Chapter 82 Chapter Ten Three Downs to the South of the Yangtze River and Four Protections to the Linjiang Battle: A Battle That Turned the Situation of the Northeast War

The winter of 1946 was the most difficult period for the Northeast Democratic Alliance Army. This winter, at the southern foot of Changbai Mountain, which is located in a remote valley, barren, sparsely populated, and supplies are scarce, Linjiang, a small county on the bank of the Yalu River, is crowded with the leading organs of the South Manchurian Party, government and army and their troops. On the front is a menacing enemy, behind it is the virgin forest of the Changbai Mountains, and on the flanks is North Korea across the river.Whether to withdraw or stay, to abandon South Manchuria or stick to South Manchuria, has reached the critical moment to finally decide the fate of South Manchuria.

In order to smash the enemy's key offensive, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Chairman Mao Zedong have long telegraphed the Northeast Bureau to make various preparations.On November 1, 1946, the Northeast Bureau issued the "Instructions on Strategic Missions in South Manchuria", which proposed the mission and operational policy of persisting in the struggle for South Manchuria.He pointed out that the task of the current South Manchuria base area "is to weaken and restrain the enemy, preserve itself, and persist in the base area"; "sufficient troops should be dispersed to restore rural work and suppress bandits behind the enemy; at the same time, control enough troops to destroy the enemy 1 small troops scattered around the battalion”; “We must move the stored weapons and ammunition quickly, so as not to fight cover battles and lose things.” Our army should fight battles that can annihilate the enemy, and not "Fight" is the highest principle of action. Do not fight passive defensive warfare in a small area.

In order to strengthen the leadership of the struggle to persevere in South Manchuria, the Northeast Bureau decided to set up the South Manchurian Sub-bureau on October 31 with the approval of the Central Committee. Hua served as deputy secretary, deputy commander of the military region, and deputy political commissar.Since then, under the leadership of the Nanman Sub-bureau, the party, government, army and people in Nanman have carried out a great struggle of great strategic significance. At this time, the enemy army was rushing towards the Linjiang area, and the situation became increasingly critical.In this dark cloud and the situation is very difficult and dangerous, in order to unify the ideological understanding of the whole party and army in South Manchuria and determine the correct struggle policy, on December 10, 1946, a meeting of cadres above the army division was held in Qidaojiang. There was a lively discussion on the current situation and operational policy issues.The central topic of discussion was: to persist in the struggle in South Manchuria, or to abandon South Manchuria and go to North Manchuria?If we insist on southern Manchuria, should we concentrate our forces and actively defend, or disperse our forces and passively defend?There was a heated debate at the meeting.

Comrades who advocate abandoning the southern Manchurian movement to the north believe that we cannot fight the enemy decisively in Changbai Mountain, because the enemy's "south first and then north" combat policy is an attempt to drive our main force from southern Manchuria to Changbai Mountain, where we will fight with us in Changbai Mountain, wiped out or trapped to death our army.However, the terrain of Changbai Mountain is narrow, and our large corps has no room for maneuver in combat. Coupled with the lack of soldiers, food and grass, it is not a place for the main force to stay for a long time.If you fight a decisive battle with the enemy here, you will be outnumbered, and you will surely wipe out the main force.Comrades who advocate persisting in the struggle in South Manchuria believe that the main force of the enemy must be held back in South Manchuria. Although there are many difficulties and high costs, it is beneficial to the entire Northeast War situation.The more enemies we attract and eliminate in South Manchuria, the more conducive to the development of the entire battle situation; the strategic position of South Manchuria is very important, and insisting on South Manchuria will be beneficial to our future strategic counterattack; there are many small hills in South Manchuria, and the terrain is beneficial to us, which is convenient for size If the activities of the troops are used well, they will definitely be able to gain a foothold in Nanman.

The meeting was deadlocked on the question of whether to stay or not, and the question of combat was even more difficult to determine.