Chapter 26 4. The loss of the 180th Division

On May 21, the China-North Korea Joint Command issued an order to transfer the main force to rest and reorganize.According to the deployment of the China-North Korea Joint Command, the corps of the Volunteer Army successively issued deployment orders to stop the attack and move the main force northward. On May 23, the main force of the Volunteer Army and the People's Army began to shift. Each corps left a division or an army to adopt the method of mobile defense, blocking the attack step by step, and covering the main force to rest. However, just as the main force of the Volunteer Army began to shift, Li Qiwei adopted the so-called "magnetic tactics" and launched a counterattack across the board. The "United Nations Army" formed a task force of tanks, artillery, and motorized infantry. Under the cover of the air force and long-range artillery, they searched for gaps in the defense lines of the Volunteers and the People's Army, and plunged deeply.And airborne battalion-scale troops seized the rear key points to prevent the main force of the Volunteers from moving northward.The Volunteer Army was once passive, and the 180th Division of the 60th Army suffered serious losses.

Regarding the loss of the 180th Division of the Volunteer Army, there have been various inaccurate claims for a long time.For example, it is said that the 180th Division "was wiped out without fierce fighting", "the flag of the 180th Division is still in the United Nations" and so on.What was the process of the 180th Division's defeat?How much damage did you suffer?What was the reason for the failure?As researchers of military history, we have the responsibility to answer these questions truthfully and objectively using the archives at our disposal. The 60th Army was originally scheduled to deploy on the front line of Gapyeong-Cangdong and organize defense. On the morning of May 9, in view of the lack of transportation capacity and the slow transfer of the wounded, the head of the 3rd Corps decided not to disperse for the time being, but to block the enemy from the north in place to cover the transfer of the wounded.

The 179th Division and the 181st Division of the 60th Army deployed the 12th Army and the 15th Army respectively in the second phase of the campaign, and they had not yet been rebuilt at this time.Therefore, only one division of the 180th Division was responsible for the defensive task in the defensive area of ​​an army in the south bank of the North Han River.Wei Jie and others originally planned for the 180th Division to organize defenses in the northwestern Chuncheon area on the north bank of the North Han River. After receiving the order from the Corps on the morning of May 23, they changed the original plan and made a new blocking deployment on the evening of the same day, that is, ordered the 180th Division Fight against the counterattack of the "United Nations Army" in the Han Valley and Zhengping Mountain areas on the south bank of the Northern Han River, and order the 179th Division to block the attack in Dalong Mountain and the area to the east.At the same time, the troops of the two divisions on the south bank of the Northern Han River were ordered to fight for five days to stop the enemy.

Since then, although the 179th Division and the 181st Division have been rebuilt successively and put into defensive operations, the 60th Army did not adjust the defensive deployment in time according to the enemy's situation and our situation. Neighboring troops also did not coordinate well, which prevented the army from entering the original defense area, resulting in a gap in the section from Jishanli to Mudongli.At the same time, a division of the 63rd Army of the 19th Corps, the right wing of the 60th Army, had moved north on the evening of the 23rd. Therefore, there was another gap at the junction of the 3rd Corps and the 19th Corps.

On May 24, the "Task Force" of the 25th Division of the United States took the opportunity to wedge into the defense line of the Volunteers and occupied the Gapyeong-Jiningli-Songloodang line on the right side of the 180th Division of the Volunteers; the "Task Force" of the 7th Division of the United States After occupying Chuncheon on the left side of the 180th Division; the South Korean 6th Division, which attacked from the front of the 180th Division, has entered Jiangcun on the south bank of the North Han River and controlled the Jiangcunli Ferry.Although the enemy's attack was delayed, the 180th Division, which suffered heavy casualties, was in an extremely unfavorable situation of being attacked on three sides and fighting with its back.

At 11:30 on the 24th, the 60th Army called the 3rd Corps and proposed two plans to prevent the enemy from committing northern crimes. The current position was maintained within the territory, and the main force was transferred to the area north of the North Han River on the evening of the 25th; the troops of the 179th Division located south of the Zhaoyang River also moved northward to the Jiangbei area at the same time; The counterattack, seeking to annihilate a part of the enemy attacking Zhengping Mountain, in order to gain a longer time, cover the northward movement of the main force of the corps and the transfer of the wounded.

