Chapter 110 3. Nie Rongzhen formulated an anti-sweeping policy

Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei is the earliest anti-Japanese base area established by the Communist Party of China. It relies on the Beiyue area stretched by Hengshan and Taihang Mountains as the center, and takes the Jizhong and Jidong Plains, which are rich in products and populous, as the bases of cotton grain and soldiers, directly threatening Manchuria, the rear area of ​​the Japanese army that invaded China and the Soviet Union; and the masses mobilized deeply, and the army was strong. At that time, it was recognized as a model anti-Japanese base.In order to consolidate their rear, the enemy Japanese army must conduct a "sweep" on Jinchaji every year in spring and autumn.However, in the past few years, both Sugiyama Moto's "divided advance and joint attack" and Tada Hayao's "cage policy" ended in failure.In the autumn of 1941, the Japanese base camp decided to launch the so-called "Great East Asia Jihad." Commander of the North China Front Army.

During Tada Jun's tenure, Anda 23, chief of staff of the North China Front Army, had already begun to formulate an autumn "sweep" operation plan for the Jinchaji Beiyue District.After Okamura took office, he summed up the lessons learned from the failure of Sugiyama and Tada's "sweeping" operations. In addition to strengthening the public security movement politically, threatening and deceiving the people in the occupied areas from political, economic, and cultural aspects, in order to eliminate our Jinchaji In terms of tactics, the Eighth Route Army adopted tactics such as "encirclement with iron walls", "comb-style suppression", "horseshoe-shaped fortress lines", and "torpedo-style encirclement formations", and "mopped up" the Beiyue area in three steps, in an attempt to eliminate the main force of the Eighth Route Army and capture the border areas. The purpose of the head office of the party, government and military.

The Japanese troops participating in the war and the names of their chief officers are as follows: Ningji Okamura, commander of the North China Front Army, and twenty-three chief of staff Adachi. 1. Offensive Corps, Commander of the 21st Division (C) Tanaka Hisaichi, Commander of the 133rd Infantry Brigade of the 110th Division Takemi Ida, Commander of the 33rd Division (C) Shozo Sakurai. 2. Blockade Corps: Commander of the 108th Brigade of the 110th Division, Commander of the 26th Division (C) Shibashi Kanshiro, Suzuki Shinji, Commander of the 1st Independent Mixed Brigade, Mano Goro, Commander of the 2nd Independent Mixed Brigade, Independent Maori Suehiro, head of the 3rd mixed brigade, Shotaro Katayama, head of the 4th independent mixed brigade, Mineta Yoshida, head of the 8th independent mixed brigade, and Toto Tanaka, head of the 15th independent mixed brigade.

The leading organs of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region have accumulated rich combat experience in the Japanese "mopping up". The commander of the military region, Nie Rongzhen, discovered the symptoms of the Japanese army's "mopping up" in early July 1941. This time Okamura Ningji mobilized more than 70,000 people from 5 divisions, most of 6 brigades and some puppet troops to carry out an unprecedented "mopping up" of Beiyue District, and formulated a plan that was even more powerful than the Battle of Zhongtiaoshan. The most rigorous battle plan centered on the "iron wall encirclement" and various "sweeping" forms such as the so-called "comb-style sweeping and suppression", "horseshoe-shaped fortress lines", and "fish-scale encirclement formations".He also stipulated that the "Three Alls Policy" of "burning, killing, and robbing" the base areas should be implemented.The executioner, whose hands were stained with the blood of the Korean people and the Chinese people, thought that in this way, he could "annihilate the Communist Army in Wutai Mountain" in one fell swoop, relieve his worries, and make North China a "military base" for the Japanese army to launch the Great East Asian War. Human and material resources are used to serve for its invasion of the Soviet Union in the north or launch of the Pacific War in the south.Due to the unprecedented use of troops to carry out the "mopping up", Neiji Okamura called this operation the "Million Wars", which was intended to retaliate against the Eighth Route Army's "Hundred Regiments War". ("Selected Military Documents of Nie Rongzhen", People's Liberation Army Press, July 1992, 1st Edition, p. 158)

On July 10, Nie Rongzhen informed the troops of the military region: The Japanese army forcibly built roads and bunkers in the Hebei-Shanxi border area, and gradually advanced, intending to divide and block our army.In this regard, it is necessary to organize troops to actively attack the enemy's transportation lines and road construction and fortification troops to defeat their plots. On July 14, he clearly reported to the headquarters that two divisions of the Japanese army were transferred to the north along the Ping-Han line, and one was transferred to the west along the Deshi Road, and repeatedly "swept" the areas on both sides of the Ping-Han road. In order to "clarify" North China, the military region is actively making various preparations.

Nie Rongzhen's combat policy for this anti-"mopping up" is: "Amass the basic corps, expand guerrilla activities, take advantage of the opportunity to remove the enemy's strongholds that have penetrated into our interior lines, completely destroy their roads, destroy their blockade ditches, and increase the difficulty of the enemy's "mopping up" , laying the foundation for my victory against the 'mopping up'." On July 22, he issued the military region's combat instruction on preparing for the autumn anti-"mopping up".The instruction pointed out: The enemy's "mopping up" this time will require a large force and a long time, and the method of "stepping forward step by step, clearing and suppressing in different areas" may be used, and the struggle will be particularly cruel.Then they successively issued anti-"sweeping" political work instructions, specific instructions on reconnaissance, communications, supply, and clearing the walls.Order Jizhong to strengthen the "Qingshazhang" offensive to disperse the enemy's forces.Armed propaganda teams were organized in each division to strengthen anti-"sweeping" propaganda, strictly investigate suspicious elements, and crack down on the activities of enemy agents.

The participating troops and the names of the chief officers of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region are as follows: Commander of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region: Nie Rongzhen Commander of Beiyue Military Region: Nie Rongzhen (concurrently) Commander of the 1st Military Division: Yang Chengwu Political Commissar: Luo Yuanfa Commander of the 2nd Military Division: Guo Tianmin Political Commissar: Zhao Erlu Commander of the 3rd Military Division: Huang Yongsheng Political Commissar: Wang Ping Commander of the 4th Army Division: Xiong Botao Political Commissar: Liu Daosheng Pingxi Advance Commander: Xiao Ke Political Commissar: Wu Jinnan

At the same time, it also instructed to mobilize the masses to break roads and dig ditches, fortify walls to clear the fields, and evacuate institutions and schools that lack combat capabilities. The enemy and the puppet regime restored the base area.