Chapter 14 Chapter Thirteen The Japanese Army Has No Rear

The reason why Mao Zedong's "On Protracted War" became the most influential work during China's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression lies in its historical background and profound historical pertinence. China's war against Japan has lasted for nearly a year.During this period of time, the Japanese invaders occupied a large area of ​​China at an extremely fast speed.A huge question thus permeated the hearts of Chinese people: Will China perish?Is there any hope of victory in the War of Resistance?If the hope of victory has not finally been shattered, then what is the correct path for China's war of resistance?

These doubts arise not only from the harsh reality of the Chinese army's retreat and the rapid loss of the country, but also from the cognitive confusion caused by various views and speeches popular in China.At this time in China, there are at least two views on the war with Japan that are extremely dangerous, and may lead China to a place of eternal doom. One of the views is the "quick victory theory", also known as the "high profile theory". The core content of the "quick victory theory" is: China can defeat the Japanese aggressors in a short period of time, and the war will soon end with China's decisive victory.

This view has been present since the outbreak of the war.Many people in the country once said that Japan does not have the ability to annex China. If the Japanese army attacked North China, it would be impossible for the vanguard of its army to cross the Great Wall, let alone invade Shanxi.In the early days of the Battle of Songhu, when the Chinese army resisted the Japanese army’s landing and held on to the outer positions in Shanghai, the Japanese army was struggling for a while, so some Chinese declared that as long as China persisted for three months, the situation would definitely change, the international would intervene, the Soviet Union would send troops, and China would The army will soon be able to drive the Japanese army into the sea, and it is even predicted that the Chinese army will take advantage of the victory and pursue to regain the lost Northeast. The "quick victory theory" reached its climax after the Battle of Taierzhuang. It not only believed that the victory of the Chinese army was a sign of the collapse of the Japanese army, but also believed that the next battle of Xuzhou would be a "quasi-decisive battle" in which the Japanese army would face "the final struggle." ". ——If the "quick victory theory" is held by the general public and public opinion, it may be justifiable under certain circumstances; however, if it is held by people in China's decision-making levels, it will lead to reckless and even gamble on the fate of the country "Strategic decisive battle" will be a danger to China's future of the war of resistance.

First of all, no matter in terms of national power and military power, China is at an absolute disadvantage. In terms of "military power, economic power and political organizational power", China has a considerable gap with its own war opponents. caused by history.In addition to the competition of spiritual quality, war is also a competition of industrial ability, scientific and technological ability and innovation ability. In these aspects, China at that time was almost incomparable with Japan, which had entered the era of industrial power.Admitting disadvantages requires courage, and it is also a kind of sobriety and wisdom; blind self-righteousness is self-confidence, it is reckless and stupid, and the resulting optimism has to pay a price and bear consequences.Since Japan provoked the war of aggression and the anti-Japanese national united front was formed, the whole country of China fought against Japan, and the army fought desperately, but they failed to resist the successive attacks of the Japanese army from north to south. Under such circumstances, how could China seek a quick victory?

Secondly, the "quick victory theory" is also supported by Japan.Nobody wants the opponent to be as reckless and stupid as possible.If China continues and stubbornly remains blindly optimistic, Japan can achieve their "quick win" results.Because under the guidance of the "quick victory theory", China will invest all its national power and military power regardless of the consequences, to conduct a large-scale decisive battle with the Japanese army, or to stick to a certain important place and famous city, forming a large-scale decisive battle situation.In this case, the Japanese army will concentrate all its superior forces and firepower, and carry out a devastating annihilation of the Chinese army, making China completely incapable of resistance, thus reducing China to Japan's spoils of war in the shortest period of time.For the Japanese army, which has superior weapons, equipment and combat skills, the biggest worry is that it will not be able to find an opportunity for a decisive battle on the Chinese battlefield, and it will not be able to consume the main force of the Chinese army, thus prolonging the war indefinitely.

The second point of view is the "subjugation theory", also known as the "low-key theory". The core content of this view is: China cannot defeat Japan, if it continues to resist, the end can only be China's demise; moreover, the firmer China's will to resist the war, the faster the speed of national subjugation.If it is due to the repeated retreat of the army and the repeated fall of towns, which triggers the pessimism of the general public, it is just a confusion of thoughts; however, if the representatives of the "theory of subjugation" come from high-level decision-makers in China, it is far from a matter of thoughts However, it would lead to "compromise problems that may occur at any time in the Anti-Japanese Front".

The representative of the "theory of national subjugation" is Wang Jingwei, vice president of the Kuomintang. After the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Wang Jingwei proclaimed in his various speeches the "theory of national subjugation" that "wars must be defeated", and his representative work is a speech entitled "The Last Moment".Among them, Wang Jingwei described the ending of the war of resistance to the death in this language: "The word sacrifice is harsh. We sacrifice ourselves, and we sacrifice our compatriots all over the country. Because we are a weak country, we are the people of a weak country, and our so-called resistance , has no other content, and its content is only sacrifice." "Because we don't want to see our compatriots become puppets after we have sacrificed ourselves, we must force our compatriots to sacrifice together without leaving a single puppet seed. Whether it is through A large town or a barren village will turn people and land into ashes." "Our sacrifice is over, and our goal of resistance has been achieved." ——Wang Jingwei's core point of view is that if China wants to resist foreign aggression, the result can only be that the nation and the country "turn into ashes."So, based on this inference, what is the significance of China's bloody war of resistance?After "The Last Chance", Wang Jingwei delivered another speech "Everyone must tell the truth and everyone must be responsible", in which he used yin and yang to imply that it would be irresponsible for the country to persevere in the War of Resistance: "If you make peace, you will suffer losses. , just admit the loss honestly, and ask for compensation after the loss. In war, you will lose the battle, so you will honestly admit that you have lost the battle. , and finally created a situation of survival from death."

Inside the KMT’s top ranks, there is a group that agrees with Wang Jingwei. This group opposes the persistence of the War of Resistance and the cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and eventually forms a political group that surrenders to the enemy and seeks peace. The core figure of the group is Zhou Fohai. Zhou Fohai, who studied in Japan in his early years, was a representative of the First Congress of the Communist Party of China, and later defected to the Kuomintang. In 1924, he was expelled from the party by the Communist Party of China.He was a key member of the Kuomintang who was single-handedly selected by Chiang Kai-shek. He used to be the secretary of the general headquarters, the secretary-general and director of the political department of the Wuhan branch of the Central Military Political School, the director of the Central People's Training Department of the Kuomintang, and the deputy director of the second office of the chairman of the military committee. Vice Minister of the Central Propaganda Department of the Kuomintang.

