Chapter 19 2. Liu Bocheng knows the enemy's situation like the palm of his hand

On September 19, 1945, Hu Zongnan, the commander-in-chief of the 1st theater of the Kuomintang, was ordered by Chiang Kai-shek to convene a military meeting in Zhengzhou.The meeting decided: the 40th Army of Mafawu, the 30th Army of Lu Chongyi, and the New 8th Army of Gao Shuxun assembled in Xinxiang will be incorporated into the 11th theater, and will be under the command of Sun Lianzhong, the commander of the 11th theater.At the same time, Ma Fawu and Gao Shuxun were announced as the deputy commanders-in-chief of the 11th theater. Their mission was to open up the Pinghan Road, cooperate with Hu Zong's southern main force to go north, and occupy the strategically important Pingjin area. The 30th Army entered Beiping, the New 8th Army entered Baoding, and the 40th Army occupied Handan and Xingtai.Taking advantage of the main forces of Liu and Deng to fight in Shangdang, it was impossible to divide the troops to cut off the Tongpu Road. Hu Zongnan commanded the 3rd and 16th armies of the 1st theater to arrive in Shijiazhuang via the Tongpu and Zhengtai railways, and the 1st army of the follow-up force advanced to Wenxi, Shanxi.Sun Lianzhong did not dare to neglect, and commanded the two armies of Ma Fawu and Gao Shuxun in Xinxiang to cross the Yellow River and go north along Pinghan Road. ("Summary of the Historical Facts of the Handan Uprising", see Ren Peiyu Editor-in-Chief: "Handan Uprising")

On October 14, the 30th Army, 40th Army, and New 8th Army set off from Xinxiang and went north along Pinghan Road. Our army kept a close eye on the enemy's movements, and quickly grasped the enemy's action rules and characteristics based on intelligence: 1. The form of advance is to march in parallel columns. The right-wing column is a division of the 40th Army and the 30th Army, and the left-wing column is two divisions of the New 8th Army and the 30th Army.The way of advancing is the method of alternating advance. For example, if the first echelon of the left column advances, the second echelon will stay to cover the advance, so that its side and back are safe, and it will advance alternately.

2. On the way forward for each division, plainclothes scouts are first sent out. At the one-day itinerary, each regiment or echelon regiment also sends plainclothes scouts to the left, right, front, back, and half-day itinerary. Search 1 km away. 3. Build fortifications every time you reach a village, cut down trees to make deer villages, or use carts to block the intersections of streets and alleys, and build fire nests (bunkers) to cover up firepower, so as to strengthen its defense function, and use ditches to dig outer trenches to prevent us from blasting with explosives Its bunker fortifications and other buildings. ("Summary of Preliminary Experience in the Ping-Han Campaign of the Shanxi-Hebei-Luyu Military Region", November 10, 1945)

When the Kuomintang army started to move, it was quite cautious.It took less than 200 miles from Xinxiang to Anyang, and we walked for five days without being blocked by our army. On October 19, Ma Fawu judged that our army might block the attack on both sides of Pinghan Road on the north bank of the Zhanghe River, and ordered the vanguard to cross the river at Fengle Town and Ni Xinzhuang in an attempt to avoid our army's frontal block and detour to Handan to the north.Because the main forces of Shanxi, Hebei, Shandong and Henan had not yet ended the battle of Shangdang, Yang Dezhi led a vertical movement to Handan. After the Kuomintang army successfully crossed the Zhang River, Ma Fawu had the idea of ​​​​underestimating the enemy and accelerated the pace of action.

Ma Fawu's scheming is no match for the experienced Liu Bocheng.He grasped the enemy's weakness by using the image metaphor of "a shit-eating dog can't leave the toilet": "The enemy's attempt is to open up the Ping-Han line. It is inconvenient to walk to the west because of the mountains; to the east is the desert, which is difficult; It is impossible to advance the railway to the north." ("Tactical Issues", June 25, 1946, see "Liu Bocheng Military Selected Works") Liu Bo admitted that he really analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy army:

"These troops are based on the old Northwest Army, and they are relatively effective. They participated in Taierzhuang and other battles in the past. Since the Kuomintang implemented the policy of watching the war during the War of Resistance, they were transferred from the enemy's rear to Western Hubei and Western Henan for training for many years. Therefore, the officers have Higher military literacy and combat experience, strong commanding power, and well-trained soldiers...Because the Kuomintang reactionaries treat miscellaneous cards and direct descendants differently, and those who do not want to be transformed into direct descendants are particularly different, there are contradictions among the armies, In particular, there are progressive elements in the miscellaneous army who advocate peace and democracy, and oppose the fascist civil war and dictatorship. Gao Shuxun’s army is the chief representative of this category, and Chiang Kai-shek’s taboo is the deepest. And American equipment is used to deal with our army’s close combat, especially night hand-to-hand attacks In addition, the large army cannot carry more ammunition and military supplies because it is away from the railway supply, which has become an insurmountable weakness."

"However, the reactionaries ignored these weaknesses. On the contrary, they regarded our army as a guerrilla force that could only disrupt, thinking that with three armies rushing along the Fuyang River, they could leave us on both sides, especially Ci (county) ) Handan (Dan) between the Pinghan Road West side attack, and freely enter Handan and Xingtai, and connect with the 3rd Army and 16th Army in Shijiazhuang. Therefore, it does not need the cooperation of aircraft and tanks, and does not require other corps to be in the vicinity Direct support, without having to bring enough ammunition, can complete the task. This is the pride of "Yelang's arrogance" and the mistake of going deep alone." ("Summary of Tactics in the Battle of Ping-Han", see "Liu Bocheng Military Selected Works")