Chapter 34 8. Lin Biao withdraws from Siping

On the night of May 18, the Siping defenders withdrew from their positions one after another and quietly left the battlefield.The Siping Defense War, which lasted for a month, is over. Although our army dealt a heavy blow to the Kuomintang army in this unprecedented battle, we also paid a huge price. According to the later statistics of the Northeast Field Army Command: "The total number of casualties in the Siping defense battle reached more than 8,000 people, and the strength of the troops was greatly lost. Huang Kecheng's 3rd Division and 7th Brigade was originally an old Jinggangshan army. After Siping retreated, there were only more than 3,000 people left. Lost combat effectiveness; Wan Yi's 3rd Division originally had 13,000 people, but was dispersed after Siping battle casualties and retreat, leaving only 4,000 to 5,000 people, losing combat effectiveness; The combat effectiveness is still maintained; Deng Huabao's 1st Brigade suffered serious losses, followed by the 3rd Division, 8th Brigade, 10th Brigade, and Yang Guofu's troops were all exhausted and suffered a lot of losses."

Its conclusion is: "Defensive warfare is not an effective means of destroying the enemy. Under the circumstances at that time, it was not appropriate to adopt a large-scale defensive warfare. The Siping defense war was formed due to a wrong estimate of the current situation. To achieve peace. This kind of combat was not very suitable according to the general conditions at the time." (Northeast Military Region Command: "Military Materials of the Three-Year Liberation War in Northeast China") In fact, before the battle started, Lin Biao and Huang Kecheng pointed out that it would be "extremely difficult" to stick to Siping. On April 11, Lin Biao called the Central Committee and the Northeast Bureau to express his opinion on the issue of defending Siping:

"Under the situation that Chiang Kai-shek continues to increase troops in the Northeast, the possibility of me sticking to Siping and capturing Changchun and the possibility of quickly realizing peace in the Northeast are not great. As a result, we can neither defend the city nor lose our strength...According to my opinion, the current policy seems to be to break away from forced warfare and take the initiative to attack." During the same period, Huang Kecheng also called the central government, arguing that it would be "extremely difficult" to stick to Siping when the power gap between the enemy and ourselves was too great.

However, soldiers are bound to obey orders.On the day when the Kuomintang army aggressively attacked Siping, Lin Biao reported to the Northeast Bureau and the Central Committee: "The enemy has begun to attack Siping directly, and our defenders will fight to the last man." During the fierce battle in Siping, Huang Kecheng sent a telegram from Ximan to Lin Biao, suggesting that enough is enough and not to fight the enemy head-on.The reason is: "When the enemy starts to attack, it is permissible to hit him all at once to defeat the enemy's spirit. The current situation is that the enemy is out in force to fight us decisively, and our army does not yet have all the conditions for a decisive battle. Therefore, we should let the big cities out and let the enemy in. We should go to small and medium-sized cities and vast villages to establish base areas and accumulate strength. , then we took the initiative.”

Huang Kecheng sent Lin Biao several telegrams in succession, advising him to retreat from Siping.But Lin Biao neither responded to the call nor withdrew his troops.Huang Kecheng had no choice but to send a telegram to the central government, raising objections to sticking to Siping.The center also refused to answer. Huang Kecheng felt very strange about the attitude of Lin Biao and the Central Committee.The mystery was not solved until fourteen years later.During the Lushan meeting, Mao Zedong chatted with Huang Kecheng.Huang Kecheng talked about Lin Biao's decision-making mistakes in the defense of Siping.Mao Zedong asked: "Could it be that the defense of Siping was fought wrong?" Huang Kecheng explained: "At first the enemy advanced towards Siping, and we hit him for a while, which was not bad. But later, when the enemy assembled heavy troops to find our main force for a decisive battle, we You shouldn’t stick to Siping.” Mao Zedong said: “It was my decision to stick to Siping.” Only then did Huang Kecheng realize that Lin Biao’s refusal to call back was unspeakable.

On May 17, Tazi Mountain on the right side of Siping, the key line of defense in the battle, was surrounded by the enemy on three sides.With the development of the situation to this point, Lin Biao knew in his heart that Siping could no longer stick to it, and it was time to consider retreating.He called Chen Zhengren and Chen Yi and instructed them to draft a telegram to retreat. Lin Biao said: "It is estimated that the enemy will occupy Tazi Mountain tomorrow. Liao Yaoxiang must attack Tazi Mountain with all his strength. If Tazi Mountain falls, the enemy can turn around from our side and block the retreat of our army defending the city in Siping. Passive and in danger of being annihilated. We have exhausted the enemy and bought time. Our defense is victorious, and each of our troops, in particular, has been tempered to a certain extent."

Speaking of this, Lin Biao let out a long sigh: "It's a pity that we didn't cherish and make good use of this time later." He said solemnly to all his subordinates around him: "Peaceful air is the most harmful thing in our Northeast today. The enemy with weapons and equipment is still underestimated, and the 3rd vertical line of defense was quickly broken through by the New Army, which affected the overall situation of the defense war. Sure enough, as Lin Biao expected, a fierce battle broke out in Tazi Mountain early on the morning of the 18th.At this critical juncture, Lin Biao finally sent an emergency telegram to Mao Zedong: "Several positions in the east of Siping have been lost. At this moment, the enemy is attacking fiercely, and the situation is critical." .The situation on the front line of Siping reached the most dangerous moment. Lin Biao made a decisive decision without waiting for the central government to call back.He called the Chief of Operations and the Chief of Intelligence, and dictated the order: "The 7th Division will retreat on the North Mountain of Sandaolinzi, and the 7th Brigade will retreat across the board at the southeast highland in Siping."

From 8:30 in the evening, according to the plan formulated by the former general, all troops withdrew from their positions in an orderly manner.The 56th Regiment in Siping City was returned to the Wanyi Column, and the Artillery Regiment was returned to the 7th Division.The peripheral troops quietly left the fortifications and trenches, and retreated separately to the rear assembly point under the cover of night.Due to the tight organization and good secrecy, although the Kuomintang army was right in front of them, they didn't notice it.Also played guns and cannons all night.At 9 o'clock in the evening, when the troops began to withdraw, Lin Biao sent a telegram to Mao Zedong:

Central and Northeast Bureaus: The enemy used aircraft, artillery, tanks and vehicles to cover the infantry's onslaught today. The main position in the northeast of the city was lost and could not be recovered. Lin Qiaohai On the morning of May 19th, Mao Zedong sent a telegram to Lin Biao: "First, our army held on to Siping for a month and fought against ten divisions of the enemy army, which showed the high tenacity and heroic spirit of the people's army. Second, if you feel that it is impossible to continue defending Siping, you should voluntarily abandon Siping, delay the enemy with a front, and withdraw the main force to the two wings to rest, and prepare to change from positional warfare to mobile warfare." The telegram concluded: " What policy should be adopted is for Lin to decide according to the situation." ("Mao Zedong Military Collection" Volume III)