Zhou Fohai named their group the "low-key club": After returning to Nanjing, I studied with many friends how to end the war of resistance in the north and restore peaceful relations under appropriate circumstances... Mr. Wang’s proposition was completely consistent with ours, so we imperceptibly used Wang’s Mr. is concocting a peace movement at the center... It so happens that some friends who advocate the same idea live in my house, and some come every day.So the air gradually spread out, gradually attracting the attention of the outside world.However, we have no scruples, and call our small group the "low-key club".

Not only did Wang Jingwei and Zhou Fohai have no historical connection, but they were once political opponents.After Zhou Fohai joined the Kuomintang, he became a right-winger. Wang Jingwei, the leader of the left wing, satirized him: "He used to be a member of the Communist Party, but now he is attacking the Communist Party. It's fine for him to quit the Communist Party, but he still has to come to counter-fraud. It's really nothing." Zhou Fohai countered Wang Jingwei. : "He was originally a member of the Kuomintang, but now he wants to be a tool of the Communist Party and attack the Kuomintang. It's not a thing for him to go to a foreign country, but he still wants to turn against him."

In any case, the members of the "low-key club" held the same position: they advocated the theory of the failure of the War of Resistance and national surrender, tried every means to prevent the war of resistance across the country, wantonly attacked the Communist Party, tried their best to undermine the cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and actively acted as the threadmen of the compromise with Japan. ——In the high-level decision-making of the national government, there is such a group of people who are "unscrupulous" and "not a thing". It was under this huge historical worry that Mao Zedong wrote "On Protracted War". "On Protracted War" comprehensively explains and summarizes the experience and lessons of the ten-month war of resistance based on dialectical and historical materialism. First of all, Mao Zedong once again emphasized the importance of national unity for the War of Resistance Against Japan: "The national parties, from the Communist Party to the Kuomintang; the national people, from the workers and peasants to the bourgeoisie; the national army, from the main force to the guerrillas; From the country to the justice-loving people in various countries; from the enemy's country, from some people who oppose the war at home to the soldiers who oppose the war at the front. In a word, all these factors have exerted their efforts in various degrees in our war of resistance. People of conscience should pay tribute to them. We Communists, together with other anti-Japanese parties and the people of the whole country, have the only direction to work hard to unite all forces and defeat the evil Japanese aggressors." Mao Zedong believed that in the ten months since the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War, "all experience has proved that the following two viewpoints are wrong: one is the theory of China's inevitable collapse, and the other is the theory of China's quick victory. The former tends to compromise, while the latter tends to underestimate the enemy."So, will China perish?Mao Zedong replied: "It will not perish, and the final victory belongs to China." Can China win quickly?Mao Zedong replied: "It cannot be won quickly. The War of Resistance Against Japan is a protracted war." A desperate war."Japan is a powerful imperialist country. "Its military power, economic power, and political organization power are first-class in the East." win".However, "the imperialist nature of Japan's social economy has produced the imperialist nature of Japan's war, and its war is retrogressive and barbaric." This kind of retrogressive and barbaric war with feudal military characteristics is completely "unachievable" The prosperity desired by the Japanese ruling class will achieve the very opposite of what it desires - the death of Japanese imperialism".At the same time, due to the "lack of human, military, financial, and material resources", the Japanese ruler originally wanted to "solve this difficulty through war", but the result could only be that it "launched a war" to solve this difficulty, and the difficulty will be reversed due to Wars continue to increase, and wars will "consume what is already there."Furthermore, although Japan "can receive assistance from the international fascist countries, at the same time, it has to encounter an international opposition force that exceeds its international assistance force. This latter force will gradually grow, and eventually not only will the former aid force offset, and will put its pressure on Japan itself."Mao Zedong said that this is the law of injustice and lack of support, which "comes out of the nature of Japan's war."As for China, Mao Zedong pointed out that although China is a weak country in a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society, although it is inferior to Japan in "military strength, economic strength and political organizational strength", the Chinese people have accumulated a century of struggle for national independence since modern times. With the power of liberation, today's China "has more progressive factors than in any other historical period". The representative of this progressive factor is "the Chinese Communist Party and the army under its leadership". protracted war and the possibility of final victory".Moreover, China's struggle against Japanese