Chapter 6 5. The Eighth Route Army adjusted its combat deployment

On August 22, 1937, the Nanjing National Government and the Communist Party reached a negotiation and cooperation in Nanjing, and the Military Commission of the National Government issued an order to reorganize the Red Army into the Eighth Route Army.During the negotiations, Chiang Kai-shek made concessions in view of the critical situation of the war, agreed to some important opinions put forward by the CCP, and agreed that the combat mission of the Red Army was to serve as a strategic guerrilla detachment, carry out flank operations, assist friendly forces to harass and contain most of the Japanese army, and eliminate them. one part.

The combat mission of the Red Army adhered to by the Communist Party was put forward by Luo Fu and Mao Zedong in a telegram to Zhu De and Zhou Enlai on August 5, 1937, on the eve of the reorganization: the Red Army should undertake independent guerrilla mobile warfare, suppress most of the enemy, and eliminate part of the enemy.Towards the enemy advancing westward along Pingsui and southward along Pinghan, attack the side, disrupt, contain and attack, and assist friendly forces in combat.And sent one, far out of Jehol. On this day, Luo Fu and Mao Zedong also raised the issue of the strategic deployment of the Eighth Route Army: the troops should first send out 1/3 of their troops to the border areas of the four provinces of Hebei-Chahar (Har) and Shanxi-Sui (far) region) as the center, carry out guerrilla warfare on the flanks against the enemy advancing westward along the Pingsui Railway and southward along the Ping-Han Railway, and use another force to move towards the Jire (River) Cha border area, threatening the enemy's rear.

On August 22, at the same time as the main force of the Red Army was reorganized into the Eighth Route Army, Mao Zedong formally assigned the basic tasks of the People’s Army, including the Eighth Route Army, at the Luochuan Conference: 1. Create base areas; Cooperate with friendly forces in combat (strategic detachment mission), that is, cooperate with the Kuomintang army strategically in combat, and adhere to the principle of independence in campaign tactics; 4. Preserve and expand troops; 5. Struggle for leadership in the national revolutionary war. At the Luochuan meeting, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China also passed the strategic deployment ideas of Luo Fu and Mao Zedong.

At that time, the strategic deployment proposed by Luo Fu and Mao Zedong had the strategic intention that all the Eighth Route Army be deployed at the junction of the four provinces of Shanxi, Chahar, Hebei and Sui, with the Hengshan Mountains as the center, and relying on this, they would march south of Chahar and south of Rehe. Developed with western Hebei, went deep into the Pingjin area, deployed on the enemy's flanks and rear, attacked and restrained the Japanese attack, and cooperated with the Kuomintang army to fight on the frontal battlefield. However, when the Eighth Route Army marched day and night to the North China Anti-Japanese Front Line according to the scheduled deployment, the Japanese Kwantung Army Chahar Dispatch Corps, which marched west along the Pingsui Railway, adopted a right-wing detour. After occupying Datong on September 13, it was divided by a The troops continued to advance westward to Suiyuan, while the main force went south along the Tongpu Railway to Taiyuan, in an attempt to cooperate with the main force of the Japanese North China Front Army going south along the Ping-Han Railway and Jinpu Railway to threaten Henan, occupy Shandong, seize the area north of the Yellow River, and occupy the whole of North China. territory.At the same time, they threatened the Kuomintang army along the Pingsui Railway and won the first opportunity.

According to the new changes in the war situation in North China, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Central Military Commission, and the leaders of the divisions of the Eighth Route Army headquarters made a strategic decision to adjust the deployment of the Eighth Route Army after repeated deliberations. On September 17, Mao Zedong sent telegrams to the heads of the Eighth Route Army headquarters and divisions regarding the deployment of the Eighth Route Army, pointing out that the Hengshan Mountains must be the strategic center for the enemy to seize the three provinces of Shanxi, Chahar and Hebei, and dispatch the main force to this center. Our three divisions have already There is no possibility of concentrating in one place in the northeast of Shanxi, and there is no need for it.Therefore, the previous plan to establish all the Eighth Route Army's guerrilla bases in the Hengshan Mountains is no longer applicable.At this time, if the original plan is carried out, all will be in the enemy's great strategic detour. Even if the second step is to withdraw to the Taihang Mountains, assuming that the enemy occupies Taiyuan, it will also be completely passive in the enemy's great detour.In order to deploy strategically in an active position, that is, to deploy on the enemy's flanks, to contain the enemy's attack on Taiyuan and continue southward, and to assist the Kuomintang army in the Shanxi-Sui area so that it does not lose too much strength; to truly carry out independent mountain guerrilla warfare; to mobilize the masses widely. , organize the Volunteer Army, create guerrilla bases, support guerrilla warfare in North China, and in order to expand the Eighth Route Army itself, it is planned to change the original deployment and adopt the following strategic deployment: The 115th Division immediately enters the southern section of the Hengshan Mountains in the northeast of Shanxi with a conscious posture. If the enemy advances southward and the friendly forces fail to repel them, prepare to gradually move southward according to the situation and deploy in the Taihang and Taiyue mountain ranges in southeast Shanxi; the 120th Division should be assembled in Xin County to the north of Taiyuan to stand by and prepare Transferred to the Guancen Mountain area in Northwest Shanxi; the 129th Division entered the Luliang Mountains at an appropriate time; the Eighth Route Army headquarters entered the vicinity of Taiyuan, and determined the appropriate location according to the situation.

According to Mao Zedong's telegram, on September 21, Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, and Ren Bishi jointly issued the "Instructions on Mobilizing the Masses to Launch Guerrilla Warfare", pointing out: Except for the 115th Division and the 120th Division in the Northeast and Northwest of Shanxi, the other The 129th Division was deployed in the Liao County area in the southeast of Shanxi, and deployed in Wutai and Yu counties on the border of Shanxi, Chahar and Hebei with the first unit directly under the headquarters. On September 23, Mao Zedong called the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army and the office of the Eighth Route Army in Shanxi from the perspective of the trend of the war situation and long-term deployment, pointing out: if you are hostile to Taiyuan, you are determined to win.Wutai, Dingxiang, and Yuxian areas are too small.After the enemy entered Taiyuan, they were surrounded by it.Therefore, the 120th Division quickly went to the northwest of Shanxi to take the lead. It was located on the outer flanks of Datong and Taiyuan, and guerrillaized towards Suiyuan and Datong in order to effectively suppress the enemy's southward advance to Taiyuan; In the Taiyue Mountains and the Luliang Mountains (between the Fenhe River in Jixian County), a part of the Northern Shaanxi Army can be dispatched to support them.Guerrilla warfare should be carried out mainly on the enemy's flanks and rear. In Shanxi, it should be in the four areas of Northwest Shanxi, Northeast Shanxi, Southeast Shanxi, and Southwest Shanxi. Towards the enemy entering the central city and main roads, adopt a posture of enveloping and attacking the enemy from all sides. It is not suitable to concentrate on the Wutai Mountains. It is difficult to gain a foothold in one district and concentrate on one district.