Chapter 366 3. Ye Fei's strategy

According to the order of the Military Commission, the 10th Corps, under the leadership of Commander Ye Fei, immediately started preparations for marching into Fujian. On July 2, Ye Fei led the 10th Corps from Suzhou to the south. On July 26, they arrived in Jianyang, Jianou and Nanping in Fujian. At this time, there were 150,000 enemy troops in Fujian.Among them, those who retreated in the Fuzhou area are: the 25th Army, the 96th Army (located on the west side of the Minjiang River in the northwest of the city), the 73rd Army (located in Fuqing and Pingtan Island), and the 25th Army under the jurisdiction of Zhu Shaoliang and Li Yannian of the 6th Corps of the Fuzhou Appeasement Administration. There are 5 armies including the 74th Army (located on the front line of Lianjiang and Guantou) and the 106th Army (defending the urban area of ​​Fuzhou), with a total of 14 divisions and more than 60,000 people.

Chiang Kai-shek tried to stick to Fuzhou and Xiamen to secure Taiwan.His strategic intention is to drag the United States into the water.Others said that he wanted to keep Taiwan and wait for the outbreak of World War III to counterattack. Zhu Shaoliang knew that his troops were limited, not only was their morale low, but most of them were remnants and defeated generals, and their combat effectiveness was particularly poor.Therefore, he advocated abandoning Fuzhou and trying to protect the retreat at sea.There were disagreements among the enemy on whether to defend Fuzhou or not.Although Zhu Shaoliang didn't want to stick to Fuzhou, he didn't dare to disobey Lao Jiang's order.

Based on the above situation, Ye Fei considered two options.One is to adopt a roundabout tactic to cut off the enemy's land and sea retreat.Detour to the south, occupy Fuqing and Honglu south of Fuzhou, cut off the Fuzhou-Xiamen Highway, cut off the connection between Zhu Shaoliang's corps in Fuzhou and Tang Enbo's corps in the Xiamen direction, and cut off the retreat route of the Fuzhou enemy fleeing south from the Fuzhou-Xiamen Highway.However, it is more difficult to implement this plan.Because, starting from Youxi, the detoured troops to the south have to climb over hundreds of kilometers of high mountains, and then drill out from Yongtai to capture Dongzhang before they can capture Fuqing and Honglu.

The whole journey is more than 200 kilometers, and it is all high mountains and mountain trails. There are no roads or roads to walk on, and cannons and mountain cannons cannot be carried.This was a dangerous move, because the army was already exhausted by the time they arrived at Fuqing and Honglu after five days of trekking in the scorching heat. The second plan Ye Fei considered was to detour eastward, capture Mawei, and cut off the enemy's sea retreat.In this way, the troops only need 2 days away.This is a relatively safe solution.However, Ye Fei and other leaders analyzed that although this plan has advantages, it cannot cut off the enemy's land retreat because there is no major detour to occupy Fuqing and Honglu.No matter how fast our army pursues, it will not be able to pass the Minjiang Bridge and cross the Wujiang River smoothly.It may turn into chasing ducks, failing to achieve the goal of completely annihilating the enemy, so that the enemy of Fuzhou slipped through the net and fled southward along the Fuzhou-Xiamen Highway by land.After weighing again and again, they decided to adopt the first plan in order to wipe out the enemy.

Then, Ye Fei issued a battle order: the 31st army is the left army, starting from Gutian, capturing Mawei, cutting off the enemy's sea route, and attacking Fuzhou from Mawei after winning; the 29th army is the right army, starting from Nanping Cross over Shaxian County and Yongtai Mountain, capture Fuqing and Honglu, cut off the connection between Zhu Shaoliang in Fuzhou and Tang Enbo's troops in Xiamen, and cut off the way for the enemy to flee south on land; the 28th Army is the Central Route Army, responsible for the frontal attack from Gutian to Fuzhou. After the armies from all walks of life were ordered, they immediately attacked.

