Chapter 67 3. Zhangjiakou was besieged

According to the instructions put forward by the central government to "capture the three roads and four cities, first lay down Pinghan Road, Shijiazhuang, and Baoding", Nie Rongzhen pointed out that without the cooperation of Shanxi, Hebei, Shandong and Henan, it would be difficult to implement the instructions of the central government. It is recommended to spend half a month first. Cooperate with Jinsui to lay down Datong.The Central Reply agrees.So in July, in order to isolate Datong, the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei and the Jinsui Military Regions cooperated in the Battle of Northern Shanxi.The troops of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region liberated towns such as Shanyin, Fanzhi, Yuanping, Wutai, and Dingxiang in more than 40 days, wiped out more than 8,000 enemies, and basically achieved the expected goal.After the Battle of Northern Shanxi, the Datong and Jining Battles were organized with the Jinsui Military Region.

On August 2, Nie Rongzhen went to Yanggao to preside over the battle meeting of the Datong Campaign.According to the fact that Datong’s defensive force is not strong, but its city defense is solid, it is determined to besiege Datong with 5 brigades, and first wipe out the enemies on the periphery. At the same time as the siege, another 4 brigades will be deployed to fight Fu Zuoyi’s possible reinforcements, and form a front-line headquarters. Zhang Zongxun, the deputy commander of the Jinsui Field Army, served as the commander, Luo Ruiqing, the deputy political commissar of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region, served as the political commissar, and Yang Chengwu, the commander of the third column, served as the deputy commander.

The battle began on July 31.The city of Datong was underestimated and failed to conquer as planned. On September 2, Fu Zuoyi's three divisions reinforced Datong, which was in my expectation.Fu Bu entered Jining and was surrounded.When the enemy was about to be wiped out, Fu Zuoyi sent another division to reinforce Jining.Due to the improper command of the front-line commanders, instead of concentrating all their efforts to eat the enemy's 3 divisions first, they turned around and attacked the enemy's reinforcement division. Later, Nie Rongzhen summed up the lessons in his memoirs and said: "Initiating the Battle of Datong was improperly considered. Because although the enemy's strength in Datong is not strong, the city defense facilities are quite strong. At that time, our army had no heavy weapons. , and lack of experience in tackling tough battles, how can we have the confidence to capture Datong?" ("Memoirs of Nie Rongzhen", People's Liberation Army Press, March 2, 1986, p. 631)

Under such circumstances, the troops withdrew from Jining on the 13th, withdrew from the siege of Datong on the 16th, and abandoned Chengde on the 28th. So far, Zhangjiakou was attacked from east and west, forming a passive situation.Nie Rongzhen weighed the pros and cons, and believed that our army has always focused on annihilating the enemy's vital forces, regardless of the gains and losses of a city or a place, and was determined to abide by the rules, and voluntarily abandon Zhangjiakou when necessary.