Chapter 128 2. The Japanese Army's "mopping up" plan

The Japanese North China Front Army aimed to get rid of the Jizhong Anti-Japanese Base Area, which directly threatened the safety of its rear.From 1941 onwards, along with its "policy and order", the Japanese army set up strongholds in important villages and towns in the entire central Hebei region except Shenxian, Wuqiang, Raoyang, Anping, Shenze, Shulu and other central areas. , and built roads extending in all directions and enemy and puppet army strongholds: 3,900 kilometers of partition trenches and 1,300 fortifications were built on both sides of the communication line. In order to cut off the connection with the mountainous area in western Hebei and strengthen the economic blockade of the Beiyue base area, the enemy and the puppet built a blockade line of hundreds of kilometers at the foot of Taihang Mountain in the west of Pinghan Road with a stone wall about 2 meters high and a thickness of about 1 meter connected with blockhouses.In addition, after Okamura Ningji took over as the commander of the North China Front Army, he carried out two consecutive so-called "security strengthening" campaigns. Through threats and deceptions, a large number of unsteady elements were forced to defect, and puppet regimes and guards were established around their strongholds. Army, self-defense regiment and other traitor armed.In this way, the area of ​​anti-Japanese armed activities was greatly reduced, and the military and civilians in central Hebei entered the most difficult stage of the war of resistance.

Subsequently, the Japanese army conducted a large number of investigations on the population, area, roads, rivers, varieties of agricultural products, and the strength and activities of the Eighth Route Army in the central Hebei region, stepping up preparations for a major "mopping up".It is believed that from May to June, the river "is not an obstacle when there is a shortage of water."By the end of May, high-stalk crops such as sorghum and corn, "although it hinders shooting somewhat, it is not inconvenient for troops to see and pass." Through investigation, it is believed that the characteristics of the Jizhong Anti-Japanese Base Area are as follows: First, "Although our armed raid targets the enemy's core cadres, it is difficult to capture small groups of troops scattered in a wide area." Therefore, "must be concealed." Second, "Although the targets of our extermination are such armed forces, most of them are completely integrated with production, making it difficult to distinguish the bandits from the people, and because they rely on the mobilization of the people The joint defense organization established makes it difficult for us to carry out encirclement and surprise attacks at wrong distances." Third, "In the middle of the adjacent non-security areas, there is a security zone, where villagers or Chinese groups appear to assist us. However, we carried out the work of recruiting the enemy secretly, which made it very difficult for us to move our personnel and materials and cut off the enemy’s contact.” (Edited by the War History Office of the Japanese Defense Agency: "North China Public Security War" Volume 2, p. 147, Tianjin People’s Publishing Society 1982 edition)

According to the above investigation, in February 1942, Neiji Okamura held a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the North China Front Army.At the meeting, he said ambitiously: "The 1942 Suzheng Operation Plan is about to be implemented. Regarding the implementation of the Suzheng Operation Plan, the main points are: to be directly commanded by the front army to eliminate the CCP’s plain base in the northern part of Hebei Province, which is the key area of ​​this year’s Suzheng. In one fell swoop, build the area into a security area.” (Japanese Defense Agency War History Room: "North China Security War" (Part 2))

"Beginning in May, we will start two major operations. One is the focus on the Jizhong region, that is, Operation No. 3. The 41st Division directly under the Front Army and the main force of the 9th Brigade and the 27th Brigade will be formed independently. Some troops from the division and the 110th division participated. The other is the Suzheng operation in the Shanxi-Hebei-Henan border area, that is, the No. C operation, which will be executed by the 1st army." Neiji Okamura added. At the meeting, Major Yokoyama Yukio, chief of staff of the North China Front Army’s intelligence officer, also introduced in detail why the Central Hebei region was the main combat target: “The Central Hebei region is the granary in the central part of Hebei Province, and occupies an important position strategically and economically. It has already been deeply rooted here. Since this area has become a base for supplying and cultivating the combat effectiveness of the CCP’s base area in the Taihang Mountains, which lacks agricultural products, it can be considered that as long as this base is strangled, great results will be achieved.” (Japanese Defense Agency War History Room: "North China Public Security War" (Part 2)

In April, Neiji Okamura arrived in Shijiazhuang and reiterated the policy of the "sweeping" operation: "Surprise attack and encirclement operations against the main force of the Communist Army in the Central Hebei area under the command of Lu Zhengcao, destroying their base areas, and at the same time politically Take various measures in terms of economy, economy, and ideology, so as to turn the area into a security area in one fell swoop." (Japanese Defense Agency War History Room: "North China Security War" (Part 2)) In order to realize this surprise attack, Okamura Ningji also launched a series of small-scale feints: On April 25 and 26, he used the Shirataki Rishiro Brigade of the 110th Division stationed on the Pinghan Line to attack Beiyue Yang Chengwu's 1st Military Division launched an offensive; on April 29, two independent mixed brigades, Hayashi Yoshitaro and Yoshida Minetaro, stationed on the Jinpu and Tokushi lines, launched an attack on the Song Renqiong Southern Hebei Military Region Party in the area north of Wucheng. Sudden attacks by political, political, and military agencies were used to confuse the Eighth Route Army and to conceal its intention to "encircle with an iron wall" against Jizhong.

The following is the combat implementation plan formulated in mid-April 1942 (extracted): 1. Combat policy The main force of the communist army in central Hebei, commanded by Lv Zhengcao, was launched a surprise attack to encircle and destroy its base areas. At the same time, various political, economic, and ideological measures were taken to turn the area into a security area... Two, slightly. 3. Key Points of Combat Guidance The first phase of the operation (approximately 10 days from May 1st) Baitaki's troops were in the north bank of the Hutuo River, Ogawa's troops were in Hejian and Suning, and the independent and mixed 9th Brigade was conducting "sweeping" operations in the south of Shide Road. Compress the enemy in the triangular area formed by the Hutuo River, Fuyang River, and Shide Road to prevent the enemy from escaping from this area.During this period, the 41st Division used railway transportation to carry out feints from Shanxi to Handan and Shunde, and then launched in the areas along Shide.

The second phase of the operation (approximately 5 days from May 11) The 41st Division (attached to the independent and mixed 9th Brigade) marched north along Shide Road, Shirataki's troops marched south from the north bank of the Hutuo River, and Xiaochuan's troops advanced from Hejian and Suning to Raoyang, respectively. Attack suddenly, encircle the enemy in a triangle and destroy them. The third phase of the operation (approximately 25 days from around May 16) In the previous stage (approximately 10 days), the combat area was demarcated and raids were repeatedly carried out to eliminate the enemy and its base facilities.

In the latter stage (about 15 days), we will continue to wipe out the remaining enemy forces, and at the same time vigorously promote various construction work.The 41st Division transferred to the security situation in the new combat area, and then officially launched the security work. On April 28, Okamura Ningji formally issued the "May 1st" combat order for the "mopping up" of Jizhong University at the meeting of the corps commanders held.