Due to communication problems, it was not until 6:50 pm the next day that the 3rd Corps replied to the 60th Army: agreeing to the first plan proposed.The 3rd Corps also instructed the 60th Army: In addition to controlling one division from Gapyeong to the mountains north of Xinyanjiang to take on the task of blocking the enemy, the main force of the army was transferred to Guantingli, Changyanli, and Shichang tank areas for short-term rest.At this time, in view of the dangerous situation of the 180th Division, the 60th Army ordered the division to withdraw to the Tudongri and Sanjuli areas north of the Bukhan River on the 24th in order to get rid of the unfavorable situation.After receiving the order, the 180th Division began to cross the river and withdraw northward on the evening of the 24th, and resisted the enemy's attacks step by step, continuing to cover the main force and transfer the wounded.At dawn on the 25th, the main force of the division withdrew to Jiguan Mountain in Jiangbei - Beipei Mountain - Shangfang Cave - Mingyueli line, but it failed to control the main points.The 24th Division of the United States and the 6th Division of South Korea jointly attacked Jiguan Mountain from the west and south. The 180th Division of the Volunteer Army resisted tenaciously. The position was still taken by the troops of the 6th Division of South Korea.

On the 25th, the 60th Army of the Volunteer Army ordered the 180th Division to continue to move north to Mengde Mountain-Jiade Mountain-a line of highlands north of Tuidongli to block.At the same time, the 536th Regiment of the 179th Division was ordered to occupy positions in Wukou Nanli and Mapingli, north of Chuncheon, to block the US 7th Division from Chuncheon North, and to cover the northward movement of the 180th Division. However, at that time, two battalions of the 179th Division and the 536th Regiment had lost contact. The 180th Division had to move over mountains and mountains during its northward movement. The 24th Division and the 6th Division of South Korea fought, so they moved slowly and failed to reach the designated area on the night of the 25th.At this time, the rear position on the right side of the 180th Division's position had been captured by the US 24th Division. The US 7th Division, attacking from the direction of Chuncheon, captured the positions of a part of the 179th Division of the Volunteer Army in Xishangli and Tuidongli. The 180th Division was divided into Beipei Mountain, Jiade Mountain, and Wuyueli area, and the situation was quite critical.

On the 25th, as the "United Nations Army" continued to attack, a large gap appeared in the defense lines of the Volunteers in Jiam-ri, Guanting-ri and Jisan-ri from the northeast of Gapyeong to the northeast of Pocheon, and the "United Nations Army" had entered the county and its north, In the area north of Gapyeong, it was judged that there was ample possibility of attacking Jinhwa. Therefore, the Volunteer Army Command adjusted its deployment. Stop the northern criminals of the enemy in front of you. On the same day, the 6th Division of South Korea, which was attacking from the front, continued to advance northward; the 7th Division of the United States broke through the position of the 179th Division of the Volunteer Army, completely cut off the connection between the 179th Division of the Volunteer Army and the 180th Division, and continued to the side of the 180th Division Attacked and cut off the retreat of the 180th Division; the US 24th Division, attacking from the left, occupied Songtingli, Tanganli, and Jiancun.In this way, the 180th Division of the Volunteer Army in the area south of Zhiyanli was almost completely surrounded by the "United Nations Army".

At 4:30 p.m. on this day, the 180th Division of the Volunteer Army urgently called the 60th Army to report the critical situation of deployment, and decided to break out to the northwest on the evening of the 26th.At this time, the 60th Army rescued the 180th Division. The task of the Volunteer Army Command to stop it in Changyanli, Guowangfeng, and Shicangli could not be realized. The Volunteer Army Command immediately ordered the 15th Army to take on the defensive task of this line.The 60th Army ordered the 536th Regiment of the 179th Division to launch a counterattack from the east of Zhiyanli at 6:00 p.m. , The 181st Division was ordered to rescue the 180th Division from the Huachuan area.At the same time, the 60th Army suggested that the main force of the 3rd Corps urgently support the 60th Army in operations.

