Chapter 46 2. Su Yu has different opinions on the instructions of his superiors

This is related to the planning of the entire war situation in Central China in the future.After Su Yu received the instructions from the Central Military Commission, based on his understanding of the military situation of the KMT and the Communist Party in East China, he was very contradictory.It was late at night, and there were sounds of frogs, but Su Yu could not fall asleep.On the night of receiving the telegram from the Central Committee, he drafted a telegram to the Central Committee and the military headquarters of the New Fourth Army, stating the advantages and disadvantages, and suggested that the main force of central China stay in central Soviet Union to fight.In his telegram, he stated the advantages and disadvantages of fighting on the outside and inside. He analyzed:

First, in the central Soviet Union, the environment is relatively stable, and it takes a process for the troops to transition to a state of war.In the early days of the war, if the main force of our Central China Field Army fought in Huainan, not only the supply of food and grass needed to be guaranteed, but even the former migrant workers also needed supplies from the Soviet Union.The arrival of the main force, together with migrant workers and cadres, requires at least 100,000 catties of grain per day, and the grain needed for two or three months can reach tens of millions of catties. The task of supplying other military supplies is also quite heavy. This will give our army Operations in the central Soviet Union brought great difficulties.

Second, there are currently 9 enemy brigades in central Soviet Union. If our main force in central China moves westward, the remaining troops will not be able to take on the task of containment. There is a great possibility that the area will be quickly occupied by the enemy.Central Jiangsu is rich and sparsely populated, with a population of 9 million, accounting for two-fifths of the total population of central China, grain also accounts for two-fifths of the total output of central China, commerce along the river is prosperous, and taxation accounts for half of central China, all of which support the war Great power, once it falls into the hands of the enemy, it will be used by the enemy.Moreover, Suzhong is close to Beijing and Shanghai. If it is abandoned without a fight, the political influence will also be unfavorable.

Third, there is the enemy's 5th Army in Huainan, and a brigade of the reorganized 74th Division is also in Huainan.The other two brigades are in Nanjing, and if they fight, they will inevitably cross Huainan from the north.Both of these two troops belong to the five main forces of Jiang's army, plus other enemy troops in Huainan, their strength is relatively strong.Relatively speaking, the enemy in the Soviet Union and China is relatively weak. If you have different opinions on the instructions of your superiors, you will feel like you have a bone stuck in your throat, and you will not vomit quickly.This is a general who commands actual combat and is highly responsible for the party's cause.But after the telegram to the central government was sent away, Su Yu still couldn't calm down.He thought, would his suggestion affect the decision-making of the central government?Will my own consideration be a partial view of the problem?In short, he worried whether his ideas would have an adverse impact on the revolutionary cause.

After the telegram arrived in Yan'an, Mao Zedong and the Central Military Commission attached great importance to Su Yu's analysis, and decided to change the original strategic deployment after research.And call back to Su Yu. The next day, Su Yu received a reply from the Central Military Commission: "The troops continue to hide in the standby position and wait for arrangements." After receiving the telegram from the Central Military Commission, Su Yu calmed down.Then, he repeatedly negotiated with several other leaders of the military region, and jointly reported to the central government in the names of Zhang Dingcheng, Deng Zihui, Su Yu, and Tan Zhenlin and Chen Yi: It is suggested that the 1st and 6th divisions should fight a few battles in central Jiangsu first, and then go to the second In the second stage, it will go west to Huainan.

At the beginning of July, the central government found out from all parties that the Kuomintang troops in Jiaoji, Xuzhou, northern Henan, eastern Henan, and northern Jiangsu might attack our Jiangsu, Henan and Anhui bases at the same time.The Central Military Commission made important adjustments to the original combat plan, instructing Zhang, Deng, Su, and Tan: "First win a few battles on the inside line, and then transfer to the outside line, which is more politically beneficial." In this way, Su Yu and others adhered to the policy of fighting between the Soviet Union and China, which has actually been affirmed.

In his later years, Su Yu talked about the guiding ideology of insisting on fighting in the middle of the Soviet Union and said: "The cadres and soldiers below the battalion of our army are basically born and bred; , persisted in the war of resistance for eight years, formed a flesh-and-blood relationship with the people, and had a very harmonious and close relationship with the local party and government. At that time, the leadership of the party, government and army was unified. This is an invincible force of ours. Our troops are very familiar with the terrain, geography, roads, human conditions, and customs at that time, which is also a very favorable condition for our army to fight. At the same time, our army's supplies don't matter what lines of communication Very long question, our rear is everywhere, our sick and wounded can be accommodated everywhere, and supplies can be obtained everywhere, so we don’t have any worries.” “We considered at that time, if we don’t take advantage of these favorable conditions in the Soviet Union and China to fight A few battles and withdrawal without fighting will not only affect morale, but will also greatly lose the support of the people, and it will also affect the confidence of local cadres, party and government agencies, let alone persist in the struggle in that locality.” (Su Yu: 1978) talk on May 16)