aggression was progressive and just, and it could "awaken national unity" and "enlist assistance from most countries in the world."China itself "is also a very large country, with a large land, abundant resources, a large number of people, and a large number of soldiers, which can support long-term wars."Therefore, these "basic and contradictory characteristics" of China and Japan determine that "the protracted nature of the war and the final victory belong to China and not to Japan." On the premise of clarifying the final outcome of the Anti-Japanese War, Mao Zedong analyzed the reality that the Japanese army had achieved "a certain degree of victory" and "I have suffered a certain degree of defeat" in the past ten months: "This is only a certain period of time." Win or lose to a certain extent."Because "Although the enemy is strong, the enemy's strength has been reduced by other unfavorable factors, but at this time it has not been reduced to the necessary degree to destroy the enemy's superiority; although I am weak, my weakness has been reduced by other favorable factors." factors, but at this time it has not been supplemented to the extent necessary to change my disadvantage."Mao Zedong pointed out: In the coming war, "as long as I can use correct military and political strategies, do not make mistakes in principle, and do my best, the enemy's disadvantages and our advantages will all increase with the prolongation of the war." Development must continue to change the original level of strength and weakness between the enemy and ourselves, and continue to change the situation of superiority and inferiority between the enemy and ourselves. When a new certain stage is reached, there will be major changes in the degree of strength and weakness and the superiority and inferiority of the situation, and the enemy will be defeated. The result of my victory." Mao Zedong believed that the protracted war of the War of Resistance Against Japan "will be manifested in three stages": "The first stage is the period of the enemy's strategic offensive and our strategic defense. The second stage is the period of the enemy's strategic The period of conservatism and our preparation for counter-offensive. The third stage is the period of our strategic counter-offensive and the enemy’s strategic retreat.”——This analysis of Mao Zedong will be fully verified by future history.Among them, regarding the second stage of the war, that is, the stalemate stage of the war, Mao Zedong predicted that China would endure unimaginable hardships and survive this long period of pain.However, "in the first stage, guerrilla warfare will take advantage of the emptiness in the enemy's rear to develop generally and establish many base areas, basically threatening the preservation of the enemy's occupied areas. Therefore, there will still be extensive warfare in the second stage. In this stage, we will The main form of warfare is guerrilla warfare, supplemented by mobile warfare." "Our army will move a large number of troops into the enemy's rear, relatively dispersed deployment, relying on all the areas not occupied by the enemy, cooperate with the armed forces of the people, carry out extensive and violent guerrilla warfare in the enemy's occupied areas, and mobilize the enemy as much as possible to destroy them in mobile warfare. ".Under such circumstances, the Japanese aggressors "can only keep about one-third of the occupied area, and about two-thirds are still ours. This is the enemy's big defeat and China's big victory" and is the key to the entire war" hub of transformation".Therefore, the victory or defeat of the war does not depend on the gains or losses of certain cities or certain territories, but on the Chinese people's "unswerving persistence in the war", on "expanding and consolidating" the national united front, and on "eliminating all pessimism and compromise theory". . Mao Zedong asserted: "The protracted War of Resistance Against Japan will be a glorious and special page in the history of human warfare."Its "canine-toothed war form" is its most special feature: "The War of Resistance Against Japan was fought on the inside line as a whole; but the relationship between the main force and the guerrillas was that the main force was on the inside line, and the guerrillas were on the outside line, forming a pincer attack on the enemy." the spectacle". "In the first stage of the war, the regular army fighting on the inside strategically retreats, but the guerrillas fighting on the outside strategically march forward broadly towards the enemy's rear."And "using the country's general rear", "it is the main force that extends the battle line to the ultimate limit of the enemy's occupied territory. It is the guerrilla army that breaks away from the general rear and extends the battle line to the enemy's rear."From the perspective of the overall form of warfare, the enemy's attack and our defense seem to be surrounded by the enemy; but "with our numerically superior forces" and "adopting the strategy of outer-line operations in campaigns and battles", we can control "everything" The enemy's road or roads will be surrounded by us."The same is true for the guerrilla warfare bases in the enemy's rear. It seems that each base is "surrounded by the enemy on four or three sides." I surrounded many enemies again."If the world's anti-fascist forces are included, the countries belonging to the Peace Front are like a net. When a fascist country has nowhere to escape in this big net, it is the day when it is "completely overthrown."In short, "the long and vast War of Resistance Against Japan was a war of intertwined