Chapter 301 19. Inventory

East China, Central Plains People's Liberation Army and East China, Central Plains Military Region and other local troops launched the Huaihai Campaign on November 6, 1948, and ended the battle on January 10, 1949. They fought continuously for 66 days and captured and wiped out the KMT army. The Ministry of Defense and the 5 Corps Headquarters under its command, 22 military headquarters, 56 divisions, and 1 appeasement area, the regular army and other troops have a total of more than 555,000 people.Among them, more than 320,000 people were captured, more than 170,000 people were killed and injured, more than 35,000 people surrendered, and more than 28,000 people rebelled and reorganized; 124 Kuomintang generals were captured, 6 were killed, 22 surrendered, and 8 rebelled.The Kuomintang army that was wiped out does not include the number of people who broke up and fled.In the battle, Li Yannian and Liu Ruming's corps were repelled and forced to retreat to the south of the Yangtze River.

The main seizures included 4,215 guns of various types, more than 14,500 light and heavy machine guns, more than 151,000 long and short guns, 6 aircraft, 215 tanks, 1,747 cars, 6,680 carriages, more than 120,000 artillery shells, and 20.151 million bullets. And a large number of other combat materials. The East China and Central Plains People's Liberation Army also paid a certain price.In total, more than 25,000 people were killed, more than 98,000 people were injured, and more than 11,000 people were missing.A total of more than 136,000 people, the loss ratio of the People's Liberation Army and the Kuomintang Army is 1:4.1.The main combat consumption of the troops includes: 34 mountain, field, and howitzers, 219 mortar and 60 artillery pieces, 1,884 light and heavy machine guns, more than 14,000 long and short guns, more than 679,000 rounds of various shells, and various bullets. 20,149,400 rounds, more than 48,000 kilograms of explosives (no consumption statistics on double-stacked battlefields).

In the Huaihai Campaign, the enemy and our forces were 600,000 against 800,000. It was a decisive battle between the People's Liberation Army and the Kuomintang Army's heavy forces when the battlefield strength and equipment were not superior, and ended with a huge victory.Chairman Mao Zedong praised: The Huaihai Campaign was fought well, like a pot of raw rice, which was not fully cooked, and he insisted on eating it bite by bite.After the war, both combatants summarized the reasons for the success or failure of the Huaihai decisive battle. On January 20, 1949, Su Yu pointed out in his report at the enlarged meeting of the Front Committee of the East China Field Army: "The Battle of Huaihai was indeed a great battle. We won the victory because of the Party Central Committee, Chairman Mao, Commander-in-Chief Zhu and The correct leadership of the General Front Committee and the full support of the party, government, military and civilians in the rear" "All corps and various arms cooperate to fight, the comrades present at the meeting are flexible and direct at the front, and all the commanders and fighters fight bravely and tirelessly. These are also factors of victory."

On February 11, 1951, Liu Bocheng and Chen Yi were entrusted by Chairman Mao Zedong to introduce the situation of the Huaihai Campaign to the Soviet ambassador to China Yudin.Chen Yi briefly explained the reasons for the victory in the Huaihai decisive battle: "First, the enemy's strategic judgment was wrong. He believed that we had no strength and would not concentrate our forces to fight against him. Second, our campaign tactics divided and wiped out the enemy in batches, mainly relying on night combat and close combat. Strengths. The third is the huge and deep support of the people, which actually formed 3 million against 800,000, giving full play to the power of the people's war. Fourth, the battle process is very difficult, like a blunt knife cutting the neck, and the enemy cannot be wiped out at once. Soldiers are brave and dedicated to complete the correct decision in strategic battles. Fifth, they played the role of political offensive. During the battle, 5 divisions of the enemy army revolted and 1 division surrendered. In terms of the captive policy, principles and flexibility were implemented (Strategic) combination to divide the enemy. In short, this is a successful example of Chairman Mao’s military thinking.” ("Chen Yi Chronicle" Volume 1, People's Publishing House, December 1995 edition, p. 619)

On the part of the Kuomintang army, Liu Zhi, the commander-in-chief of Xuzhou's "Suppression General", concluded: "In this battle, the failure of strategy was more than that of tactics, and the failure of tactics was more than that of combat." He also specifically listed 13 mistakes and mistakes. The main points are : "Hesitating about the plan of advance and retreat, the result is a temporary battle instead of a planned and prepared battle, resulting in a disadvantage in our military strength and situation"; , leading to the dispersion of troops in the decisive battle. And the final battle failed, and the Yangtze River and the Huaihe River could not be defended." ; "Du Yuming gave up the Xuzhou base area and made a circular movement. It was an adventure, but he couldn't show his brave and decisive spirit to defeat the 'bandit army' with quick actions, and put the whole army in danger." There is a spiritual gap, and it is not easy to cooperate in support during wartime, so that even though there is a large army, it is difficult to exert the maximum integrated combat power." (Liu Zhi: "My Memories", Taiwan Wenhai Publishing House, January 1982, p. 171, 172, 173)

The post-war review of the Kuomintang Army Command said: "The main reason for the failure of the Xubeng Battle was a strategic error, followed by a lack of improvement in tactics, and it was difficult to support the strategy. Others include continuous combat power maintenance, integrated combat power, and counterintelligence, etc. , all made major mistakes." (KMT Military History and Political Compilation Bureau: "KMT Revolutionary Army Battle History" Volume 5 "Killing Chaos" (Part 2) Volume 5, p. 185)