The 181st Division, which was fighting fiercely with the enemy, immediately gathered its troops after receiving the order to rescue the 180th Division.However, due to the interruption of the telephone between the divisions and the delay in conveying orders on foot, coupled with heavy rain and rough roads, it did not start westward until 24:00 that night. On the 27th, the 181st Division of the Volunteer Army who rushed to rescue was blocked in Lunweili, Changjuli, Yuanchuanli and the northward enemy, and the rescue plan failed to materialize.The first rescue operation of the 60th Army failed. At 6 pm on the 26th, the 180th Division, which had been fighting continuously without rest, began a difficult breakout operation.The main force of the division broke through Mount Hede and Mount Mengde, and arrived at Yingfeng at 9:00 am on the 27th. The rest of the troops made a detour through Nashili and Jiancun.Due to the continuous fighting, the troops have run out of food and ammunition is very small, coupled with the interruption of communication, the strict blockade of enemy artillery fire, the rugged mountain roads, and many lost personnel, the whole division has less than 1,000 people at this time. On the 27th, the Volunteer Army Command ordered the main force of the 3rd Corps to break the siege of the 180th Division.But at this time, the 12th Army of the 3rd Corps was turning in, so the 3rd Corps ordered the 15th Army to send troops to Yanli and Guangdeli at 12:00 on the same day, ordering the 60th Army to rescue the 180th Division at all costs , and instructed the cadres of the 180th Division to be calm, to control the troops well, to maintain the organizational system, and to take advantage of the enemy's gaps to withdraw the troops.A few hours later, the 3rd Corps sent a telegram to the 60th Army, ordering the 180th Division to die desperately. The cadres of the division led the team to select the strongest troops and organize firepower. , Choose the enemy gap, cut a bloody road along Hongqiling, Fangquetun, and Shiziling, and break through in the direction between Shicangli and Songtingli.Prior to this, the 180th Division of the 60th Army had issued an order to resolutely break out in the direction of Shicangli, and at the same time ordered the 179th Division to take a shortcut to attack the enemy south of Shicangli to rescue the 180th Division. After receiving the order, the 179th Division set off immediately.However, due to the high mountains and dangerous roads, and the enemy's tight blockade of firepower, only one battalion rushed to the Mingzhixian and Xia Shinari areas by 5 o'clock on the 28th.At this time, the "United Nations Army" had already attacked Shicangli in three ways, and captured Shicangli on the afternoon of the 28th, connecting its east and west positions.The second rescue operation of the 60th Army failed. On the evening of the 27th, the 180th Division formed three companies to attack Shicangli with all its strength to break through.Because of getting lost, he returned, and turned to break out in the northwest direction.After breaking through the enemy's three positions, the troops suffered heavy casualties and were unable to continue the attack.Under such circumstances, the main commander of the 180th Division did not find out the situation well, and collectively continued to search for gaps in the enemy's encirclement to break through. In the original episode, the division suffered heavy losses as a result.From May 29 to mid-June, the 180th Division successfully broke through and concentrated nearly 4,000 people including the division commander, deputy division commander, division chief of staff, regimental commander and below (including a battalion that covered the logistics transfer of the army in advance).The 180th Division lost a total of more than 7,000 people during the retreat. On May 27, in order to stabilize the situation, Peng Dehuai ordered part of the army to stop the rest plan. The main forces of the 63rd, 64th, 15th, 26th, and 20th armies of the Volunteer Army and the 5th, 2nd, and 3rd armies of the People's Army were launched on the Linjin River , North of Hantancheon, Shibapo-ri, Hwacheon, Yangkou, and Ganseong areas were blocked across the board.Under the unfavorable circumstances of running out of food and ammunition, very difficult supplies, and extreme fatigue from continuous operations, the various units of the Volunteer Army stubbornly blocked and counterattacked continuously, stopping the rampant attack of the "United Nations Army".By June 10, it was stopped in the north and south areas of the 38th parallel, and the fifth battle ended.During the 20-day transfer and blocking battle, the Volunteers wiped out more than 36,000 enemies. After the fifth battle, all levels of the Volunteer Army are summing up the experience and lessons of the battle, including the lessons learned from the defeat of the 180th Division. Wei Jie, commander of the 60th Army, and Yuan Ziqin, political commissar, summarized the reasons for the damage to the 180th Division: (1) The enemy takes advantage of