Chapter 286 4. Chiang Kai-shek's "Battle of Xu Bang" plan

In late October 1948, the Northeast Liaoshen decisive battle was coming to an end, the Kuomintang had suffered a disastrous defeat in the Northeast, and Chiang Kai-shek of the Kuomintang also saw that the Xuzhou War was imminent.Therefore, they decided to strengthen Xuzhou's defense. On October 22, the Kuomintang High Command held a military meeting in Nanjing to prepare for the Battle of Xu Bang.The meeting proposed that Bai Chongxi, the commander-in-chief of the Central China "Suppression General", command the two "Suppression General" units in Central China and Xuzhou, and decided that Huang Wei's 12th Corps would go out of Zhoujiakou to support Xuzhou's "Suppression General" or Central China's "Suppression General" operations according to the situation. .

On the 24th, Chiang Kai-shek issued the "Guidelines for Current Operations", requiring Xuzhou to "suppress the general" and take "offensive defense" to "consolidate Xuzhou and ensure it"; ordered Huang Botao's 7th Corps and Li Mi's 13th Corps to control Ahu and Li Mi respectively. Maneuver near Xin'an Town and Cao Baji (now Bayiji) to prevent the East China Field Army from advancing southward, and timely respond to Qiu Qingquan's 2nd Corps and Sun Yuanliang's 16th Corps; ordered Qiu Qingquan's Corps to maneuver and control near Dangshan, and was responsible for monitoring Southwest Shandong and East China According to the situation, we will cooperate with the Huangwei Corps to pinch our army eastward into the Central Plains; order Sun Yuanliang's Corps to move to Su County and Mengcheng, and control the maneuvers near Bengbu.Chiang Kai-shek's order had requirements for the rest of the Xuhuai area. Feng Zhi'an's 3rd appeasement area should use the main force to control Taierzhuang and Zaozhuang in the area west of the canal, and serve as a garrison; Traffic from Shangqiu to Xuzhou in the eastern section of Hailu Road.The Xuzhou "suppression general" should strengthen the fortifications in Xuzhou, Bengbu, Huaiyin and other places, and stick to them for a long time, so that Xuzhou can form the core of the mobile corps.

After the 24th, the KMT's Xuzhou "Suppression General" adjusted its deployment in accordance with Chiang Kai-shek's instructions.This deployment started from Lianyungang in the east, Shangqiu in the west, Lincheng in the north, and Bengbu in the south. With Xuzhou as the center, a cross was placed along Jinpu and Longhai Roads.The Kuomintang army believed that there were sufficient troops in this area, flexible mobilization, and strong fortifications. They could stick to Xuzhou to shield Beijing (Nanjing) and Shanghai, and then waited for an opportunity to sneak into the Central Plains.

According to Guo Rugui's recollection, on October 29, the Kuomintang Chief of Staff Gu Zhutong held a meeting with the Kuomintang Defense Minister He Yingqin and others to study the Central Plains operations.The participants all realized that the Central Plains operations were to protect the strategic defense of the south of the Yangtze River, so they put forward the proposition that "to defend the river, we must defend the Huaihe River".But there are two different opinions on Shouhuai. The first opinion advocates to use offense as defense, that is, except for one or two troops to stick to Xuzhou, all towns on the Longhai Railway will be abandoned, and the troops that can be concentrated will be concentrated on both sides of the Jinpu Railway between Xuzhou and Bengbu to form a focus , for strategic defense.Regardless of whether the People's Liberation Army went south from Pinghan Road, Jinpu Road or through northern Jiangsu, they all concentrated their efforts to seek a decisive battle with the People's Liberation Army.In order to cooperate with the operation in Xuzhou, the Central China "Suppression General" must use the Huangwei Corps to enter and exit Zhoujiakou.

The second opinion advocates withdrawing the banks of the Huaihe River for river defense. The results of the study concluded that it would be inconvenient to retreat to the south bank of the Huaihe River, and then it would be inconvenient to maneuver to the Pinghan Road or northern Jiangsu; and after the People's Liberation Army opened up the Longhai Road, it would be very convenient to mobilize troops to the east and west, which would be even more unfavorable to the Kuomintang army.Therefore, the meeting decided to adopt the first proposition. ("Memoirs of Guo Rugui", p. 323)

According to Du Yuming’s recollection, on November 3, Xu Langxuan, deputy director of the Department of Operations of the National Defense Ministry of the Kuomintang, gave him the “Xu Bang Battle Plan”. ~9 pages): First, policy In order to concentrate its forces near Bengbu, break the offensive of the Communist army, and achieve the goal of "putting down chaos and building the country", the Jiang army moved the main force of the corps of Xuzhou's "Suppression General" and the troops in the appeasement area to the east and west areas of Bengbu on the south bank of the Huaihe River (including Linhuaiguan, Huaiyuan and the area between Fengtai), occupy the position, repel the opponent's attack with offensive defense, turn the camera into offensive, and annihilate it.

Second, tasks and actions 1. Use part of a certain corps to defend Xuzhou and Jiawang to cover the transfer of the main force. 2. The actions of each unit: (1) The 7th Corps near Xin'an Town passed through Wuhe and near Linhuai Pass. (2) The 13th Corps near Xuzhou and the 3rd Appeasement District passed Chulan and Guzhen to Bengbu. (3) The 2nd Corps near Huangkou and Yucheng to the west of Xuzhou turned to the vicinity of Huaiyuan via Kuoyang. (4) The 16th Corps near Liuhe and Shangqiu and the 4th Appeasement District pass through Mengcheng to Haihe Street and the area between Fengtai. (5) Headquarters and troops directly under it transferred to Bengbu via Jinpu Road.

3. After the troops arrive at the destination, they should quickly occupy the positions and build fortifications. The content of the battle plan recalled by Du Yuming is obviously the content of the second plan. Du Yuming was in the Northeast at this time, and he only learned of two combat plans discussed by the Kuomintang Ministry of Defense after the fact, and he clearly stated that he had no impression of the content of the first plan.Guo Rugui's recollection is that he adopted the first plan, but Du Yuming was given the second plan. It can be seen that the plan for the so-called Xu Bang battle had not yet been finalized when it was delivered to Du Yuming on November 3.

Du Yuming also heard people say that Gu Zhutong went to Xuzhou on November 4 and presided over the meeting on November 5, which was arranged according to the principle of the first plan, but he did not act decisively and implement it in time. On November 6, the Battle of Huaihai officially started.Liu Zhi was restless in Xuzhou, so he called Chiang Kai-shek for help.At this time, Chiang Kai-shek issued a formal order according to the first plan.