Chapter 85 4. A series of operational principles of the Democratic Alliance Army

Compared with the 400,000 soldiers of the Kuomintang Army, the 300,000 General Corps of the Northeast Democratic Coalition Army seemed a little weak, and the battlefield environment was harsh, and the mobilization of the masses was not deep.In terms of military strength, I am far less than the Northeast Kuomintang Army. In July, due to the temporary truce on the enemy's battlefield, it provided me with an opportunity to step up and reorganize the army.Our main force has been reorganized into 5 columns and 15 divisions, and 10 independent divisions and 44 independent regiments. Artillery, armor, engineering and other arms have been initially established.The local troops were reorganized into 3 military regions in the east, west and south, and 6 small military regions.At the same time, each military region formed the first batch of second-line corps in preparation for going to the front line in time to replenish the main force.At this time, the total strength of our army in the Northeast was about 300,000.

In terms of the battlefield environment, the winter in Northeast China is extremely cold. The lowest temperature in most parts of North Manchuria is around minus 30 degrees Celsius; most parts of South Manchuria are also around minus 20 degrees Celsius.This made it very difficult for the Northeast Democratic Alliance Army, which lacked cold-proof equipment at that time, to operate and march, and was especially unfavorable for night operations and long-term field operations.At the same time, the rivers in the North Manchuria area were blocked, and the Songhua River, Yitong River, Yinma River, and Xinkai River criss-crossed each other, which caused great obstacles to the actions of the PLA's large corps.The main force of the Northeast Democratic Alliance Army assembled north of the Songhua River can only maneuver back and forth on the river surface by taking advantage of the icy season that lasts for more than three months.This also brought seasonal limitations to the strategic cooperation between South and North Manchuria.

In terms of people's and social conditions, as mentioned above, due to the late establishment of the Northeast Liberated Areas, the conditions of the masses are far inferior to those of the old liberated areas in the pass, coupled with transportation and other reasons, our operations and combat support are very difficult. In response to these special circumstances in the Northeast battlefield, the Northeast Democratic Alliance Army Headquarters determined the following operational principles: Concentrate absolutely superior forces to fight small and medium-scale mobile warfare and annihilation warfare.The headquarters has repeatedly instructed the field corps: "In terms of operational policy, at the present stage, we do not adopt large-scale defensive warfare or attack large-scale stationed enemies, but adopt concentrated forces to fight in small-scale mobile warfare, focusing on annihilating the enemy's vital forces. Maintain small and medium-sized cities and vast villages. This will cause the enemy to be in a conflict where if they are over-dispersed, they will be annihilated by us individually, and if they are over-concentrated, large areas will fall under the control of our army." Telegram from the Military Commission and the heads of ministries, October 19, 1946)

"Prepare to give up some places temporarily and take the initiative, and concentrate our forces to wipe out the enemy one by one, attack individual small groups of the enemy, or part of the enemy's route."Advocate that "small battles should be fought as big ones" and "kill chickens with a sledgehammer".It is required to concentrate 6 to 9 times the enemy's strength in each battle, "A division of mine should usually find about one battalion of the enemy's troops to fight; a column of mine should usually find about one regiment of the enemy's troops to fight; two or three columns should be used to fight However, when the situation is favorable, of course, this multiple can be reduced as appropriate.” (Lin Biao, Peng Zhen, Gao Gang, Chen Yunzhi to each column)

Emphasize "concentrate forces to find scattered small enemies and annihilate them one by one", in order to accumulate small victories into big victories, and gradually weaken the enemy forces in the Northeast.Take this tactic as the "main combat method" to win the Northeast. (Lin Biao sent a message to the heads of various ministries, October 19, 1946) From October 1946, when the Kuomintang army re-launched a large-scale attack on the Northeast Liberated Area, to the spring of 1947, the Northeast Democratic Alliance Army Headquarters attached great importance to summarizing and promoting the concentrated forces of various troops. The experience of annihilating battalions and regiments to organize the Kuomintang army.

