Chapter 259 11. Specific plans to encircle and wipe out Liao Yaoxiang Corps

On October 15, the Northeast Field Army captured Jinzhou, which greatly shocked the Kuomintang defenders in Changchun. Previously, starting from June 25, 1948, the People's Liberation Army officially imposed a long-term siege on Changchun, adopting a combination of military siege, political offensive and economic blockade, forming a blockade area on the ground with a radius of 25 kilometers outside Changchun City. . Inspired by the powerful political offensive and preferential treatment policies of the PLA, the Changchun defenders went out of the city to surrender in whole squads, platoons and companies .

On October 17, Zeng Zesheng, deputy commander of the Changchun 1st Corps and commander of the 60th Army, led an uprising; on October 19, Li Hong, commander of the Changchun New 7th Army, surrendered.Changchun was declared peacefully liberated. After Jinzhou was conquered and Changchun was liberated peacefully, how to annihilate the enemy in Shenyang was put on Mao Zedong's agenda. Judging from the strategic situation at that time, the main force of our army in the Northeast was located in Jinzhou; the KMT's Eastward Corps was located in Jinxi and Huludao, and the Westward Corps led by Liao Yaoxiang stopped in Zhangwu and Xinlitun areas.

Our army faces two choices: one is to wipe out the Kuomintang East Corps first, and the other is to wipe out the Kuomintang West Corps first.Mao Zedong carefully analyzed the battle situation, and on the 17th, the day after our army captured Jinzhou, he put forward his own idea: in the northeast, our army will fight the enemies of brocade and gourd first. Lin Biao and others put forward their own views based on the situation in the Northeast battlefield and implementing Mao Zedong's vision. On October 17, 18, and 19, Mao Zedong, Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou continuously exchanged telegrams to discuss the battle concept after the attack.Mao Zedong identified Jinxi and Huludao as attack targets on the 17th, and changed them to containment targets on the 19th, clearly proposing to catch Liao Yaoxiang to attack; Lin Biao and others proposed two possibilities on the 18th, one of which was to fight a large-scale mobile war On the 19th, it was proposed to annihilate the enemy advancing from Shenyang to Jinzhou first, that is, to annihilate Liao Yaoxiang first.So far, Mao Zedong and Lin Biao's understanding tends to be consistent.

At 7 o'clock on the 20th, Mao Zedong called Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou, and put forward his opinions on the specific deployment of the annihilation of Liao Yaoxiang's corps. 1. The original defense forces against Jinxi and Huludao, namely the 4th, 11th, and 3 independent divisions, will still defend in this direction, and no more troops will be added. 2. Use 1 column, 2 columns, 3 columns, 5 columns, 6 columns, 7 columns, 8 columns, 9 columns, and 10 columns, a total of 9 columns, to divide and encircle the 5 armies of the Liao Yaoxiang Corps... 3. It is advisable to have 7 divisions located north of Yingkou to prevent the enemy from escaping, and among them there should be 2 to 3 divisions with strong combat effectiveness.

4. A cadre meeting should be convened immediately to mobilize for new operations. According to Mao Zedong's opinion, Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou formulated the specific deployment for encircling and annihilating the Liao Yaoxiang Corps at 10 o'clock on the 20th: 1. The troops originally located in the Zhangwu and Xinlitun areas: 10 verticals and commanded the 1st vertical 3rd division and the Inner Mongolian cavalry 1st division, and entered the Heishan and Dahushan areas to hold on. If the enemy in the Zhangwu and Xinlitun areas is found At the time of the retreat, set out immediately regardless of day or night, inserting to the line of Xiaodongshan and Gutaizi to the east of Xinlitun, and cut off the enemy's retreat in Xinlitun; If the enemy stops, we will stop. If we find that the enemy is retreating, we will quickly advance to the north of Xinlitun to cut off the enemy's retreat route. Then we should decisively encircle the enemies of Zhangwu.Lin Biao and others demanded that the above-mentioned troops must not be negligent or hesitant, and must not let the enemies of Xinlitun and Zhangwu escape, otherwise they would lose the opportunity to win a great victory.

2. The 2nd Independent Division and a heavy artillery battalion affiliated to the Paozong rushed to Yingkou to deploy defenses in a 4-day journey, and carried out tenacious defenses against land and sea. 3. Troops located in Jinzhou: 1st, 3rd, 8th and 6th 17th divisions are the first echelon. They set off on the evening of the 21st and marched towards Goubangzi, Dahushan, Heishan, and Baituchang respectively; The 7th, 9th, and Paolongs are the second echelon, which set off on the 22nd and followed up the rear of the first echelon.Lin Biao and others demanded that the above-mentioned troops should act very secretly and quickly, and all actions should be based on the principle of not being discovered by enemy planes.

4. The 4th, 11th, and independent 4th and 6th divisions should still use the positions in the Tashan area between the Bohai Sea and the Hongluoxian Mountains to continue fighting the enemy going north. 5. Troops in Changchun: The 12th passed through Siping, Changtu, and Kaiyuan. Regardless of fatigue, they quickly inserted all their strength to the south of Tieling, surrounded the 53rd Army's direct team and 1 division, and held back the enemy in Shenyang, Tieling, Fushun, and Benxi. It cannot go south; the 1st Corps led independent divisions, took parallel roads, and quickly advanced towards the line of Tongjiangkou, Kaiyuan, and Nanchengzi. Depending on the situation, it either participated in the encirclement and annihilation of the Liao Yaoxiang Corps, or took over from the 12th vertical encirclement of Tieling.Lin Biao and others demanded that the above-mentioned troops all operate at night and keep secrets so as not to frighten off the enemies in Zhangwu, Xinlitun and other places.

In the deployment, Lin Biao and others also proposed that in case our army failed to capture the enemy in Xinlitun and Zhangwu, when the enemy retreated to Yingkou, the main force of our army, except for the troops going south near Changchun, would be In Goubangzi, he quickly marched east across the Liaohe River to fight, and wiped out the enemy between Yingkou and Niuzhuang.