Chapter 88 7. The Kuomintang army summed up the experience and lessons

When the Kuomintang army launched the third attack on the Linjiang base in South Manchuria, our army in North Manchuria crossed the Songhua River for the second time and started the second battle in the south of the Yangtze River.The basic deployment of the Northeast Democratic Alliance Army Headquarters for the second attack on the south of the Yangtze River is: to concentrate the troops of 3 field columns and 3 independent divisions in the North Manchuria, a total of 12 divisions, and go south. The camera wiped out the Kuomintang army that came to aid Jiutai and Dehui; the second step besieged Dehui, and the camera wiped out the Kuomintang army that came to aid Changchun and Nong'an.The South Manchurian troops are required to cooperate closely in the entire combat process; the Eastern Manchurian and Western Manchurian troops are required to actively carry out the battle against the Jifeng Line (Jifeng Line, referring to the railway line from Jilin City to Shenyang City) and the Changshen Line The sabotage activities prevented the reinforcements of the Kuomintang army.

The first step was to attack Chengzi Street, and the Northeast Democratic Alliance Army won the first victory in the daytime battle against the Kuomintang Army's strong fortified town.However, when we attacked Dehui in the second step, our army concentrated 4 divisions, but the absolute advantage of more than 80 artillery pieces was not defeated. What is the reason? 1. The guiding ideology of underestimating the enemy led to reckless command. 2. Improper selection of the main attack direction and the equal distribution of troops and firepower are the main reasons for the failure of the attack.

3. Improper use of artillery. Although these reasons are not among the six weaknesses of our army listed in the "Experience and Lessons in Combat Against Bandits" compiled by the enemy's chief of staff, they also taught our army commanders a lesson: to fight modern warfare In order to defeat a well-trained and powerful enemy, it is not enough to rely on numbers and bravery. We must adhere to the principle of concentrating our forces, and we must carefully prepare for the battle. There must be adequate estimates and countermeasures. Just as Lin Biao pointed out in his call to 6 Zong after the battle: "The Dehui battle showed that you did not concentrate the firepower and troops with absolute superiority in the focus of the attack. You did not understand enough about the one-point-two-front tactics that emphasized concentrating the main force to attack the enemy and one weakness. Divide the force equally and split the attack This style of fighting can still be used against weak, fleeing, or defeated enemies, but against an enemy who is determined to defend and has a position, he will definitely suffer." (Six Columns Experience Summary: Dehui Combat)

The following is the "Experience and Lessons in Combat Against Bandits" compiled by the Kuomintang Army, which was captured by the 4th Column in South Manchuria in November 1946. "Experience and Lessons in Combat Against Bandits", from the analysis of the Siping Battle and a series of previous operations, studied the combat characteristics of our army, and summarized seven points when talking about the advantages of our army: 1. Attack at any cost. 2. Good at night fighting. 3. Be good at using folk manpower and material resources. Fourth, the intelligence is flexible, and can use the people to sneak into our side to spy on the military situation.

5. Supplies are provided to the people, and the marching equipment is less heavy and the movement is light. 6. The efficiency of political work in the army is good, and the commanding organization supervises the battle directly behind the troops during the battle. 7. Concealment of intentions and actions. They concluded that our army has six weaknesses: 1. Poor equipment. 2. The training is too poor, the terrain and features are not well used, and the sports are often exposed. 3. Every time a place is captured, they often gather in one place, causing casualties. Fourth, the fighting spirit is not strong, the ammunition is insufficient, and it is difficult to last.

5. Life is hard, and fleeing winds are on the rise. Most of the "bandit troops" are good civilians and are forced to join the army. Sixth, taking and giving from the people will lead to resentment from the people. Excluding the insulting and defamatory elements, it should be said that the Kuomintang has grasped some actual conditions.