Chapter 144 4. Chen Yisu Yutanbu Distressed

In late March, the three corps of the Kuomintang Army began to act.Chen Yi, Zhang Dingcheng, and Deng Zihui were inspecting the troops on the southern front. They felt the seriousness of the situation. On the 27th, they called Su Yu and Chen Shiju, who commanded the rear, requesting the end of the troops' rest and preparation for combat. Regarding the direction of operations, Chen Yi pointed out four assumptions, most inclined to the main force going south to assault Linyi, Donghai, and Xin'an.Su Yu and Chen Shiju studied Chen Yi's opinion, and quickly drew up a battle plan for going south, and reported it to the Central Committee, Chen Yi and Rao Shushi on the 28th.The telegram said: In order to smash the stubborn attempt, extend the stubborn defense line, force the stubborn to disperse our troops and support the struggle in Central China, we plan to use 3 columns (2, 7, and 8 columns with a total of 82,000 people) to extend into Tancheng, the docks, and Xin'an Town. .Then expand westward and occupy the canal line to threaten the Jinpu Railway and attract the 74th and 83rd divisions to return to aid.The 1st, 3rd, 4th, 6th, and 9th columns of the main force were assembled in the southeast of Mengyin and northwest of Linyi, waiting to annihilate the enemy's 74th and 83rd divisions.Or annihilate the 11th Division in the direction of Surabaya and the 5th Army in the direction of Dawenkou.The above deployment started on April 1st and started around the 14th.Chen Yi approved this plan, so Su Yu, Chen Shiju and others led the field army command post to the south and joined Chen Yi in Tanbu Town, Mengyin County.

Something unexpected happened suddenly.The main force of Huaye went south by day and night, and brought its own dry food, so as not to disturb the people, it was supposed to be quite secretive.But just three days after our army took action, the Kuomintang army discovered our army's actions and attempts. On April 3, Kuomintang planes bombed the Tanbu area, and Chen Yi, Su Yu, and comrades at the East China Field Army Command Post experienced a death threat.Comrade Wang De, who worked in the headquarters, recalled: "Just when our field commander moved south to a village near Tanbu, we were bombed and strafed by enemy planes on the third day. Fortunately, we still paid attention to air defense at that time, and entered the village. That day, I asked Fang Ruyu, the chief of the management section, to prepare an air-raid shelter for the chiefs, which should be slightly larger, because at that time, Comrade Chu Qing, the lover of Deputy Commander Su, and Comrade Guo Huimin, the lover of Deputy Political Commissar Tan, all followed the wild fingers. Comrade Zhang Qian also served as the instructor of the security platoon. The bombs were dropped in the center of Zhuangzi, where the government staff lived, and everyone had already dispersed outside the village. The chief and his family members used to live in scattered huts on the edge of the village. There were also dug air-raid shelters, so there were no casualties." (Wang De: "East China Battlefield Staff Notes", Chapter 4, Section 2)

Tanbu was in danger, which surprised Chen Yi and Su Yu.Why did the enemy grasp the actions of our army so quickly, and the intelligence is so accurate.They thought that there was a problem with the confidentiality work, and reported to the central government on April 15: "After our main force moved south, we originally planned to implement the 28th electric combat plan around the 12th. However, our army's actions and plans will be the enemy within three days." It was discovered that the enemy was very clear about our army's deployment. Our army's command post was moved to the vicinity of Tanbu in the east of Mengyin, and it was bombed in just three days (the central war room, the confidential department, the political department, the guards, except the guards) Injuries and no loss), the enemy did not fully know the location of our command post. If we rely on the direction finder of the radio station, it will not be so accurate. I am afraid that there is an error in the secret station, so during the southward movement, except for the northern line, there are still some Except for the camouflaged radio station, we did not report to the various verticals at all, fearing that it was an insider who informed us. We are now investigating and trying our best to reduce the number of notifications. All combat orders were communicated orally or in writing, but the troops moved south and were spotted by enemy planes at dawn and dusk. It is also one of the reasons." ("Selected Historical Materials of the Third Civil Revolutionary War of the Chinese People's Liberation Army" Volume 2, Volume 1)

After investigation, it was found out that there was a captive soldier who was added to the team directly under the command post, who was originally the platoon leader of the Kuomintang Army.After he learned of our army's action plan, he deserted and defected to the Kuomintang army to inform the secret.This is a profound lesson. The Kuomintang has grasped the direction of our army's actions. It is impossible for the main forces such as 1 Zong to go south to fight, and the original combat plan needs to be changed.Chen Yi and others studied the enemy's actions and felt that the enemy's strength in Southwest Shandong was relatively weak.

In order to disperse the enemy's forces and seek to wipe out the main force of the enemy during the movement, the Field Army Command decided to form the Western Front Corps with 1, 3, and 10 columns, and the attack on Tai'an was under the unified command of Chief of Staff Chen Shiju and Director Tang Liang.The rest of the columns stand by for action.