Chapter 304 3. Lin Biao advocated beating the head of the snake, while Mao Zedong wanted to beat the tail of the snake

Judging from the layout of Fu Zuoyi's department in the west to Zhangjiakou in the east and Tangshan and Tianjin in the east, the snake's head is in Tangshan and Tianjin, the snake's belly is in Beiping, and the snake's tail is in Xuanhua and Zhangjiakou.Lin Biao advocated attacking the snakehead Tangshan first to prevent the enemy from retreating south, and wait for the main force of the Northeast Field Army to arrive one after another to take over the encirclement.At that time, Cheng Huang's corps may insert to the east of Peiping to prevent the Beiping defending enemy from retreating eastward, or directly encircle Tianjin, depending on the situation at that time.

Mao Zedong believed that Lin Biao's proposition was inappropriate, because without cutting off the retreat route of Fu Zuoyi Group, especially the retreat route at sea, and when the main force of the Northeast Field Army was still far away from Tangshan and Tianjin, to attack Tangshan with a part of the force first would be tantamount to scaring the snake. It will prompt "with the central government to attach all the armies near Peiping, and even to add part or most of the Fu army to advance to the Tianjin, Tang, and Tang lines, while the main force is located in Tanggu, so that the enemy in Tangshan can be taken out and the retreat by sea can be completed." Prepare, it will be very difficult for our army to annihilate this enemy when it enters the border."

Therefore, on November 20, Mao Zedong called Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou, pointing out: "The timing of encircling Tangshan's enemies is worth considering. Cheng (Zihua) and Huang (Zhiyong) can prepare to encircle Tangshan between the 25th and 27th. Cut off the Tang enemy’s retreat route, but the implementation must wait for our final order.” ("Mao Zedong Military Anthology", Volume 5, p. 253, Military Science Publishing House, Central Literature Publishing House, 1993 edition.) If at this time Mao Zedong had not completely rejected Lin Biao's opinion that Tangshan should be attacked first, but the timing was worth considering, then by November 26, Mao Zedong had realized more clearly that Tangshan could not be attacked first.He said: "Tangshan is the coal source of Pingjin. If you go to encircle Tangshan before you cut off Pingjin and Tianjin, there is a danger of mobilizing the Beiping enemy to fight in Tianjin and Tangshan or run away by sea and land. If you agree with this, call Cheng Huang and Huang should not encircle Tangshan at present, but if there is definite news that the enemy of Tangshan will retreat, they should encircle it quickly." Therefore, Mao Zedong clearly stipulated that the first combat mission of the Northeast Field Army after entering the customs should not be Tangshan, but in Tangshan. Langfang and other places on the Pingjin line cut off the connection between Pingjin and Tangshan with a part.After completing this task, the second task is not to attack Tangshan, but to annihilate the three divisions of the enemy's 62nd Army and the independent 95th Division between Tianjin and Tangshan.The third combat mission is to wipe out the enemies in Tangshan, then capture Tianjin, wipe out the enemies around Peiping, and finally capture Peiping.

On November 27, Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou stated to the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China: "The Pingjin operation was implemented according to the order of the Military Commission." Approved by the Military Commission for implementation.” Mao Zedong disagreed with Lin Biao's proposal to fight Tangshan first, so where should the Pingjin campaign start?Mao Zedong believed that the key point of Fu Zuoyi's one-character long snake formation was not in Tangshan, the head of the snake, but in Zhangjiakou, the tail of the snake.Therefore, he proposed to fight from the west, grab the snake's tail first, and force the snake to turn back, that is, first attack and annihilate the enemy in the Pingzhang section of Pingsui Road, and encircle Zhangjiakou.This is because the (North) Pingzhang (Jiakou) line refers to the line from Beiping to Zhangjiakou in the east section of Pingsui Road. It is the only line of communication connecting the Pingjin area and Suiyuan behind the Fu Zuoyi Group, and also the only line of communication for the Fu Zuoyi Group to escape westward. Zhangjiakou is an important hub on the Pingzhang Line.In order to ensure the smooth flow of this line of communication, Fu Zuoyi deployed more than 10 infantry and jockeys (brigades) of his direct troops on the line from Zhangjiakou to Nankou.If our army surrounds Zhangjiakou and cuts the line of tension, it will hit Fu Zuoyi's vital points, and Fu Zuoyi must send troops to rescue him.In this way, our army can lead the enemy to the west and seize the main force of Fu Zuoyi's group, which not only prevents it from retreating westward to Suiyuan, but also makes it difficult for Fu Zuoyi to abandon the main force of his lineage and flee south, so as to achieve the purpose of holding the main force of Jiang's clique in the Pingjin area.Therefore, Mao Zedong said to the Northeast Advance Corps and the 2nd and 3rd North China Corps: As long as the 16 infantry and cavalry divisions of the Fu Zuoyi Group are dragged on the Pingzhang Line within December, the enemy cannot move, cannot escape westward, and cannot escape. Running eastward is a great strategic victory.

To this end, Mao Zedong personally deployed an action plan to cut off the tension line. On November 22, 1948, Mao Zedong called Yang Chengwu, Li Jingquan, and Li Tianhuan, the leaders of the 3rd North China Corps, and pointed out: "It is planned to use your three main columns to move eastward quickly and secretly, and cooperate with Zhan Danan (Jirecha Military Region) to cut off the connection between Ping and Zhang. , encircle Zhangjiakou, prevent the enemy of Zhangjiakou from shrinking towards Pingzhang, and attract the enemy of Peiping to send troops westward to rescue Zhangjiakou, so as to delay the time for the Pingjin Fu (Zuoyi) army to escape south. For this reason, your three columns are divided in Guisui The nearby troops will not move for the time being, so as to confuse the returning enemy, the main force should be ready to move eastward on the 25th." ("Mao Zedong Military Collection", Vol. 5, p. 261, Military Science Publishing House, Central Literature Publishing House, 1993 edition .)

On November 24, Mao Zedong again telegraphed the 3rd North China Corps, asking them to lead three columns of the main force to set off from the current site on the 25th, quickly and secretly advance eastward, and arrive near Zhangjiakou in 6 days (the sooner the better), and then Two columns encircled the enemies at Zhoujiahe and Huai'an to the southwest of Zhangjiakou, and inserted one column between Zhangjiakou and Xuanhua to cut off the connection between the two enemies in Zhangjiakou and prevent the enemies at Zhoujiahe, Huai'an, and Zhangjiakou from escaping.If the enemies of Zhoujiahe and Huai'an quickly retreat into Zhangjiakou or the enemy of Zhangjiakou quickly shrinks to the east, they should quickly go east, cooperate with the troops of the Jirecha Military Region to cut off the connection between Ping and Zhang, and encircle Zhangjiakou, Xuanhua or Xiahuayuan. "In short, the principle is to capture this group of enemies and prevent them from running away to the east. After capturing and encircling them, do not attack. Wait for the main force in the Northeast to enter the pass (keep secrets) and encircle and annihilate the enemies before attacking with cameras."

On November 25, Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou replied to the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, fully agreeing with the Central Military Commission's deployment of the 3rd North China Corps, and suggested that Yang Dezhi's 2nd North China Corps and Cheng Zihua's Northeast Advance Corps also join the Pingzhang Line. Mao Zedong adopted the suggestion of the leaders of the Northeast Field Army and decided that the North China Second Corps and the Northeast Advance Corps would also join the Pingzhang Line operations.