Chapter 50 2. Seriously divergent provisions

The war dragged on beyond 1951, as negotiations failed to proceed as China and North Korea wanted because of the U.S. administration's stubborn attitude.Negotiators are entangled in several deeply divisive provisions, probing, defending, confronting and attacking each other. This is not an easy battle. On the issue of the principle of sending prisoners, the subcommittee has not made any progress after more than a month of talks.After repeated studies, the Chinese staff involved in the negotiations proposed a plan to sweep away the periphery, isolate key points, and finally force the other party to make concessions on the principle of sending prisoners.After the plan was approved by the central government, representatives from North Korea and China proposed it at the negotiation meeting on February 3, 1952.

The proposal put forward by the DPRK and China took into account the requirements of the U.S. proposal, and made reasonable arrangements for the reasons the U.S. used for refusing to repatriate all prisoners of war, such as the return of civilians and no longer taking part in hostilities.After the proposal was announced, it was praised by international public opinion, and it was inconvenient for the U.S. government to directly oppose it.Thus, on February 7, the fourth item on the agenda was transferred to another form of negotiating meeting—the staff meeting, where the discussion was based on the above-mentioned proposals from the DPRK and China.The staff meeting lasted for 22 days. Except for the principle of repatriation, they basically reached a consensus on the various items of the agenda for the repatriation of prisoners of war. On February 29, the fourth agenda subcommittee resumed its meeting, focusing on the most critical issue of repatriation principles.

In March, representatives from the DPRK and China proposed amendments to the principle of repatriation twice in succession.For the first time, China and North Korea announced that they agreed to repatriate all prisoners of war on the basis of the list of prisoners of war submitted by the two sides. They did not require immediate repatriation of the more than 40,000 prisoners in the list submitted by the United States to the International Committee of the Red Cross. They could be negotiated after the armistice agreement was reached. Solution; for the second time, China and the DPRK proposed that Korean prisoners of war whose origins are in one of the host areas should not be repatriated, and all non-Korean prisoners of war and Korean prisoners of war whose origins were not in the host area should be repatriated.The United States rejected these proposals.

At this stage of the negotiations, the DPRK and China appeared to be proactive, while the US side stuck to the "one-on-one repatriation" clause and was passive at the negotiating table. World public opinion also accused it of unreasonably procrastinating the war. On April 1, the United States proposed an amendment after 110 days of negotiations.The belligerent parties shall release and repatriate all prisoners of war taken in when the armistice agreement was signed and entered into force.Its implementation is based on the list corrected and accepted by both parties before the signing of the Armistice Agreement.At the same time, the United States also proposed two "understandings".

After reading the US amendment, it makes people feel that it is much more progressive and more reasonable than the original proposal.The United States agreed to repatriate all prisoners of war, and it seemed that the distance between the negotiating parties disappeared.In fact, it is not the case. The problem lies in the second article of its "understanding".Through this sloppy and difficult-to-understand literal, it means "those who do not want to be deported do not have to go back."In a proposal by the United States, it said "all prisoners of war must be repatriated" above, and "it is not necessary to repatriate all prisoners of war" below.The complex thinking of Americans makes people miss the point.

In order to prove that a large number of captives are unwilling to repatriate, the U.S. military began to "screen" the captives from North Korea and China starting on April 4. They used threats and lures, and even used bayonets and instruments of torture to force prisoners of war to express their reluctance to repatriate. On April 19, the representative of the United States announced that after "screening", 42,100 Korean prisoners of war and 15,599 volunteer prisoners of war "refused to repatriate", and the number of prisoners who could be repatriated was about 70,000.Public opinion does not believe the figures announced by the US, and even the US itself has expressed doubts about the figures.The history of the Korean War compiled by the Americans after the war said: "The approximate figures provided to the enemy were estimated based on incomplete and inaccurate intelligence." The DPRK and China naturally did not accept the statistical results that the US actually wanted to detain prisoners of war.The United States insisted on this number, and the prisoners of war negotiations reached an impasse.