military, political, economic, and cultural aspects.We must have a correct understanding of the law of war, so that all Chinese soldiers and civilians understand that the purpose of the Anti-Japanese War is to "expel Japanese imperialism and establish a new China of freedom and equality", so as to "make tens of millions of people work together" and win the final victory of the Chinese nation . "On the Protracted War" is another historical contribution made by the Communist Party of China to the War of Resistance against Japan after advocating and promoting the anti-Japanese national united front. It comprehensively expounds why China insists on a protracted war, why the Japanese invaders must be defeated and the Chinese people must win, and how China can win the final victory of the Anti-Japanese War. The publication of "On Protracted War" once again shows the mainstay role of the Chinese Communist Party in this huge and long-lasting war. No matter what the current defeat is, and no matter what kind of pessimistic arguments the party or people have, even if there is a compromise or even surrender among the top leaders of the national government, the Chinese Communist Party will never give in.The existence of the Communist Party of China guarantees that China will "persist in the war of resistance, the united front, and the protracted war."No matter what the circumstances, the Communist Party of China will, with firm political belief and strong national will, call on all Chinese people to fight against the Japanese invaders until the final victory.Regarding this point, Chiang Kai-shek is also very clear. At the beginning of the war, he said: If the National Government is really dragged down by the war, the Japanese will have to face the Chinese Communist Party.At that time, there was no possibility of any peace negotiation, because "the Communist Party never surrenders."At the same time, the Japanese also understand that the Chinese Communist Party is not only the mortal ideological enemy of Japanese militarism, but also Japan's decisive political and military opponent in the war against China. After the publication of "On Protracted War", it was translated into Japanese, English, and Russian. Mao Zedong's exposition greatly touched and inspired the top military and political leaders of the Kuomintang, including Chiang Kai-shek.Especially in "On Protracted War", Mao Zedong gave an extremely objective analysis of the series of battles commanded by Chiang Kai-shek that ended in retreat and abandonment: "Isn't it contradictory to fight bravely before and give up the land later? Isn’t the blood of the heroic fighters shed in vain? This is a very inappropriate question. Isn’t it vain to eat before and then shit? Isn’t it vain to sleep before and get up later? Can the question be raised in this way? I think it is not possible." The goal of annihilating and consuming the enemy has been achieved, and time and "large room for maneuver" have been bought, and the blood of the fighters "is not in vain at all." "Giving up the land is to preserve the army, and it is precisely to preserve the land; because if you do not give up part of the land under unfavorable conditions, and blindly hold a decisive battle with no certainty, after losing the army, you will lose all the land, and even more. There is no way to recover lost ground.”Chiang Kai-shek highly recognized Mao Zedong's "On Protracted War", and with his permission, "On Protracted War" was printed and distributed throughout the country.Bai Chongxi also praised "On Protracted War" very much, thinking that it was "the highest strategy to defeat the enemy and win victory". "With the support of Chiang Kai-shek, Bai Chongxi summed up the spirit of "On Protracted War" into two sentences: 'Accumulate small victories for big victories, trade space for time', and obtained the consent of Zhou Gong (Zhou Enlai), and the national government military The committee issued an order to the whole country as the strategic guiding ideology in the war of resistance against Japan.” When Mao Zedong was writing "On Protracted War" in a cave in Yan'an, hundreds of kilometers away, on the loess ravines in southern Shanxi, the Eighth Route Army led by the Communist Party and the troops commanded by Yan Xishan once again joined forces to resist the large-scale Japanese attack. After the Japanese invaded and occupied North China, the serious challenges they faced were as follows: 1. The anti-Japanese force led by the Chinese Communist Party had become the main force threatening the Japanese rule in North China. The areas controlled by the Japanese army in North China even tended to hollow out or encircle these areas; second, some of the troops under Chiang Kai-shek's command but currently stranded in enemy-occupied areas were also a military force to contain the Japanese army's rear in the early days of the war.Therefore, when the Japanese army in North China made a large-scale attack southward, they had to allocate a huge force to garrison the rear to ensure the safety of the occupied area and the rear supply line. The "Implementation Outline for Maintaining Public Security in Military-Occupied Areas" formulated by the North China Front Army Command of the Japanese Army stipulates: "The purpose of maintaining public security is the need for the existence of our army, and the purpose of promoting the overall stability of the military-occupied areas is to help establish the foundation of a new regime."And "maintaining law and order" "focuses on the communist army, especially the communist areas that have been established, and should strive to destroy them as