Chapter 69 5. Should Zhangjiakou be abandoned or defended?

The information sent from the Beiping underground work system and the enemy's dynamics grasped by the military region.All confirmed that the situation in Zhangjiakou is grim.So, what kind of policy should be adopted for Zhangjiakou?Stick to Zhangjiakou or give up Zhangjiakou?Nie Rongzhen stood in front of the map thinking all day long.He knows that our troops have been fighting continuously in the outskirts of Datong and Jining, which has caused a lot of wear and tear, and needs to be replenished and rested in time.Zhangjiakou is located in a fortress, and the enemy has unstoppable ambitions.These days, the planes of the Kuomintang army have bombed and strafed Zhangjiakou from time to time.If our army wants to stick to Zhangjiakou blindly, the enemy will definitely concentrate its forces and attack from multiple directions. At that time, the soldiers and civilians of Shanxi, Chahar and Hebei will have to fight against the superior enemy under unfavorable conditions, and they will fall into a passive position.

Give up Zhangjiakou?Nie Rongzhen felt an indescribable feeling in his heart.He felt it every time the thought came to his mind.Zhangjiakou was directly taken back from the Japanese army after our army paid the price of blood. If you give up, what will the troops think? Among the general commanders of our army, especially the senior cadres, there are still great differences of opinion on whether to stick to Zhangjiakou or abandon Zhangjiakou.There are generally three opinions: One is that they think that Zhangjiakou can't hold it, and they may be forced to retreat, and the loss will be great.During the Second Civil Revolutionary War, we were forced to withdraw from the Central Soviet Area and embark on a 25,000-mile long march. Now Chiang Kai-shek has more troops than then, and with the support of the United States, how do we fight?

The second is that we have troops such as the Jinsui Military Region and the 3rd Column, and there are troops such as the Jireliao Military Region and the 2nd Column in the east, and Zhangjiakou can be defended.The third is that more people are reluctant to lose Zhangjiakou, thinking that this is the only big city captured by our army since the anti-Japanese counter-offensive, how can they be willing to give up?They took Feng Yuxiang's defense of Zhangjiakou as an example to prove that Zhangjiakou can and should be defended. In order to unify everyone's thinking, Nie Rongzhen presided over a meeting of the Jinchaji Central Bureau.Most leaders of the Central Bureau, including Xiao Ke, Liu Lantao, and Luo Ruiqing, attended the meeting and agreed with Nie Rongzhen that Zhangjiakou should be abandoned if necessary.After heated discussions, the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Central Bureau made the decision to abandon Zhangjiakou.

Xiao Ke later recalled: "Abandoning Zhangjiakou, the Central Bureau held a meeting and voted, and I first agreed. The ideological work within the party is difficult to do. Some people have poor strategic vision and discuss the facts. Because of the abandonment of the Pingsui Line, it is possible to attack the enemy on the Pingchao Road. Weakness. Comrade Nie Rongzhen and I have seen this. This is a correct measure." ("Biography of Nie Rongzhen") On September 15, Nie Rongzhen made a report on "Do Not Consider the Gains and Losses of One City and One Place, and Strive to Defeat the Enemy" at the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Central Bureau Cadres Conference.He proposed: Our army abandoned Chengde on the eastern front, and withdrew from Datong on the western front. Zhangjiakou was surrounded by enemies on both sides. "In the event of an unfavorable situation, don't put all your eggs in one basket. This does not mean giving up all towns and cities easily. For example, the big city of Zhangjiakou is a big burden on our shoulders. It is not absolutely impossible to give up, but we must not give up easily." Targeting the enemy's troops Insufficient characteristics, Nie Rongzhen pointed out, "Our strategic policy is to focus on the mobile warfare of the large corps, and the campaign guidance is based on the principles of quick-decision warfare and annihilation warfare." ("Nie Rongzhen Military Selected Works")

After the idea was matured, on September 17, Nie Rongzhen, Xiao Ke, Liu Lantao, and Luo Ruiqing jointly reported to the Central Military Commission the issue of abandoning Zhangjiakou. On the 18th, the Central Military Commission immediately replied to Nie Rongzhen and others, pointing out: "Concentrate the main force in an appropriate area and wait for the enemy to advance in separate routes, annihilate one of its divisions (about two regiments), and see the situation after success. Part of it can break the enemy's first attack. According to the terrain and mass conditions from Nankou to Zhangjiakou, we have made full preparations in advance and wiped out the enemy one by one. It is possible to break this attack." "This kind of wipeout The enemy's plan is to mobilize under the slogan of defending Chahar, but the focus is on annihilating the enemy's vital forces, not on conserving individual places, so that the main force can move freely and actively seek out possible enemies to fight. If it is not good for me, I can temporarily decide not to fight. If you decide not to fight in advance, you will lose the opportunity to fight, and it will be very bad for the morale of the army." "It doesn't take a lot of troops to wipe out one regiment or two regiments at a time. Use several regiments to contain the enemy on all fronts, and if you concentrate ten to fifteen regiments, it is possible to wipe out one brigade (two regiments). It is not inconsistent with actively arranging plans to wipe out the enemy." ("Mao Zedong Military Anthology" Volume 3)