the fact that our food and ammunition are not replenished, the troops are adjusting, and before the fortifications are built, they launch a large-scale attack. At the beginning of the battle, it is considered that the enemy's attack is partial, and its purpose is to use offense as defense.Also, due to the large number of wounded in our corps, we tried our best to delay the enemy's advance, buy time, facilitate the transfer of the wounded, and form a passive operation. (2) Due to the lack of understanding of the enemy's situation in the command, the situation was not reflected in time, and the command was not timely, resulting in two rescue plans that failed. (3) The communications were not smooth and there were serious delays, so the report of the situation and the location of the troops was not timely, and the order could not be issued in time. (4) Insufficient contact with friends and neighbors. (5) The supply was not timely, causing the troops to run out of food and ammunition, the analysis and judgment of the enemy's situation were wrong, the command was not timely, and the two aid plans were not realized, resulting in losses to the division and serious losses to the party. On August 4, 1951, the party committee of the 3rd Corps summed up the experience and lessons of the fifth battle and said: "The 180th Division suffered heavy losses. The reasons were not only the instability of the retreat, the troops were hungry, and the radio station of the Corps was attacked by enemy planes during the retreat. The strafing was destroyed, the communication was interrupted within two or three days, and the command could not be given in time. The main reason was that the division was shaken at an emergency, blew up the radio station, and ordered the troops to disperse and break through..." Wang Yunrui, chief of staff of the 3rd Corps, summed up the Corps in the 180th responsibility for division failure issues, he said: (A) In violation of Zhisi's order, the 181st and 179th Divisions, the main force of the 60th Army, were transferred from the west of Chuncheon to the northeast of Chuncheon without authorization. The frontal assist force was too weak. This was a mistake. Although the main force of the 60th Army has been transferred to the east, it can still be used mobile or used for frontal remedy.However, it was quickly used in the north and south areas of Hanxi to fight, which is wrong again.Even so, there are still two divisions of the 39th Army in the area east of Chuncheon that can still be remedied, but the army was withdrawn prematurely (20th).This created an irreparable large gap in the area of ​​more than a hundred miles, which was taken advantage of by the enemy.At the same time, the 180th Division became more prominent and isolated because of this. This gap was created by a series of mistakes. (B) The timing of withdrawal also violated Shiji's order.Zhisi stipulated to withdraw northward on the 23rd, while the Corps ordered it to withdraw northward on the night of the 22nd. The 15th Army withdrew north on the night of the 22nd. Due to the premature withdrawal of the army, it not only widened the gap that had been created, but also put the entire Eastern Front in danger. (C) Because the wounded have not been transported, they are impatient, calm and hastily order the various ministries not to withdraw temporarily, and to cover the movement of the wounded.As a result, the 60th Army misunderstood, resulting in the late withdrawal of the 180th Division and being at a disadvantage. (D) After the 180th Division was encircled, it was good to order the 60th Army to receive reinforcements and the 180th Division to resolutely break out of the encirclement. This kind of determination was good, but it was never carried out. The two aid plans of the 60th Army were aborted, causing such serious and painful losses to the 180th Division. After the fifth battle, the Volunteer Army convened a party committee to sum up the experience and lessons. Peng Dehuai, Deng Hua and other leaders expressed their views. They agreed that although the battle was a great victory, it was far from satisfactory.Peng Dehuai repeatedly publicly criticized himself for the losses in the fifth battle, and took the initiative to take responsibility, showing his frank feelings.As Mao Zedong pointed out: "The fifth battle was fought more quickly, farther, and harder." In general, in the fifth battle, although the counterattack of the "United Nations Army" was underestimated when they returned to the division in victory, they were somewhat passive, but the whole battle still achieved a major victory, with a total of more than 82,000 enemies wiped out.The Volunteer Army and the People's Army lost more than 85,000 people in this battle. The fifth battle was another major blow to the "United Nations Army" after the second battle, smashing the US attempt to establish a new line of defense on the Pyongyang-Wonsan line, forcing the "United Nations Army" to switch to strategic defense, forcing the The U.S. authorities had to adjust their Korean War policy and seek peace talks.