Chapter 108 12. Inventory

In the Battle of Southern Shandong, the Shandong and Central China Field Army wiped out 2 reorganized divisions, 4 brigades, 1 fast column (including 1 infantry brigade) and 1 regiment of the Kuomintang Army, totaling more than 53,000 people, with only more than 8,000 casualties.A large number of weapons and equipment were seized, including 24 tanks, more than 470 cars, and 217 guns of various types (including 48 105mm howitzers).These heavy equipment provided the material basis for the formation of special forces of the People's Liberation Army.Due to the seizure of more than 1,000 light and heavy machine guns, many field troops expanded the battalion machine gun platoon into a machine gun company after the war.

The victory of the Lunan Campaign, the East China Liberation Army captured a large number of Kuomintang military personnel and weapons and equipment, especially the capture of a large number of modern weapons and captured a large number of technical personnel, which provided the necessary conditions for the construction of the East China Liberation Army special forces. The victory of the Battle of Southern Shandong, the East China Liberation Army recovered Pixian County, Yixian County, and Zaozhuang, realizing the strategic intention of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China to open up the southern Shandong battlefield and prepare for a larger annihilation war. On January 21, Mao Zedong sent a telegram to Chen Yi, Su Yu, and Tan Zhenlin: "From the day after the capture of Zaozhuang, the whole army will be trained for two weeks, and all forces will be concentrated to wipe out Ou Zhen." The whole division achieved unprecedented victories. The main disadvantage is that it failed to concentrate Shanye and Huaye in one battle in the two battles of Subei and Lunan, and Ou Zhen and Li Yannian restrained more than 20 regiments of our army. Otherwise, Hu Lian The two units of Feng Zhi'an have been wiped out. In the future, we must concentrate 50 regiments on one battlefield to fight against Ouzhen. In the case of Taiwan and Xulincheng, we can only use local guerrillas to monitor them." ("Mao Zedong Military Collection" Vol. 3, No. 632 Page) Chen, Su, and Tan followed the instructions and seized the gaps between the wars to supplement, reorganize and train troops, and at the same time stepped up investigation and research on the movements of the Kuomintang army to prepare for new battles.

The Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China spoke highly of the significance of the Battle of Southern Shandong. On January 14, 1947, it pointed out in a telegram to the heads of the Shandong and Central China Field Army: "The victory in southern Shandong opens the situation. We have seized the initiative and the enemy has fallen into a passive position." ( "Mao Zedong Military Collection" Volume 3, Military Science Press, Central Literature Publishing House, December 1993, first edition, p. 618) Su Yu, commander of the Central China Field Army, believes: "The battles of Subei and Lunan are the two key battles (in East China) for our army to transform from frontier operations in the liberated areas to in-depth operations. If these two battles are fought well, this transformation will turn around." He He also believed that these two battles also had special significance for the construction of the PLA; they played a major role in solving the ideological problem of withdrawing the Central China troops from northern Jiangsu to Shandong, and in comprehensively training and improving the combat effectiveness of the troops; especially for Shandong and Central China. The field army has laid the foundation for the centralization and unification of its combat guiding ideology, command relationship, and organizational establishment. (A transcript of a conversation by Su Yu at the Academy of Military Sciences, December 1981)

In the Battle of Southern Shandong, the Shandong and Central China field armies concentrated their absolute superior forces to annihilate the enemy individually, accurately selected the direction and target of the attack, strictly organized the division of battles and tactical encirclement, timely transferred troops to expand the results of the battle, and used inferior equipment to attack the enemy's armored forces. All achieved great success.When Chen Yi talked about the operational characteristics of the Lunan Campaign, he pointed out that the method of drilling holes and digging hearts has a special effect on the densely packed Kuomintang army. "When our army approaches several enemy armies, when we use advance tactics, we don't need to drill the gap and dig the heart. We can only attack from the front or the flank, and we can't achieve the goal of annihilating the enemy. This kind of tactic is formally breaking into the enemy's encirclement. It is risky. In fact, it is a surprise attack by a group of troops, which is the easiest to work." "In the Lunan campaign, a column was inserted between the enemy's Ma Liwu 26th Division and Feng Zhian's 77th and 59th Divisions. With the division headquarters of the 26th Division and its tank units, the distance between the Feng Department and the Ma Liwu Department is only ten or twenty miles away," which is a successful example. (Chen Yi: "Experience in Organizing Campaigns and Battles")

When the Kuomintang Army reviewed the lessons learned from the Lunan Campaign, it said: In terms of strategy, "Our army and corps are too separated. When the bandits retreat from northern Jiangsu to the north of Xin'an Town, our Ouzhen Corps, 74th Division, 11th Division and other departments, There was no active action to contain the bandit army, so that the bandit could completely concentrate its forces to defeat our 26th Division. After that, our Ouzhen Corps continued to travel slowly,...with a daily journey of eight kilometers. After arriving in Xin'an Town, and After two days of rest, "the bandits were able to defeat our 51st Division again."In terms of tactics, "Our army in southern Shandong is too prominent, the front-line troops are sticking to the point line, and the front is too wide", so that they are surrounded and defeated by various forces (Edited by the Kuomintang Officer Training Corps: "Review of Important Battles in the Past Year").