Chapter 319 Chapter 33 Battle of Crossing the River: Announcing the Demise of the Chiang Dynasty

Crossing the south of the Yangtze River is a strategic decision carefully planned by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Military Commission for a long time.As early as July 1947, Mao Zedong proposed the strategic concept of the Battle of Crossing the River. In the second half of 1947, when he was deploying the main force of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army led by Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping to leap thousands of miles into the Dabie Mountains, he considered deploying the first and fourth columns of the East China Field Army (column commander They were Ye Fei and Tao Yong, so they were also called Ye Zong and Tao Zong) crossed the Yangtze River and went straight out of the Fujian, Zhejiang and Jiangxi regions to establish base areas in order to push the front further to the strategic rear of the Kuomintang army.

On July 23 of this year, the Military Commission proposed in the telegram "Military Deployment for Ensuring and Expanding the Strategic Initiative" that when Liu Deng led his troops to leap thousands of miles into the Dabie Mountains, and Chen Xie (referring to Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi) crossed the Yellow River to advance into Henan At the same time as the Shaanxi border, Chen Yi, Su Yu, and Tan Zhenlin led the main force of the East China Field Army to stay in Shandong (including southwestern Shandong) to "take on the entire internal combat mission."Its steps: the first step is to carry out repairs and political mobilization; the second step is to go to the west of Anhui to establish a temporary base; the third step is to cross the river to the south of Anhui to establish a second temporary base; the fourth step is to go to Fujian, Zhejiang and Jiangxi destination.In order to strengthen the leadership of this unit after the attack, Mao Zedong also proposed the idea of ​​forming the Southeast Branch Bureau with Deng Zihui, Zhang Dingcheng, and Zeng Shan, and asked the East China Bureau to consider it.

Liu Deng's army leaped thousands of miles into the Dabie Mountains and created a new liberated area of ​​the Central Plains. It was a chess game played by Mao Zedong with ingenuity. It fundamentally reversed the situation of the battle and turned the People's Liberation Army from defense to offense.However, the most critical move in the overall situation - Liu Deng's army marching towards the Dabie Mountains, although the Chen Xie Group entered the west of Henan and assisted the Prime Minister on the right, its strength was still insufficient. possibility of withdrawal. After careful consideration, Mao Zedong decided that Chen Yi and Su Yu should immediately go to Southwest Shandong in the telegrams to Chen Yi, Su Yu, and Tan Zhenlin on August 6, and to Liu Deng and Chen Su on August 7, and to unify the command of the 1st and 4th troops. The six columns of Huaye, including the column, formed the Huaye West Front Corps, and carried out the combat mission of directly cooperating with Liu Deng's army to advance into the Dabie Mountains.Mao Zedong estimated that when Liu Deng's army leaped southward, the Kuomintang army would inevitably pursue it with heavy troops.Under such circumstances, Chen Su's Western Front Corps immediately followed the enemy's army southward, and could "contain the enemy from the opposite direction", effectively covering the advance of Liu Deng's army and gaining a foothold in the Dabie Mountains.This telegram actually temporarily changed the plan to have Ye Fei and Tao Yong lead the first and fourth columns to cross the south of the Yangtze River on July 23.Subsequently, the Central Military Commission officially decided to stop the implementation of the plan of the first and fourth columns to cross the south of the Yangtze River to Fujian, Zhejiang and Jiangxi.

In early January 1948, Chen Yi, who had rushed from the front line of the Central Plains to the central part of northern Shaanxi, met Mao Zedong in Yangjiagou.This is the first time they met after breaking up in Yan'an following the victory of the Anti-Japanese War.When Mao Zedong talked with Chen Yi about the combat operations of the whole army since July 1947, he emphasized that the nature of our military operations is no longer a "self-defense defense", but a "revolutionary offensive", which is to push the main battlefield of the war It is called a "strategic offensive" because it is a combat operation that seeks to liberate the whole of China from Chiang Kai-shek's control of the region.Mao Zedong pointed out: Chiang Kai-shek is already on the defensive.Yellow Crane is gone forever, and it is impossible for him to return to the situation at the beginning of the war. In the future, it will be a question of how we will transfer to Jiangnan, Sichuan, and Guangdong and Guangxi.

In the conversation with Chen Yi, Mao Zedong once again talked about the issue of crossing the Yangtze River in the south. On January 27, according to the situation of the war at the time, the Central Military Commission sent a telegram to Su Yu: "About your command of Ye, Wang, and Tao's three columns to cross the south of the Yangtze River to carry out a large mobile mission... There are three plans... After crossing the river, the Forcing the enemy to change his deployment may attract 20 to 30 enemy brigades to return to defend Jiangnan. You go to Jiangnan with a force of 70,000 to 80,000, and first spend half a year to a year in Hunan and Jiangxi provinces, making circles along the way and leaping forward. Arriving in Fujian, Zhejiang, and Jiangxi in several stages puts the enemy in a completely passive position to deal with it and it is impossible to defend against it." The telegram also stated that the time to cross the river can be in February, May or autumn.

The plan to cross the river proposed this time was ultimately not implemented due to immature conditions.