soon as possible." On February 8, 1938, Yan Xishan reported to Chiang Kai-shek the deployment of the Eighth Route Army to persist in the Shanxi and North China resistance wars and to cooperate with the Kuomintang troops in the southern section of Jinpu Road: The 129th Division, with two regiments located in the mountains east of Pingding, Xiyang, and Heshun, west of Pinghan Road, and south of Zhengtai Road, cooperated with the 3rd, 44th Brigade of the 5th Division and Zhengtai Road to actively attack and wipe out the line. the enemy, and destroyed the Zhengtai Railway and the Pinghan Road south of Shijiazhuang on a large scale.One is located in the area south of Yuci and Shouyang, and the other is in the area west of Wu'an and Xingtai.The Zhang and Han detachments of the division (the two guerrillas of the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army, with Zhang Xianyue and Han Dongshan as the detachment leaders) are still moving towards Cangshi Road and eastward in the area south of Cangshi Road. The 120th Division assembled elite troops in the area west of the Yanmen-Yangqu line, cooperated with the Wutai District troops, actively attacked the enemy on the northern section of Tongpu Road, and continued to destroy the enemy's traffic roads; the Song Detachment (the Eighth Route Army's The Yanbei Detachment of the 120th Division, commander Song Shilun) was still active in the south of Datong, breaking the enemy's traffic and attacking the enemy along the line. The 343rd Brigade of the 115th Division organized elite troops to actively operate in the Jiaocheng and Wenshui areas south of Taiyuan. The Yang Detachment of the Jinchaji Military Region (the first detachment of the Jinchaji Military Region with Nie Rongzhen as the commander and political commissar, Commander Yang Chengwu) cooperated with the first division of the Chen Detachment and the Zhao Detachment (the fourth detachment of the Jinchaji Military Region, the commander Chen Manyuan; The Fifth Detachment of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region, Commander Zhao Tong), actively moved towards the Zhengtai and Pinghan lines; entered the mountainous area north of Zijingguan with a small force, and moved to the area north of Baoding.The Zhou Detachment (the third detachment of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region, commander Zhou Jianping) cooperated with the activities of the 344th Brigade and continued to destroy the Pinghan Railway.The Zhao Detachment (the second detachment of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region, commander and political commissar Zhao Erlu) went to Hunyuan, Fanzhi, Daixian, Naoxian, and Yuanpingjian to cooperate with the 120th Division.The main forces of the Chen Detachment and the basic units of the Lu Detachment (the People's Self-Defense Army of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region, commander Lv Zhengcao) in the east of Pinghan Road and north of Cangshi Road should lead the local guerrillas and cooperate with the Zhang and Han detachments to go to Cangshi Road , Move to Jinpu Road, try to disrupt traffic, block the enemy's southward movement and eastward movement, so as to directly cooperate with the southern section of Jinpu. Judging from the above-mentioned telegrams, although the Japanese army has occupied Taiyuan and the northern and central parts of Shanxi, and the main forces of Yan Xishan and Wei Lihuang have retreated to the south, within the area occupied by the Japanese army, the Eighth Route Army is still moving from east to west and from south to south. Widely distributed in the north. In January 1938, the Eighth Route Army and the Japanese army fought on Zhengtai Road: The 688th Regiment of my Xu Brigade (the 344th Brigade of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, brigade commander Xu Haidong) ambushed the advancing enemy in Jingxing near Wentang Town.At about 9 o'clock, contact with the enemy coming from Jingxing began, and about a thousand people were about to be defeated by the enemy. The enemy suffered about two hundred casualties, but the battle could not be resolved.At twelve o'clock, the enemy of Pingshan arrived, accompanied by two enemy planes to assist in the battle, and the enemy fired thousands of cannons.The head of the regiment supervised and led his troops to attack bravely and charged more than ten times repeatedly.In the evening of the battle, Wentang Town was finally occupied by the enemy. Chen Jinxiu, the commander of the regiment, and the commander of the third battalion both made heroic sacrifices, and more than 300 people under the company commander were killed or injured.But the enemy also suffered heavy casualties. After Taiyuan fell, China's Second Theater planned to launch a counterattack against Taiyuan. At the military conference held in Linfen, the second theater decided to divide the existing troops into three group armies: the Central Army, the East Route Army, and the West Route Army. The Eighth Route Army's 129th Division and 115th Division 1, the Shanxi New Army's 1st and 3rd Columns of the Death Squad, and the 84th Division Zhu Huaibing were responsible for attacking the Yuci and Niangziguan areas on Zhengtai Road. Just as China's second war zone was preparing to carry out counterattack operations, the Japanese army was also planning to launch operations in the southern part of Shanxi. Its main purpose was to completely wipe out the anti-Japanese armed forces led by the Communist Party.The deployment of the Japanese army was as follows: the 20th Division of Fumisaburo Kawagishi under the command of the First Army under the command of