao Hua were convinced by Chen Yun's analysis and agreed to stick to the decision of South Manchuria. Only then did they unify their thinking and passed the "consolidate the Changbai Mountains and insist on the three major areas behind the enemy" (referring to the military area) According to the general policy of the three divisions to which it belonged, and made a comprehensive arrangement for military operations, it was decided to send the main force to the enemy's rear to attack the enemy on the basis of the base areas of 230,000 people in four counties.On the night when the Qidaojiang meeting ended, that is, on the night of December 14, 1946, the Four Columns, which volunteered to fight behind the enemy, sent 12 divisions to set off from the Henglu area as the first echelon under the leadership of Commander Jiang Xieyuan and Political Commissar Pan Shoucai. , and go in the direction of Haicheng and Zhuanghe.

In the history of the Northeast Liberation War, the Qidaojiang meeting was an extremely important meeting, and in the history of the struggle in the South Manchuria region, it was even more fate-determining.The correct line and strategy adhered to by the meeting were supported by the Central Committee and the Northeast Bureau, and won continuous victories in future struggles.