Chapter 8 7. Differences at critical moments

When the officers and soldiers of the 115th Division headed to the front line in Shanxi were divided into two echelons, and in late September, they successively entered the Shangzhai area near Pingxingguan to hide and wait, an urgent and realistic question was placed in front of the Yan'an High Command and the head of the 115th Division: how to Use force?Should we concentrate our forces on mobile warfare, regular warfare, or spread them out to fight guerrilla warfare? In this regard, Lin Biao, the commander of the 115th Division, disagreed with Mao Zedong. As early as September 14, when the 115th Division arrived at Yuanping Station, Lin Biao had telegraphed Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, and Ren Bishi at the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army, saying: "The 344th Brigade and its divisions will be concentrated in the camp and prepare to wait for the enemy to pretend to attack the camp. After I attacked the enemy's left side with the camera, I wiped out part of the enemy to expand the results of the battle." Obviously, Lin Biao wanted to concentrate his forces to fight big battles and fight mobile warfare.

Lin Biao's telegram was also forwarded to Mao Zedong at the Yan'an High Command. On the 16th, Mao Zedong called Lin Biao and pointed out: "Our army should adhere to the established policy and use guerrilla warfare to cooperate with friendly forces. This policy was decided by Jiang He in Beijing, and Zhou Peng decided in front of Jin and Yan. Basically, this policy should not be shaken." This telegram was also forwarded to Zhu De, He Long and others at the same time. On the 17th, Mao Zedong sent electricity to Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, Lin Biao and others, pointing out: "The Red Army is in the nature of a detachment at this time and cannot play a decisive role in a decisive battle. But if deployed properly, it can play a role in supporting guerrilla warfare in North China (mainly in Shanxi) Decisive."

However, two consecutive telegrams failed to convince Lin Biao, and he insisted on concentrating his efforts on fighting a war of annihilation and a big battle. On the 18th, Lin Biao replied to Mao Zedong, insisting on his own opinion, and proposed: "When the enemy is currently attacking, our vanguard brigade should take combat and annihilate the enemy as the main task." Cooperating with friendly forces on the spot, the division and the Xu brigade should also approach the Chen brigade with the same task, and should not focus on doing mass work for the time being." "At present, it is necessary to fight big battles and capture prisoners to improve the confidence of the army and the people in the war of resistance and improve Party and Red Army prestige."

It can be seen from these telegrams that Lin Biao advocated concentrating the troops to fight big battles, and used most or even all of his forces to cooperate with the Kuomintang army in regular warfare. However, regular warfare with the Kuomintang army as the main body is no longer possible to reverse the crisis, and the Eighth Route Army is too weak. Only by dividing troops to mobilize the masses, creating anti-Japanese base areas, and launching guerrilla warfare can the enemy be defeated. Due to the persistence of Lin Biao and others, perhaps Mao Zedong felt that their opinions were reasonable. On the 21st, Mao Zedong called Peng Dehuai again, expressing his agreement with Lin Biao to temporarily concentrate a brigade to fight, but at the same time pointed out that if there is no time to take advantage of it for a long time, he should still take advantage of it in due course. It is advisable for the center to turn to mass work. "Judging from the situation, even if Lin leads Chen Brigade to win one or two battles, they will soon have to turn to Wutai."

Although Mao Zedong agreed with Lin Biao and the others to temporarily concentrate a brigade to fight, he still did not give up his established strategic policy. On the 25th, he called Zhou Enlai and the heads of the Northern Bureau Liu Shaoqi, Yang Shangkun, and Zhu Rui, clearly stating: "Guerrilla warfare should be the sole direction of work in North China. All work, such as troop movement and the united front, should revolve around guerrilla warfare. We are not responsible for the failure of regular warfare in North China; but we are responsible for the failure of guerrilla warfare. The main responsibility . . . is to tell the whole party that there will be no other work in the future but guerrilla warfare.”

Later war practice proved that Mao Zedong was worthy of being a master strategist, standing higher and seeing farther than ordinary people.