Kiyoshi Kozuki, and the 109th Division of the mountains and mountains, went south from Taiyuan along both sides of Tongpu Road, and pointed directly at Yuncheng in southern Shanxi He Fenglingdu; Doihara Kenji's 14th Division headed west from Xinxiang, along the north bank of the Yellow River to attack Yuncheng and Pinglu in southern Shanxi; Xiayuan Xiongmi's 108th Division set out from Handan to the west , via Wu'an, Shexian, Licheng, Lucheng, Changzhi, Tunliu, and Anze to attack Linfen.The troops invested by the Japanese army in this direction were no less than those participating in the Xuzhou Battle, which shows that they were determined to wipe out the armed forces behind the enemy lines of the Communist Party and the Kuomintang in one fell swoop. On February 20, the 108th Division of the Japanese Army cooperated with the 20th Division that was heading south along Tongpu Road to attack Changzhi.Li Jiayu's 311th Brigade of the 47th Army was ordered to block the attack. The Chinese defenders were all killed in the bloody battle with the Japanese army, and Changzhi fell.Then, Linfen, an important town in southern Shanxi, fell.The Japanese army came so fiercely that it was impossible to implement the plan of China's Second Theater to counterattack Taiyuan.A wave of Japanese troops headed west from Fenyang, approaching Xixian County, Yan Xishan's retreat route.Yan Xishan ordered Wang Jingguo's Nineteenth Army to meet the enemy.However, after a day and night of fierce fighting, the position of the 70th Division in Kawaguchi was breached by the Japanese army. The division commander Du Kun was almost captured, and the brigade commander Zhao Xizhang was killed. Commander Wang Jingguo took the remnants of the 70th Division into the mountains.In the position of the 68th Division in Damaijiao, after two days and nights of fierce fighting by Chinese officers and soldiers, the position was still broken by the Japanese army.Zhang Peimei, Director of Law Enforcement of China's Second War Zone, was furious and ordered Chen Changjie, commander of the 61st Army, to reinforce him, and warned Commander Chen to be careful if he could not complete the mission, but Commander Chen still retreated due to the unfavorable battle.Zhang Peimei was furious and insisted on shooting Wang Jingguo and Chen Changjie, saying that only by beheading the two army commanders would it be possible to reverse the crisis in southern Shanxi.However, Yan Xishan firmly disagreed with killing his army commander. ——"Zhang Peimei saw the Japanese army approaching Xixian County, and Yan's army was repeatedly defeated, but Yan's idea of ​​killing one by himself was not adopted by Yan, so he was pessimistic and disappointed. He thought of suicide, and died by swallowing opium." In order to contain the Japanese attack and cooperate with Yan Xishan's troops, the Eighth Route Army launched successive attacks.Yan Xishan hastily called Chiang Kai-shek to report the attack and gains of the Eighth Route Army: Nie Rongzhen, commander of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region Yuri (6th), "went to supervise the battle on the Ping-Han line in person. Today I got the phone call and really recovered Xinle and Wangdu and killed more than a hundred enemies. , captured four people, and seized more than fifty rifles. Dingzhou is in a fierce battle. In the battle at Hunyuan on the North Road, forty or fifty enemies were killed, and I suffered more than twenty casualties. Now the enemy is trapped in the isolated city and dare not leave the city." ...Dingxian, Xinle, and Wangdu counties each had hundreds of enemies. Jiari (9th) was completely wiped out by our Yang detachment and captured many enemies. The enemy's reinforcements were also repulsed by us and are now tracking them Pursue. One has arrived at Nanguan Station in Baoding to fight the enemy, and there is a great possibility of occupying Baoding." "The railway bridge between Zhengding and Baoding was completely destroyed, and a train of enemy vehicles was destroyed. Pseudo-organizations on the Ping-Han line were also seized. Now they are rushing towards the Jin-Pu line in an attempt to cut off the traffic behind the enemy."On the 20th, the Chen Guang Department of the 343rd Brigade of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army recovered Damaijiao, which had been lost by Wang Jingguo's 68th Division. ) fought fiercely with the enemy in Shichuan Town (Shikou Town and Chuankou Town), and obtained 65 ammunition, 140,000 rounds, five boxes of signal flares, more than 70 rifles, and a piece of military supplies. I suffered more than 90 casualties.” The 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army under the command of Liu Bocheng decided to launch an attack on the Japanese army on Zhengtai Road. The location was chosen at Changshengkou, where the Japanese army had ambushed during the Battle of Niangziguan a few months ago. "The resumption of the Changshengkou battle is simply a careful military exercise." Li Jukui, chief of staff of the 386th Brigade, said.The division commander Liu Bocheng expounded his point of view at the cadre meeting: In war, we must choose the enemy's weaknesses.What if the enemy has no weaknesses?To fight or not to fight?Of course we still have to fight, but we must first create a weak point for the enemy. The tactic of creating a weak point for the enemy is called "surrounding the point to fight for aid".That is, first pretend to attack the old pass, attract the Japanese troops in Jingxing to dispatch reinforcements, and then set up ambushes on the only way the enemy reinforcements must pass.On the 22nd, the 769th Regiment