Chapter 126 8. Inventory

The anti-"mopping up" campaign lasted for more than 50 days. A total of 1,225 Japanese soldiers and 968 puppet troops were killed and injured, and 1 Japanese soldier and 125 puppet troops were captured. , Adhere to the Yimeng Mountain Anti-Japanese Base Area.But the anti-Japanese soldiers and civilians also paid a huge price. More than 1,400 troops were killed or injured, more than 14,000 people were killed or taken away, and 600,000 catties of food were robbed. Although the anti-"mopping up" campaign was victorious, the Japanese and puppet troops were hit and the Yimeng anti-Japanese base area was restored.However, the base area also suffered heavy losses.Luo Ronghuan was very sad about this. On January 22, 1942, Luo Ronghuan called the General Assembly and the Military Commission in the names of Chen Guang, Luo Ronghuan, and Chen Shiju, summing up the experience and lessons of this anti-"mopping up".

Luo Ronghuan and others believed that the serious losses suffered by the anti-"mopping up" were "due to our lack of understanding of the specific situation of the war behind the enemy lines and the protracted nature, cruelty, and seriousness of the struggle for its development." The reason is that before the arrival of the "mopping up", they did not take the experience and lessons of anti-"mopping up" in other regions and (implement) the various instructions of the Central Committee, the General Assembly, and the Military Commission, and made a comprehensive and sufficient mobilization and preparation for the anti-"mopping up" , causing the 'mopping up' to appear in a hurry when it comes, unable to grasp".

The "other areas" mentioned in the telegram refer to the anti-Japanese base areas such as Hebei, Shandong, Henan and Hebei.In the spring and summer of 1941, these places experienced brutal "mopping up" by the Japanese army.The local anti-Japanese soldiers and civilians gained rich experience in anti-"mopping up", such as clearing homes and fields, storing food, evacuating cadres, and dispatching a large number of cadres in a planned way to strengthen the leadership of the armed forces against the masses and anti-"mopping up".However, in Shandong, no attention has been paid to introducing and promoting these experiences.

Luo Ronghuan and others also pointed out that this anti-"mopping up" also reflected "insufficient understanding of the uniqueness of Shandong. Shandong is a triangular struggle area between the enemy and the stubborn. If you think about it, it is impossible for anyone to eliminate the other." "Did not correctly grasp the principle of the Central Military Commission's self-defense stance against stubbornness, which is reasonable, beneficial and restrained", and "abandoned the preparations for 'sweeping' the main enemy" when carrying out the struggle against stubbornness.

"In this Yimeng anti-'sweep', it is fully confirmed that the Central Military Commission pointed out that the struggle between the enemy and ourselves in the anti-Japanese base areas behind the enemy has entered a new and more intense stage. Our struggle policy should be long-term scattered guerrilla warfare, and we must use all means of struggle to deal with the enemy. It is absolutely correct to economize and preserve one's own strength, strengthen the militia and localize all armed forces, and prepare for a coordinated strategic counter-offensive. At the same time, it proves that the method of not adopting flexible guerrilla warfare, but defending villages and villages, purely defending against attacks, and relying on the main force to conquer the world, wants to defeat the enemy first. It is not correct to eliminate stubbornness at once, and to start work after opening the situation."

This anti-"mopping up" exposed problems such as "large organs and poor turnover", "impractical, in-depth, extravagant, formalistic" work style, and problems such as the fact that the head of the organization cannot work without the organization, and the work of the organization is separated from the war.They believe that these phenomena "are the biggest obstacles to work." In this telegram, Luo Ronghuan and others also studied and summarized the new characteristics of the Japanese army's "sweeping" operations, that is, "in order to avoid our detection, the enemy maneuvered more in the afternoon and entered the 20 or 30 miles away from us at dusk. Assemble everywhere, dispatch in the middle of the night, control the hills and narrow roads near our garrison before dawn, and attack our army at dawn." Surrounded by two wings, it seems to have special research on mountain warfare, and is good at using terrain and features", and so on.