Chapter 67 7. Warlord Zhou Shidi summed up the battle in Chenzhuang

Zhou Shidi, Chief of Staff of the 120th Division, who participated in commanding the battle, was from Guangdong Lehui (now Qionghai, Hainan).He actively participated in the patriotic student movement in his early years, and was elected as the secretary of the Qiongya Student Union during the May 4th Movement. In 1922, he joined the "Qiongya Review Society", a peripheral organization of the Communist Party of China in Guangzhou. After graduating from the first phase of the Whampoa Military Academy in 1924, he participated in the formation of Sun Yat-sen's Iron Armored Convoy of the Grand Marshal's Mansion of the Jianguo Army and Navy, and successively served as a trainee, deputy captain, and captain.In December of the same year, he joined the Communist Party of China.Participated in supporting the Quang Ninh Peasant Movement, quelling the rebellion of business groups and warlords, aiding the provincial and Hong Kong strikes, and defending the revolutionary government of Guangdong, etc., and was highly praised by the Guangdong and Guangxi District Committee of the Communist Party of China. At the end of 1925, he served as the commander of the 1st Battalion of the Independent Regiment of the 4th Army of the National Revolutionary Army (Ye Ting Independent Regiment), and later served as the chief of staff, acting head, and head of the regiment. battle.The troops dared to fight tough battles, made outstanding achievements repeatedly, and were known as the "Iron Army". In August 1927, he led his troops to participate in the Nanchang Uprising and served as the commander of the 25th Division.After the failure of the uprising army to go south to Guangdong, he traveled to Hong Kong, Nanjing, Shanghai, Xi'an, Fujian and other places, and participated in planning activities to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek. After the outbreak of the Songhu Anti-Japanese War in January 1932, he participated in the formation of the Shanghai Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army. In 1933, he served as the division chief and head of the 19th Route Army under Cai Tingkai.At the end of the same year, he went to Ruijin, the capital of the Central Soviet Area, to serve as a military instructor at the Red Army University.During the Long March, he served as the chief and captain of the command section of the superior cadres of the Military Commission's cadre regiment.After arriving in northern Shaanxi, he successively served as the chief of staff of the Red 15th Army and the Red Second Front Army, and participated in Zhiluo Town and the Eastern Expedition Campaign.

During the War of Resistance Against Japan, he served as Chief of Staff of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army, Chief of Staff of the Northwest Shanxi Military Region, Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander of the Jinsui Military Region, and assisted He Long and Guan Xiangying in establishing and consolidating anti-Japanese bases in Northwest Shanxi, Central Hebei, and Jinsui Military Region. Participated in the battles of Qihui, Chenzhuang, Huangtuling and Tianjiahui. After the battle in Chenzhuang, Zhou Shidi made the following summary of the battle: The enemy attacked Chenzhuang this time, using light armor, sudden attack, feigned attack, evasive tactics and resolute actions. The enemy's tactical advances.

How did we deal with the enemy's tactics and wipe out his entire army? When the enemy attacked Beitanzhuang on the 25th and 26th in an attempt to confuse and attract our army, our army only responded with one part, while the main force was hidden in a suitable area, and it was not easy to use it until the decisive battle (the time to destroy the enemy) , so that the enemy's feint attack has no effect. On the afternoon of the 26th, the enemies in Beitanzhuang and Wuhe in the north and south all retreated towards Ciyu.On the enemy's side, although it was ingenious, on the other hand, our army seized the opportunity to destroy the enemy, and the main force was dispatched from all directions. With very careful arrangements and swift movements, the enemy was forced to be surrounded.

On the night of the 27th, our army continued to attack Chenzhuang, and the enemy of Chenzhuang was in a panic. When the enemy knew that Chenzhuang could not be occupied and decided to withdraw, the enemy estimated that our army would lie in ambush on the way it came (in the direction of Changyan to the south of Chenzhuang).Therefore, we attempted to move along the river east of the river in an unexpected move, and attack Dazhuang with part of it, in an attempt to expel our army on the north bank of the river and cover its main force to march along the south bank of the river. The Baitou Mountains in Wuhe, North and South, responded violently with a fierce attack, so as to take out the enemy of Chenzhuang. This kind of action is indeed ingenious, and it will make it difficult for our army to deal with it.But our army also estimated that the possibility of such actions by the enemy is the greatest.Therefore, the main force of our army is based on this estimate as the main deployment. At dawn on the 28th, as expected, the enemy retreated to the east and was completely surrounded by me in the Fenggouli area of ​​Pomenkou, while the enemy who was reinforced by Ciyu was blocked by us in the area of ​​Baitou Mountain. , the enemy retreating from Chenzhuang has become a turtle in the urn.