of the 385th Brigade began to besiege Jiuguan, and the Japanese troops in Jingxing sent reinforcements. As a result, they were violently attacked by the 771st Regiment and the 772nd Regiment in the Changshengkou ambush circle.The battle lasted for five hours. Five of eight Japanese vehicles were destroyed, and more than 130 people were killed in a team of more than 200 people, including the commander of the Japanese army, Major Toyoyoshi Arai. After the fall of Kawaguchi, the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army was ordered to support friendly forces in combat, but this time the division had a bad start-the division commander Lin Biao had an accident.At about 9:00 on March 2, Lin Biao was wearing a captured Japanese army overcoat and riding a captured Japanese ocean horse. When he passed by Qianjiazhuang in the north of Xixian County, he was mistaken for a Japanese army by a sentinel of the 19th Army stationed there by Wang Jingguo. Injured by the gunshot—the bullet "entered from the right side and passed out from the right back, but luckily missed the vital point and must be moved to a proper place for recuperation."The commander of the 115th Division was immediately represented by Chen Guang, the commander of the 343rd Brigade.On March 17, a part of the Tenth Division of the Japanese Army set out from Puxian County to attack Daning, but was intercepted by Yang Dezhi's 685th Regiment, and was forced to retreat to Wucheng, which is located in the south-central Luliang Mountains.The 115th Division surrounded Wucheng and launched an attack—— ... The enemy army in Wucheng, because of our continuous attack, always guards against our attack at night.When the two battalions of my 685th Regiment attacked Wucheng from the northeast at night, although the Japanese army stationed in Beishan put up some resistance, they were frightened after all and soon couldn't hold on.At the same time, the third battalion of our 686th Regiment attacked from the northwest to the east, quickly occupied the enemy's fortifications, and wiped out some of the enemies.Seeing that the situation was not good, the enemy's car team wanted to flee.Our soldiers rushed forward with a burst of grenades, hitting the enemy drivers so that they dared not turn on their headlights, and drove forward, but there were so many cars, and it was dark and there was no road, so many cars rushed in the ditch. Collide.Later, although some cars got on the road, they ran right into our ambush area.How can you not eat the fat meat that is delivered to your door?hit!After a violent attack, more than 60 vehicles of the enemy were all reimbursed... Then, the 115th Division dispatched the 686th Regiment to set up an ambush near Jinggou. More than 600 infantrymen, 200 cavalrymen and an artillery squadron from the 108th Division of the Japanese Army who came from Linfen entered the ambush circle. .After the Eighth Route Army launched a sudden attack, the Japanese army counterattacked frantically after a short period of chaos, and the battle in the ambush circle entered a stalemate.The Japanese artillery fire was fierce, and fighter planes also came to help in the battle. The officers and soldiers of the 686th Regiment continued to "fight the enemy hand-to-hand" under the "bombardment of aircraft and cannons".During the battle, two battalion commanders were seriously injured, deputy battalion commander Luo Zijian, Party branch secretary Xiao Zhijian and other battalion and company cadres all died, and some died heroically.Party members among the soldiers stood up to act as commanding officers, "Their voices can be heard everywhere on the battlefield: 'Comrades! Don't worry about the planes, just go and destroy the enemies on the ground!' 'Use bayonets, use grenades! Kill! Fight!'" In the evening, the 686th Regiment divided the troops on the north and south sides of the Jinggou Highway, and then attacked together, finally eliminated all the hundreds of Japanese troops, and "captured more than 100 rifles and ten machine guns". He Long, commander of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army, launched an attack on the Japanese troops occupying Ningwu, Shenchi, Hequ, Pianguan, Baode, Wuzhai and Kelan counties.作战前，贺龙想得到友军的支援，他去找了第三十三军军长郭宗汾，郭军长表示自己是个“烂军队”，根本无法与日军抗衡；贺龙又去找骑兵第一军军长赵承绶，赵军长答应先支援两门山炮，至于部队待相机行动。第一二〇师首先打的是岢岚城。第三五九旅先把岢岚城围起来，将通往城里的水源截断，就这样围了三天，城里的日军果然弃城出逃了。出逃的日军在三井镇被第一二〇师包围，官兵们奋勇冲击，日军抵挡不住死伤过半。阎锡山立即致电蒋介石：“贺师反攻岢岚，迫近五寨，两战役计：三五九旅阵亡政治主任一员、营长一员、排长四员，受伤参谋长一、特派员二、连长四、指导员四、排长五、班长战士二百四十五人；消耗手掷弹千余颗，步、机枪弹一万二千余粒；俘敌五十三人，获山炮一门、炮弹车七辆、炮弹数百颗、步枪二十余支，敌死伤二百八九十名，骡马百余头。”第一二〇师跟踪追击，追到了五寨城，把五寨包围之后，“将主力放在机动位置，待机打击来援之敌”。果然，日军由神池增援五寨。第三五八旅和第三五九旅主力拦截了日军的援军，并发起猛烈袭击，激战六小时后，歼敌四百余人。八路军的持续攻击令日军丧失了战斗意志，先后放弃了保德、河曲、偏关和五寨县城，向朔县方向逃窜。第一二〇师紧追不舍，一直追到神池并收复了该城。在攻击被日军占领的宁武时，第一二〇师还是“以少数部队和游击队牢牢围住县城”，第三五八旅和第三五九旅主力则“分布在同蒲路东西两侧”，形成“二虎拦路”之势“单等敌人就范”。三月三十一日，日军企图接应宁武之敌突围，进至八路军的伏击圈时遭到毁灭性打击。而宁武之敌本想趁机出城，第三五八旅的一个团，在赵承绶的骑兵第一军的配合下，以夹击之势对日军发起围歼，双方激战一天，日军伤亡惨重。联队长千田负伤，退回宁武县城后不堪支撑，于四月一日弃城向北逃跑。 ——八路军第一二〇师一口气收复了晋西北的七座县城。 长生口伏击战后，为配合津浦路南段的作战，刘伯承的第一二九师迅速南下，以主力进军晋东南的襄垣地区，拟侧击西进的日军。三月十日，陈锡联的第三八五旅七六九团突袭黎城，又以主力击退涉县的东援之敌；而陈赓的第三八六旅，则在日军从潞城增援黎城的必经之路神头岭设伏。此时，日军第一〇八师团为了保护其补给线，在涉县、黎城和潞城都驻有重兵。八路军的伏击如能成功，不但可以切断日军的补给线，还能遏制其进攻的势头。神头岭位于潞城东北十几公里处，从一张晋军提供的作战地图上看，神头岭公路是从一条深沟中间穿过的，两侧险峻的山势是个伏击的好地方。但是，当旅长陈赓带领干部们勘察了现场后，不禁大吃一惊：军用地图与现场相差甚远，神头岭段公路竟然盘在山梁之上。干部们不知这下如何是好，陈赓却认为出其不意也是军事上的险招：在“独木桥上打架”，谁先下手谁就能占据主动。陈赓的部署是：七七一团在左，七七二团在右，两个团都埋伏在公路北面，补充团在对面。由七七二团的一个营担任断敌退路的任务，再派小部队把浊漳河上的桥炸断，切断河两岸敌人的联系。三月十五日，部队向伏击地点运动时，主要由新兵组成的补充团的战士手里的武器竟然还是红缨枪。凌晨，万籁寂静。突然，黎城方向传来沉闷的枪炮声，这是七六九团开始攻击黎城了。天亮后，终于看见了从潞城出动的大约一千五百多日军。陈赓很高兴：多了吃不下，少了不够吃，一千五百多人正合适。这股日军是第十六师团和第一〇八师团的混合辎重队。