Chapter 297 15. Du Yuming refused to implement the breakout order

When the East China Field Army and the Central Plains Field Army entered the rest stage, the Du Yuming Group still had 8 armies and 22 divisions (brigades) in the encirclement.That is, the 45th, 46th, and 200th Divisions of the 5th Army of the Qiu Qingquan Corps, the 32nd, 96th, and 139th Divisions of the 70th Army, the 34th and 233rd Divisions of the 72nd Army, and the 51st and 58th Divisions of the 74th Army , the 112th Division of the 12th Army, the newly organized 44th Division, and the 1st Cavalry Brigade; the 42nd, 170th, and 237th Divisions of the 8th Army of the Li Mi Corps, the 3rd, 166th, and 253rd Divisions of the Ninth Army The 115th Army (compiled from the remnants of the 59th Army collected) the 39th and 180th Divisions.There is also the 122nd Division under the command of the 72nd Army, which was taken in by Sun Yuanliang's remnant troops.

After the Huangwei Corps was wiped out, Chiang Kai-shek ordered Du Yuming to "expand outwards and try to escape from the encirclement" on December 16.Du Yuming knew very well that when the Huang Wei Corps was wiped out, the People's Liberation Army would do its best to deal with his remaining troops. Letting him break through at this time would be tantamount to self-destruction. Therefore, he did not immediately implement Chiang Kai-shek's telegram, but strengthened the fortifications and held them for a long time to wait for the time to come. bureau development.He called Chiang Kai-shek back, requesting reinforcements and said that he would lead the Qiu and Li corps to stand firm to the end.

Chiang Kai-shek insisted that Du Yuming break out of the siege quickly according to his order, and on December 17 he telegraphed Du Yuming to reiterate: "My brother, please do not act alone. Tomorrow, we will send personnel to Beijing to teach the opportunity face-to-face." Memories of Kuomintang Generals), p. 41) On the 18th, Comfort Cunfei was ordered to fly to Nanjing. On the afternoon of the 19th, he returned to Chenguanzhuang with Dong Mingde, deputy director of the Third Department of the Air Force General Command, and brought back two personal letters from Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Shuming, the deputy commander-in-chief of the Air Force.

The general idea of ​​Chiang Kai-shek's letter was: the failure of the 12th Corps to break out was entirely due to Huang Wei's stubborn temperament, and he did not follow my plan to break out during the day under the cover of the air force; Huang Wei decided to break out at night without authorization, ruining my army.After my younger brother was besieged, I tried my best. All the troops in North China, Central China, and Northwest China were pinned down by the Communist Army and could not be transferred.The only way at present is to concentrate our forces under the cover of the air force, break through one side, and break through, even if it breaks out by half.For this breakout, the air force will use all its strength to cover and throw poison gas bombs.How to release the poisonous gas has been handed over to Wang Shuming to send Dong Mingde to discuss with his younger brother the specific implementation method ("Huaihai Campaign Personal Experience" (Memories of the former Kuomintang generals), p. 41).Wang Shuming stated in the letter that he was determined to use the air force to cover Du Yuming's breakout.

According to Chiang Kai-shek's will, Du Yuming, Comfort Cun and Dong Mingde drew up a joint land and air breakout plan.At the same time, he discussed with Qiu Qingquan the top, middle, and bottom three strategies: the best strategy is to concentrate all the forces that can be concentrated in Xi'an and Wuhan (abandon if necessary), and fight a decisive battle with the Communist army; Gain time politically; the worst policy is to break out of the encirclement according to the order, which will definitely not meet the hope. On the evening of December 20th, the climate changed suddenly, the wind and snow were heavy, and the plane could not take off. It was not until the weather turned fine on the 29th that Dong Mingde and Comfort Cun brought the breakout plan and the "Three Strategies" proposals back to Nanjing.

On January 1, Chiang Kai-shek issued a peace statement, proposing to conduct "peaceful" negotiations with the Chinese Communist Party.At this time, Du Yuming, in view of the hopelessness of reinforcements and the danger of breaking out of the encirclement, instead hoped that the "peace talks" would succeed in order to preserve his troops, so he delayed taking action to break out of the encirclement.On the third day after the announcement of the peace statement, that is, on January 3, Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram to Du Yuming again: from the 5th, after two days of food and ammunition, he quickly issued an order to break through the encirclement ("The Personal Experience of the Huaihai Battle" (the memory of the former Kuomintang general) ), p. 46).He also instructed Comfort Cun to bring about 800 sets of gas masks at random when he returned to Chenguanzhuang, for use in releasing poisonous gas when breaking out of the siege.

On January 5, Chiang Kai-shek began airdropping food bombs.Du Yuming, on the other hand, deliberately delayed the breakout operation because he had not dropped enough food and ammunition, the soldiers were hungry and weak, and asked to continue to drop a large amount of food and ammunition.Chiang Kai-shek gave a stern order that "it will be allowed to vote for another 3 days, and it must be implemented" ("Personal Experience of the Huaihai Campaign" (Memories of the former Kuomintang generals), p. 46).So far, Du Yuming had to break through.