Chapter 44 Chapter 4 Only the Strongest Have a Chance to Survive (Shanggao Battle)

Due to inconsistent ideas, the Japanese army in northern Jiangxi and their headquarters appeared to be at odds before the battle was fought.When Okamura was in office, on the eve of every battle, he would take planes, cars, and even motorboats to visit all the participating divisions as much as possible.This time is different. The Sonobu, who is responsible for the actual command, has been sitting in Hankou from the beginning to the end, making orders behind closed doors. Undoubtedly violated the taboo of military strategists. According to the plan, the 33rd Division, 34th Division, and 20th Brigade of the Japanese Army carried out separate attacks from the north, middle, and south routes.

On March 15, 1941, the northern and southern Japanese troops took the lead in launching. The two Japanese troops were responsible for attacking the flanking troops of the Nineteenth Group Army of China, pressing them to the middle road, and finally completing the encirclement and annihilation at Shanggao, which is regarded as the center of Northwest Jiangxi. Not long after the battle began, the Chinese 70th Army, which was fortified on the North Road, received an order to stay and conduct side attacks, and to retreat to the north of Shanggao to join the second-line corps. Although it looks like a simple order, it reflects a major change in China's strategic thinking.

From the battle of Songhu to the battle of Wuhan, until the battle of Nanchang, the habitual tactics adopted by the Chinese army are the traditional single-line defense deployed on the first line.A single line of defense needs to be filled with a large number of troops. During the Battle of Songhu, China mobilized as many as 70 divisions to fill the entire Shanghai defense line. This was the standard strategic thinking in the early days of the Anti-Japanese War. One of its benefits is that it can be defended for a long time at the beginning.However, in modern warfare, there are almost no lines of defense that cannot be breached. Once the front line is breached, it will be unthinkable to go back.The Battle of Songhu was a complete defeat, and there were almost no strong and complete troops to continue to fortify from Shanghai to Nanjing.The battle of Nanchang was the same. When the Japanese army broke through the forward positions, Luo Zhuoying had no reinforcements to plug the loopholes. When the Japanese army was about to approach the city of Nanchang, there were only security teams and a small number of policemen in the city. The main point is that only the police can maintain order.

The result of this is that no one is guarding the places that should be guarded, and some areas that are not critical to the overall situation are often guarded because the troops happen to be sufficient.An American military attache stationed in China who has carefully observed the frontal battlefield analyzed that the Chinese army often easily abandons positions that can be defended by only a few thousand people, but will hold on to a place that cannot be defended in theory for several weeks or even several days. months. The military officer expressed helplessness about this: "They insist on fighting in their own way. It is useless to worry about it." It's like this.

In the case of repeated battles and defeats, the Chinese military's strategies were desperately thinking about changes, and they began to rack their brains to conceive some novel strategic plans.Some people of insight have invariably thought that if a different style of play is used, instead of sticking to the front line, but resisting one by one, retreating to a certain distance, and then fighting the enemy after the arrival of reinforcements, will it be different? Under the action of this tide, the fixed mode of pure defense was gradually broken, and the strategic thinking of "retreating for a decisive battle" gradually surfaced.In fact, during the Battle of Gao'an, Luo Zhuoying already had the consciousness of "retreating for a decisive battle". He did not continue to fill the 74th Army into the Gao'an defense line, but temporarily abandoned Gao'an.

Both the terrain in northern Jiangxi and northern Hunan created conditions for the "retreat decisive battle".Here are either mountains or lakes, and the traffic has been repeatedly damaged, which determines that they are different from plains, and they cannot be exercised anywhere.Movement was limited, and casualties and fatigue along the way, the longer the fighting time, the easier it is for the advancing Japanese army to become the last of its strength, and the easier it is to be repelled by the defenders who are waiting for work. Luo Zhuoying dared to leave a part of the 70th Army for a flank attack, and he was not afraid that this force would be wiped out by the Japanese army, because he had mastered the characteristics and habits of the Japanese army in combat.

Before the Anti-Japanese War, the mainstream tendency of Chinese society was to "learn from the East in military affairs, and learn from the West in politics." The courses in military officer schools were mainly translated from Japan, and there were also many Japanese instructors.Take the Army University, which focuses on training military staff members as an example, all Japanese instructors were hired for the first nine periods.In a sense, Chinese soldiers are actually students of Japanese soldiers, and the "students" are no strangers to the tactics used by the "teacher".

There are many tactical principles of the Japanese army, but there is only one core one, that is, "Attack first, encirclement first". No matter how exquisite Okamura's command is, its basic thinking cannot be separated from this main line.Reflected in actual combat, the Japanese army often only focused on the target sites to be captured or encircled, while ignoring the annihilation of the opponent's vital forces. This is the case in Nanjing, this is the case in Xuzhou, and even the battle of Nanchang personally commanded by Okamura is no exception.At that time, there were many Chinese retreating troops falling behind the enemy's flanks. If the Japanese army, which has the advantage of mobility, made up its mind to annihilate them, these troops would be doomed. Let it go.

It was knowing that the 33rd Division of the Japanese Army was all about being superior, so Luo Zhuoying placed a considerable number of counterattack troops on the flanks.The counterattack troops will run counter to the Japanese army, and then turn around to harass and besiege the 33rd Division.