Advocate fighting "hard fight".The Northeast Democratic Coalition Army Headquarters believes that with the Kuomintang army's strength, rapid reinforcements, and poor conditions for the masses, it is difficult to carry out a war of annihilation under usually superior conditions on the Northeast battlefield.However, in the situation where the Kuomintang army is aggressively attacking South Manchuria and nibbling and compressing West Manchuria and East Manchuria, if we avoid fighting everywhere, it will definitely fuel the enemy's arrogance, dampen our morale and people's hearts, and create an increasingly passive situation.For this reason, it was proposed in December 1946, "In a certain period of time (the base area is half-baked), and within a certain limit (with the strength of several divisions, not the entire army), sometimes even if the conditions are not sufficient, we must Fight resolutely and fiercely, and strive to become a war of annihilation. If it cannot be annihilated, as long as the enemy has been severely hit... it will be considered a victory" (Lin Biao to Xiao Jinguang, Chen Yundian, December 24, 1946), the purpose of which is to dampen the morale of the enemy and block the The enemy's attack, defend the construction of the liberated area.The headquarters called this kind of battle, which does not hesitate to pay a high price, "only 60% or 70% certainty is determined to fight" (Lin Biao: "Hard Fight", January 1947), as a "hard fight" as a specific stage and A tactic the enemy must employ in order to gain the initiative.

Mobilize the entire Northeast Army to vigorously carry out "breaking the road" in the areas occupied by the Kuomintang army.In view of the fact that the northeast railway network is dense and conducive to the maneuvering of the Kuomintang army, the headquarters of the Northeast Democratic Alliance Army requested the field army and local army in the whole region to regard "breaking the road" as "one of the biggest strategic tasks" in the winter of 1946, as a part of the long-term struggle against the Kuomintang army. means. "Repair in the east and break in the west, repair in the south and break in the north, repair in the day and night" (Northeast Democratic Alliance Army Headquarters: "Instructions on Overturning the Railway", November 1, 1946; Lin Biao's instructions to the ministries, November 5, 1946) , Repeatedly, so that the enemy cannot open traffic.It also notified and promoted the "Railway Turnover" created by the 1st Security Brigade of the Liaoji Military Region ("Railway Turnover" is a method of mass destruction of railways. The method of operation is: use a company's corps with 30 iron picks , 30 wooden bars, 30 thick ropes, after removing the connected screws and spikes from one side of the rail, plan the roadbed three to four meters to separate the sleepers from the roadbed, and then use wooden bars to pry up the section of the railroad track. One side, and at the same time use a thick rope to pull the rail to turn to the other side. In this way, "turning over" section by section, it can destroy more than 15 kilometers per day).In order to ensure the supply of road-breaking equipment, the military and civilian machinery industries in Harbin, Qiqihar and other places were organized to rush to manufacture thousands of sets of iron rods and screw wrenches for prying roads and distribute them to the company.

Send small troops to fight the "Sparrow War" to harass and exhaust the Kuomintang army.In order to combat the enemy's fierce offensive, the headquarters of the Northeast Democratic Alliance Army instructed the field corps to "in addition to gathering the main force to wait for the opportunity to carry out the annihilation battle, they must send a part of them into multiple units to fight the enemy."The results of this kind of battle "should not be based on the number of prisoners or captures, but should be based on the number of times the enemy was fired."Its function is to "delay, disperse, confuse, discourage, exhaust, and kill the enemy. At the same time, it can be used to detect the enemy's situation and cover our main force's combat preparations. If this kind of battle is carried out without dividing troops, the enemy will feel that it is easy to advance...and will advance more aggressively. ".This kind of fighting is regarded as "one of the necessary steps in the whole operation" in the Northeast battlefield under the condition that mass guerrilla warfare has not been widely developed. (Lin Biao’s telegram to the heads of ministries, December 12, 1946)

In view of the vast territory of the Northeast battlefield, the characteristics of the Kuomintang's strong mobility and rapid changes, the headquarters of the Northeast Democratic Alliance Army adopted the method of "leapfrog command", requiring the heads of all levels above the division (brigade) to maintain direct radio contact with the headquarters and report to the troops at any time. Location and surrounding enemy situation.When the situation is urgent, the headquarters will directly issue combat orders to the relevant divisions (brigades), and at the same time take care of the head of the column and the neighboring troops.