Chapter 52 B. Basic principles of combat command

(1) During strategic defense: 1. Oppose pure defense and implement active defense. 2. Oppose pre-emptive strikes, implement post-strikes (general).Attacking late, that is, luring the enemy deep, is not the so-called "purely defensive line of opportunism" (the Ningdu Conference [5] and after), but the correct principle of internal line operations. (2) During the strategic offensive: 1. Oppose underestimation of opportunism, and strive to expand the results of the war (when changing from the counter-offensive in the strategic defense to the strategic offensive, and throughout the process of the strategic offensive, we should strive to expand the strategic results of the war), Strive to gain the upper hand.

2. Against Adventurism: (1) Enough is enough to ensure the victories already won (the victories already won may be lost). (2) Turn the position to a new direction, so that the Red Army can have a temporary rest between two major battles, expand the Soviet area, and link the task of expanding the Soviet area with the task of creating a battlefield for new battles stand up.Merging two or more soviet areas into one and eliminating the white strongholds in and around the soviet areas (Datuweizi) is not the so-called "wavering of opportunism" (Party News [6] in 1932), but the implementation of a correct policy .

(3) Advancing policy in the development situation, wave-like development, development with fronts and rears (that is, the so-called "consolidated development of the Soviet area", the so-called "simultaneous expansion and simultaneous deepening"), against the policy of rash advance (when the comparison between the enemy and the enemy allows is the exception). (4) Attacking cities and the enemy's consolidated positions is conditional. It was wrong to oppose the "Mountain Doctrine" and the "Northeast Route"[7] in the past (1932). (3) General principles (whether defensive or offensive):

1. Oppose the desperate doctrine of only "fighting" and not "walking". You have to fight and you have to leave. Naturally, walking is for the sake of fighting.The guerrilla nature of warfare, that is, the lack of a fixed front, is a characteristic of the Chinese Red Army's operations due to backward technical conditions, and it is also the strength of military guidance in the past.It is wrong to oppose "guerrillaism" here.The attempt to establish a fixed front in the fifth campaign against "encirclement and suppression" failed.If the temporary defeat on one front (the place is occupied) is exchanged for the victory on the other front, the problem on this front can be solved (the place can be restored).

2. To strive for this possibility, quickly change the technical conditions of the Red Army, so that the situation without a fixed front is changed into a situation with a fixed front, and mobile warfare is still mobile warfare, but the guerrilla nature is greatly reduced.Without this modern condition, it would be impossible to thoroughly defeat Japanese imperialism and its lackeys, and it would be wrong to be passive about changing technological conditions. 3. Mobile warfare is the basic principle. It is inevitable and necessary to oppose the conservative positional warfare of "not giving up an inch of ground". It is inevitable and necessary for the main Red Army to make great strides.

4. Concentrate forces on the main direction, attack people with one fist strategically, fight on outer lines during inside-line operations, and eliminate wars; oppose the doctrine of dividing troops, oppose the doctrine of two fists, oppose strategic "strikes across the board", and oppose rout warfare (strategic warfare) and general combat). 5. Protracted strategic warfare, quick-decision warfare in campaigns, opposing protracted warfare in campaigns, and opposing "struggle attrition". 6. Have sufficient rest training, oppose useless rush, and learn slowly when necessary.

7. Be fully prepared for battle. 8. The method of command is determined according to the situation, and split command under unified determination is allowed and necessary. 9. Use the strategic policy to guide the tactical policy of the campaign, connect today to tomorrow, connect the small to the big, connect the part to the whole, and oppose taking one step at a time. 10. The Military Council has complete powers within the military. Printed from transcripts kept at the Central Archives. -------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ note [1] These are the first two parts of the resolution on military strategy drafted by Mao Zedong for the Wayaobao meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee.

[2] This refers to the area under the control of the Puppet Hebei Anti-Communist Autonomous Government.In November 1935, under the instigation of Japanese imperialism, Yin Rugeng, the administrative inspector of the Luanyu and Jimi districts of the Hebei Provincial Government of the Kuomintang, established the Eastern Hebei Anti-Communist Autonomous Committee (soon to be renamed the Eastern Hebei Anti-Communist Autonomous Government) in Tongxian County, Hebei Province. ), control twenty-two counties in eastern Hebei, and separate from the jurisdiction of the Chinese government. [3] Sui refers to Suiyuan Province, see note [16] on page 371 of this volume.Cha, referring to Chahar Province, the area under its jurisdiction at that time was the northwestern part of Hebei Province and the Xilinguole League of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.

[4] Re, referring to Rehe Province, was abolished in 1955, and the original jurisdiction was assigned to Hebei, Liaoning and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. [5] Ningdu meeting refers to the meeting held by the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area of ​​the Communist Party of China in October 1932 in Ningdu, Jiangxi.In order to implement the offensive line of "Left" adventurism of the Provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, this meeting wrongly criticized Mao Zedong's policy of "luting the enemy to go deep" and his opposition to the Red Army's attack on the central city, and believed that the Red Army should attack the enemy's weaker ruling power, the party and the correct proposition for the development of Northeast Jiangxi with strong mass power.The meeting required the Red Army to take the initiative to attack before the Kuomintang army was encircled to seize the central city and strive for the first victory in Jiangxi.After the meeting, Mao Zedong was transferred to government work, and then he was dismissed from the position of general political commissar of the First Front Army of the Red Army.

[6] Party newspaper, here refers to the "Red Flag Weekly", the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.In the joint issue of the thirty-seventh and thirty-eighth issues published on April 25, 1932, the newspaper published "Opportunism in the Chinese Communist Party in Striving for the First Victory of the Chinese Revolution in a Province or Several Provinces" Shake" article. [7] In mid-March 1932, when Mao Zedong summed up the experience and lessons of the attack on Ganzhou at the meeting of the Central Bureau of the Communist Party of China held in Jiangkou, Ganxian County, he pointed out that it was wrong to attack Ganzhou, and proposed that the main force of the Red Army should be directed against the weaker enemy and the party. The idea of ​​developing a base area in northeastern Jiangxi with a good mass base and favorable terrain was rejected by the majority of the meeting.This proposition was called "Mountainism" and "Northeast Route" by the "Left" adventurists who wanted to win the so-called first victory in one province and several provinces.