The Left Army launched an attack on Danyang on the morning of August 13th, and occupied Danyang at 10:00; Go down to Min'an and Mawei, wipe out the enemy's 23rd Division and a part of the 201st Division, completely control the north bank of the Minjiang River, block the Minjiang River with artillery fire, cut off the enemy's water escape route, and immediately attack Fuzhou from Mawei. The right army started from Nanping, crossed Shaxian County and Yongtai Mountain, captured Fuqing and Honglu, cut off the land route for the enemy to flee south, and built fortifications to the south to implement vigilance.

On the afternoon of the 16th, the Central Route Army captured Xujia Village on the outskirts of Fuzhou, approached the urban area bravely, and attacked the urban area from Xihongmen in the western suburbs. The armies of the 3 Routes cooperated closely and fought together, so that the enemy had no way to escape. In the Battle of Fuzhou, our army wiped out 1 corps headquarters, 5 military headquarters, and 14 divisions, totaling more than 50,000 people; our own casualties were less than 500.Ye Fei led his troops to occupy Fuzhou on August 17.This is why Fuzhou Street was later named "Bayiqi Road".Unfortunately, only half an hour left before Zhu Shaoliang and Li Yannian slipped away by plane.

Facts have proved that Ye Fei is correct to adopt the first plan decisively.The victory in the Battle of Fuzhou allowed our army to control the central part of Fujian and opened up the situation. Then we can take advantage of the victory and go south to continue to annihilate the enemies of Quanzhou, Zhangzhou, and Xiamen, thus creating favorable conditions for the rapid liberation of Fujian Province. The troops entered Fuzhou and established the Fuzhou Military Management Committee, with Wei Guoqing as the director and responsible for taking over the work.Ye Fei led the main force of the Corps to continue southward, intending to attack Xiamen and Kinmen Islands after clearing out the enemies in the Zhangquan area of ​​southern Fujian.

After the Battle of Fuzhou, in order to quickly liberate the whole province of Fujian, the 10th Corps decided that in addition to one unit serving as the city guard and bandit suppression tasks in the new area, the main force of the Corps would be led by Commander Ye Fei to take advantage of the victory and go south to implement the second stage of peace warfare, attacking Annihilate the Kuomintang troops defending Zhangzhou, Xiamen, and Kinmen in southern Fujian. According to the terrain characteristics of southern Fujian and the distribution of the Kuomintang army, Ye Fei was determined to carry out the Zhangxia campaign in two steps: the first step was to seize the mainland of southern Fujian with Zhangzhou as the center, and control the advantageous positions for attacking Xiamen and Jinmen; the second step was to cross the sea Landing operations to capture the two islands of Xiamen and Kinmen.

The specific deployment is: use the 31st Army to attack Zhangzhou in two ways, one way to attack Zhangzhou along Nan'an, Tong'an, and Jiaowei, and one way to attack Zhangzhou along Anxi, Fengyang, Changtai, Juxi, and Nanjing, and then take advantage of the victory to develop eastward , captured coastal points such as Haicheng, Gangwei, Yuzaiwei, and Songyu; and captured Jimei, Liuwudian, Aotou and other places north of Xiamen with the main force of the 29th Army.After the above two armies completed the above tasks, they stepped up their preparations to attack Xiamen Island.The 28th Army entered the Jinjing, Shijing, Lianhe, and Yongning areas with a reinforced division to prepare for crossing the sea to capture Jinmen.In the second step, use the main force of the 31st Army and the 29th Army to capture Xiamen Island; use the main force of the 28th Army and part of the 29th Army to capture Kinmen Island.

In order to ensure the successful implementation of the campaign, the Political Department of the 10th Corps issued political work instructions on striving for a complete victory in the campaign, requiring all commanders and fighters to maintain and improve their combat mood, refrain from underestimating the enemy, eliminate impatience, and do a good job in all aspects of crossing the sea. Prepare for work, study ways to overcome difficulties, eliminate ideological concerns in cross-sea operations, strengthen confidence in victory, and strive to be a hero and model in island operations.