在把日军先头部队放过去后，第三八六旅的官兵突然跃出开始了袭击，成百上千的手榴弹大雨一般落下，而补充团的官兵们高举的红缨枪闪闪发亮——无法想象在与日军作战时，中国士兵竟然仍使用着这种冷兵器，但八路军锋利的红缨枪还是让日军很是惧怕，他们称其为“长剑”。——“一营一个战士负伤四处，用毛巾扎住伤口后，又一口气刺死了三个敌人，当他停止呼吸时，手里的刺刀深深地插在敌人的肚子里……”浊漳河上的大桥被炸断了，三百多日军跑进神头村负隅顽抗。陈赓大喊：“村边的是蒲达义的那个排吗？”蒲排长立即带领二十多名士兵冲进村，以伤亡五人的代价，把数百日军从村里赶了出来。在主力部队与日军激战的时候，被放过去的日军先头部队被七六九团特务连截住。混战时，日军从潞城来的增援部队抵达，可第三八六旅两个连的增援部队也赶到了，增援日军的十辆汽车被击毁一半，剩下的仓皇逃回潞城。 战斗接近尾声的时候，有战士给喜欢照相的陈赓旅长送来一部刚缴获的照相机。陈旅长爱不释手，把战场详细完整地拍了一遍。他后来回忆说，自己特别欣赏的是其中的一张照片：一名八路军战士站在一个小土堆上，脚下踩的是一面日本旗。 日军第一〇八师团人事书记员木村源左卫门，在受到八路军伏击的第二天写下了日记： 昨日遭受袭击之部队为栢谷部队（日军第一〇八师团辎重第一〇八联队，联队长栢谷留吉）第三中队和第十六师团兵站辎重队，几乎全部被消灭，马匹全部被带走。昨日逃回潞城者仅十四人，其惨状可想而知。昨日部队卡车也同时到达被袭击现场，拟掉头折回，车身倾覆，人员弃车暂时退却。因而车载武装、用具全被夺去，所幸车辆尚完好无缺。昨日之敌两千人，目下正紧急追击中。该敌可能为朱德指挥的第一二九师、第一一五师之一部，附近之敌尚有高桂滋的第一六九、第八十四、第九十四等三个师，以及曾万钟的第七师、第十二师。昨日我方之损失，八百人中伤亡两百名，其中战死一百名。 八路军官兵从被俘的日军那里了解到，日军第一〇八师团辎重队多为“三十至四十岁以上者”，“多系第二次被征入伍”，士兵中“老年者甚多”，且因部队中不准传说八路军的情况，因而他们对中国军队的游击战争“均不知道”。 三月二十四日，在沁县东南的一个偏僻小村庄里，东路军总司令朱德召开了军事会议。与会者均为归朱德指挥的东路军将领，除八路军的彭德怀、左权等人外，还有第三军军长曾万钟、第四十七军军长李家钰、第三十八军军长赵寿山、第九十四师师长朱怀冰，共计三十多人。会上，朱德和彭德怀详细分析了抗战的形势和前途，特别阐明应该如何在敌后开展游击战争以及健全军队的政治工作。与会的将领们都对八路军的游击战术表示出极大的兴趣，为此，八路军副总参谋长左权专门给他们作了一场介绍游击战经验的报告。 会议即将结束时，朱德向各位将领发出了邀请：八路军第一二九师即将打响一场伏击战，各位可以现场观战。 如果没有取胜的把握，哪里会有如此惊人之举。 伏击战的地点，是距神头岭战场不远的一个名叫响堂铺的地方。这是位于河北涉县以西、山西黎城县以东的一个公路边的小村子。村子的南侧和北侧，耸立着两座海拔一千二百多米的陡峭山峰，两峰之间狭长的峡谷中有一条日军修筑的简易公路，这条公路是日军从河北向山西进攻的必经之路以及后勤补给线。八路军第一二九师师长刘伯承、政委邓小平和副师长徐向前决定投入三个主力团，在这里打一场漂亮的伏击战。 朱德特地将曾万钟、李家钰、赵寿山等将领安排在公路边的山峰上，请他们居高临下的现场观摩八路军如何打仗。 第一二九师投入的三个团是：第三八六旅的七七一团和七七二团以及第三八五旅的七六九团。作战部署是：七七一团为右翼，七六九团为左翼，分别埋伏在公路两边；七六九团抽出几个连负责阻击可能由涉县增援的日军，保护战场的左翼；七七二团负责阻击可能由黎城增援的日军，保护伏击部队右翼后方。 “七七一团指战员绝大多数未见过汽车”，因此，听说这次伏击战主要是打日军的汽车后，官兵们都有点紧张。贫苦农民出身的官兵们无法想象汽车是什么样子，也不知如何对付那些轰然作响的家伙。于是，部队事先进行了关于汽车知识的教育，教给战士们如何打驾驶员，如何打油箱和轮胎。一切都准备好了，部队进入阵地后，情况突然变化了：数百名日军原因不明地绕到了伏击阵地的背后。副师长徐向前经过冷静的分析后，认为伏击行动并没有暴露，作战计划可以照旧执行。他告诉官兵们，你们尽管打仗，不要担心后面，七六九团和七七一团各留一个连，由我负责“掩护你们消灭敌人的运输队”。——徐向前在官兵中威信极高，徐副师长亲自指挥掩护，还有什么可担心的？ 七七一团团长徐深吉和政委吴富善回忆：八时左右，观察哨报告，公路上出现了日军车队，待数到一百八十辆时说后面没有了。 敌汽车过了下弯，进入河底，公路比较平坦，速度加快了。我们看到最后的几辆坐着六七十名日军掩护部队的汽车，刚到下弯，前面的七十多辆汽车已进入七六九团地段，急待出击命令时，突然听到“啪啪”两声枪响，抬头一看，两发绿色的信号弹悬挂在上空，指战员们都明白，这是徐向前副师长发出的总攻击命令。顿时，我们的步枪、机关枪和迫击炮一齐怒吼，密集的火网打得敌人懵头转向。紧接着，几十把军号一齐响起“嘀嘀哒，哒哒嘀……”的冲锋声。我们的部队如猛虎一般地冲了下去，霎时间，数以千计的手榴弹在敌群中爆炸。随着枪炮声、冲锋号声、喊杀声，我们的战士火速冲上公路，跳上汽车，与敌人展开了搏斗。敌人被打得惊慌失措，乱作一团。有的被击毙在车厢里，有的被刺死在公路上，有的滚下车来企图顽抗，有的藏在汽车下面。我们的战士越战越勇，大家的决心是，敌人不缴械就坚决消灭他。跳下汽车的敌人被我们的手榴弹炸得血肉横飞，有的被刺刀和长矛（新战士没有枪）刺死在地上。残余敌人向南山逃窜，被我南山的部队一阵猛打，又滚回公路上被消灭。就在我们七七一团紧张战斗的同时，七六九团也与敌人展开了激战。十一时，战斗基本结束。敌人的一百八十辆汽车和随车的一百七十多名日军，除了三十多个敌人乘我南山部队少，空隙大，钻空子逃掉外，其余的敌人均被歼灭。车上的军用物资也都被我缴获。那时，我们没有汽车驾驶员，汽车开不走，只好把一百八十辆汽车一一点着。顿时，一团团黑色烟柱冲上几十米的高空，一百八十辆汽车很快全部被烧毁。这时，我指战员满怀胜利喜悦，抬着缴获的迫击炮，扛着歪把轻机枪和崭新的三八式步枪，挂着子弹盒，拿着黄呢子大衣、皮靴、饭盒等军用品，高高兴兴地撤离了战场。 日方关于这支运输队受袭的记述是： 该兵站的路线在陡峭险峻的山地，八路军到处出没。兵站第七十八汽车中队于三月二十七日的行动中遭到厄运，三分之一人员战死，四十五辆汽车全部被毁坏……中队长森本少佐率领一百三十人、四十五辆汽车，于三月二十七日晨从邯郸出发，向潞安运送军需物资。当日，武藤准尉以下五十人留守邯郸，检修二十多辆有故障的汽车。去潞安往返需要五天，行车路线横穿太行山脉，只有第一〇八师团的运输队穿行过这条公路，但从未发生事端。而此次该中队至预定返回的三月三十一日，车队竟杳无音讯。次日，四月一日，第五兵站汽车队松本中佐及下属留守人员接到急报后，立即在步兵支援下赶赴现场，只见到车辆全部毁坏，一片激战后的惨状。原来，兵站七十八汽车中队三月三十日夜在响堂铺西方露营休息。三十一日晨，车队出发不久，即进入两侧山地狭路。前进中为遮断壕所阻，头车刚一停下，立即受到两侧敌人射来的弹雨。陆续到达的全部车辆，被敌包围，车辆被破坏烧毁。此外，后续的高桥队（兵站汽车队）同样遭到伏击。支援的步兵分队在队尾同行，战斗一直进行到午前，森本少佐以下六十二人战死。冲出血路的幸存者峰岛准尉以下七十人，无伤者不及本数。急忙赶到的留守人员眼含热泪，以悲愤心情收容伤员及阵亡者尸体。 阎锡山向蒋介石报告的战果是：“响堂铺伏击山田、森本两汽车队，毙敌森本少佐以下四百余人，毁敌汽车百八十辆，缴获敌轻重机枪十二挺，长短枪三百余支。” 第一次近距离地看到八路军如何作战，令阎锡山的将领们大开眼界。朱德现场点评道：打好伏击战，一要把地形选好，二要把情况判断准确，三要决心果断，四要担任打援的部队密切配合。 神头岭和响堂铺两场伏击战，都是八路军主力部队所为，可以说是动用了八路军的优势实力。但是，两场战斗中都有八路军战士使用“红缨枪”的记录。——使用最原始的武器，与拥有现代武器装备的日军作战，还要打胜仗，八路军官兵需要付出怎样的勇气和牺牲？ 或许，这才是令阎锡山的将领们真正惊愕的原因。 国民政府军事委员会派赴第十八集团军少将联络官乔茂材致电蒋介石：“八路军抗战意志坚定，机动力大，为七九步枪弹缺乏，不能放胆作战。拟恳提前酌量补充，俾在华北牵制敌人，使津浦线我主力更易奏功。” 深感八路军严重威胁的日军，决定对晋东南发动大规模围攻，以消灭或驱除太行山区的共产党军队以及退入山中的阎锡山的部队。 为了迎战日军的进攻，中国第二战区决定，由战区副司令长官兼东路军总指挥朱德统一指挥晋东南所有的中国军队。 此时，共产党著名的军事领袖朱德指挥的是一支数量庞大的部队：八路军第一二九师、曾万钟的第三军、李默庵的第十四军、李家钰的第四十七军、武士敏的第九十八军、高桂滋的第十七军、赵寿山的第三十八军、朱怀冰的第九十四师、王奇峰的骑兵第四师、山西新军决死队第一、第三纵队等。 太行山中之所以仍存在着如此之多的中国军队，是基于蒋介石三月八日下达的一道严厉指令：不准山西抗日军队的一兵一卒越过黄河，必须全部在敌后坚持进行对日作战。蒋介石所说的山西的抗日军队，主要是指阎锡山和卫立煌指挥的部队，因为八路军明确宣布其作战区域就是敌后战场，决不会渡过黄河跑到正面战场上去。如果没有这道严令的话，滞留在山西的阎锡山部和卫立煌部很有可能全部退到黄河以南避战。这是蒋介石万分担忧的。就华北的战局而言，只要山西境内仍有中国军队作战，日军就无法宣称控制了整个华北；就全国的战局而言，只要太行山战场还在作战，日军的后方就无法得到安宁，日军由此向西攻击西安并冲入四川的妄想就不会实现。 太行山，抗日根据地的母亲。 四月四日，日军华北方面军调集了第一〇八师团、第二十师团、第一〇九师团、第十六师团各一部，在第一军司令官香月清司的指挥下，兵分九路向位于晋东南地区的八路军总部及其他中国军队开始了大规模的围攻作战。当时的八路军总部在沁县，因此沁县成为日军围攻作战的重心。日军九路部队的攻击方向和目标是：第二十师团的一个联队由洪洞进攻东北方向的沁源；第一〇八师团由长治、屯留、平定各出动一个联队，分北、中、南二路向武乡、沁县和辽县进攻；第一〇九师团的一个联队由祁县和太谷向南进攻沁县，两个大队由榆次进攻马坊；第十六师团一部由元氏、赞皇向西进攻九龙关，另一部由邢台进攻浆水镇，还有一部由涉县向西进攻辽县。 朱德制订了运动战和游击战相结合的作战方案，决定采取集中优势兵力各个击破敌人的战术迎战。而共产党的将领如何指挥国民党的军队？毛泽东提出的方针是：“应采取爱护和协助态度，不使他们担任最危险的任务。”朱德和彭德怀贯彻执行这一方针，“在战区兵力部署上，将八路军配置在第一线，友军配置在第二线”。 从四月十日开始，各路进犯的日军都受到了猛烈阻击。 在日军第一〇九师团的作战方向，从榆次发起进攻的两个步兵大队被八路军第一二九师秦基伟、赖际发支队阻击在寿阳、和顺一带无法前进；另一个联队占领祁县子洪镇后，陷入朱怀冰的第九十四师、武士敏的第一六九师以及八路军游击队的包围中，双方的激战持续了五天，日军伤亡联队长以下千余人。在第二十师团的作战方向，日军的一个联队前推至沁源，被山西新军决死队第一、第三纵队以及高桂滋的第十七军、赵寿山的第十七师堵截，尽管日军最终突破中国守军的防线逼近沁县，但随即遭到八路军三个团的反击，日军向南退往安泽方向。在第十六师团作战方向，一个大队的日军被八路军第一二九师游击支队阻挡在九龙关附近，另有千余人被第一二九师先遣支队阻滞于浆水镇；另两个大队的日军被王奇峰的骑兵第四师阻击在辽县东南——以上五路日军在中国军队的猛烈阻击下，均没有完成预定的作战计划，被迫停止了深入晋东南的军事行动。 只有日军第一〇八师团的三路部队进攻到了太行山腹地：分别由长治、屯留北进的两个联队的日军，突破了曾万钟第三军的防线，进入抗日根据地的武乡、襄垣和辽县；由平定和昔阳南进的一个日军联队，在炮兵、工兵、辎重兵和骑兵的配合下向辽县发起进攻，遭到八路军秦基伟支队、汪乃贵支队和第一一五师曾国华支队的奋力截击，日军伤亡数百人，被迫多次改变路线，于十四日抵达辽县和辽县东南的芹泉镇。——此路日军是围攻作战的主力，指挥官是骄横的旅团长苫米地四楼。 苫米地旅团继续向南进攻，占领了武乡和沁县，这给八路军总部带来了巨大威胁。但朱德认为，苫米地旅团孤军深入，这也给八路军提供了围歼日军的战机。当时在榆社至武乡附近，有中国军队朱怀冰、曾万钟和武士敏等部。朱德命令曾万钟以一部在武乡边打边退，将第三军主力隐蔽在附近山地间，等日军通过武乡后追尾攻击，并与事先埋伏好的朱怀冰部实施夹击。但是，由于部队行动迟缓，这一计划未能实现。苫米地旅团不断地寻找八路军总部，又从武乡北进到榆社，进入榆社才发现这里已是一座空城，无人无粮道路也被破坏了，苫米的突然感到孤军深入的危险，立即决定退回武乡。此时，朱德带领八路军总部已转移至武乡西北的义门村。朱德认为，苫米地旅团继续向南退回长治的可能性最大，于是决定打一场歼灭战。八路军第一二九师主力和第一一五师六八九团，奉命急速赶到武乡县城西北待机。四月十五日黄昏，日军果然放弃武乡企图连夜东渡浊漳河。八路军第一二九师师长刘伯承当机立断，以七七二团、六八九团为左纵队，以七七一团为右纵队，沿池漳河两岸的山地对撤退日军实施追击，并以七六九团沿武乡至襄垣的大道实施尾追。十六日清晨，七七二团追到长乐村，发现了日军侧翼警戒部队数百人，七七二团机警地隐蔽起来，这时日军的大部已经通过长乐村，其辎重尚在后面，歼敌的时机终于到了。第三八六旅旅长陈赓命令部队发起攻击，撤退中的日军转瞬间被截成了数段，大队人马和大量辎重