Our army's original plan was to wipe out all the enemies near the broken gate of Fenggouli after the evening of the 28th. However, because most of the grenades of a certain corps were blocked, the battle could not be resolved. Only part of the enemy was wiped out, making the battle difficult. Extended day and night. Due to the remnants of the enemy at Fenggouli's broken gate, they found our main force to the east on the 28th, and then found our army moving on the mountain to the south. Charged towards the southwest highland of the broken gate, trying to escape.When they occupied a few high mountains with good terrain, they thought they were right. In fact, the enemy did not expect that this was just going into the pocket I had arranged. Soon, our main force suddenly appeared in front of the enemy from all sides. When the enemy was completely surrounded in the deep ditch on the high mountain, the "imperial army", who was proud of Bushido, possessed modern equipment and modern tactics, and "learned" my guerrilla tactics, had no choice but to become alien ghosts.

The enemy's mistakes and our army's correctness are the keys to victory.To defeat the enemy, one must make the enemy make mistakes, but who wants to make mistakes?Therefore it is necessary to cause the enemy's mistakes during the battle before the battle.What kind of mistakes did the enemy make in this battle of Chenzhuang?The enemy did not reconnaissance clearly the position of the main force of our army before the battle. (The battle map captured by the enemy only indicated that Ciyu had our army, but the number is unknown. Longtiangou has 100 of our army, and Wenchengtou has 100 of our army There are 600 troops in Tanzhuang in the north and south, 600 troops in Dongchatou, 100 troops in Dongbai Mountain under the temple, 400 troops in Nanpanchuan, it is unknown how many troops are in Shawan, and it is unknown how many troops are in Chenzhuang. ), as for a certain corps of ours who rushed from another area to participate in the battle, it was even more unexpected by the enemy.The enemy basically does not know the strength of our army. This is the enemy's mistake before the battle.

Secondly, the enemy invaded from Changyan on the 27th (should be Changyu), retreated eastward from Chenzhuang on the 28th, and broke out from Pomenkou to the southwest on the 29th. These were all mistakes made by the enemy during the battle.Why can we cause the enemy's mistakes?It is because our army has a correct estimate of the enemy's intentions, and our army's main force is concealed, command is flexible and maneuverable, and its actions are resolute and brave, which makes the enemy's judgment wrong and causes the enemy's wrong action. These mistakes of the enemy sealed their doom, though they still attempted to make a final struggle.Resisted tenaciously, and urgently called for help before he died (for example, I captured the original telegram for help sent by the enemy who was besieged on Lubai Mountain, which said: "Now the saddle on the west side is fighting hard, and your side is worried. I hope to send ammunition and food by plane urgently and increase Send a crusade.") Although the planes did come in response to the call, it was of no avail.During the 6 days and 5 nights of fighting, our army was in an active position everywhere, and firmly grasped the enemy's mistake without letting go.For example, at dawn from the 29th to the 30th, the number of enemies on the Ciyu side increased to more than 1,000 and they occupied Baitou Mountain. However, our army did not change its determination to eliminate the besieged enemies because of this. It is the secondary direction, with the right to deal with the wrong, the victory or defeat will be decided.

Cooperation in all aspects of combat is extremely important. The cooperation between the 120th Division troops and the military region troops: From the 25th to the 30th in terms of time, from the Ciyu area to the Chenzhuang area in terms of space, and in every combat deployment and combat operation, they all played a very good role in cooperation. Follow a battle plan.Especially at dawn from the 29th to the 30th, they jointly charged to Mount Lubai and intercepted them separately until the battle was finally resolved. Not only the cooperation of the regular army is like this, but also the local guerrillas. For example, the Lingshou guerrillas were actively active in the Shawan Yanchuan area, harassing and confusing the enemy, and even wiped out the sporadic escaped enemies, and seized 3 light machine guns ( The Public Security Bureau handed over 1), and captured 1 Japanese soldier.

Moreover, the masses also played a cooperative role. Thousands and hundreds of masses bravely went to the front line to help lift the wounded soldiers, rescue the wounded, and quickly transported them to the rear. They worked nervously under the enemy's firepower. The story of Wuzi, Liu Shangzong, Hao Baozi and other 4 people carrying wounded soldiers on the front line and being honorably wounded, and Luo Qi leading the way.In addition, many people handed over guns and military supplies, and captured the scattered enemies. In this battle, the great strength born of the cooperation of the Eighth Route Army, local armed forces and the masses was indeed demonstrated.We must carry forward this spirit and strength even more.