Chapter 18 Letter from the Front Committee of the Fourth Army of the Red Army to the Central Committee[1]

(April 5, 1929) central: The letter[2] of February 7 was forwarded by the Fujian Provincial Party Committee and received in Ruijin on April 3.The central government's assessment of the objective situation and subjective forces in this letter is too pessimistic.The three attacks on Chingkangshan [3] represented the climax of the counter-revolution.However, so far, the counter-revolutionary upsurge has gradually declined, and the revolutionary upsurge has gradually grown.Although our party's combat and organizational strength is weak as the central government said, it will recover quickly under the situation that the counter-revolutionary trend is gradually declining, and the passive attitude of party cadres will also be quickly eliminated.The masses will definitely lean towards us.Slaughterism, of course, drives fish out of the abyss, and reformism can no longer appeal to the masses.The illusions of the masses about the Kuomintang will soon be wiped out.In the future situation, no party can compete with the Communist Party for the masses.The political and organizational lines indicated by the Sixth Congress[4] are quite correct: the current stage of the revolution is civil rights, and the current task of the party is to win over the masses rather than immediately armed riots.But the development of the revolution is very fast, and the propaganda and preparation of the armed insurrection should adopt a positive spirit.Under the current situation of great chaos, only positive slogans and positive spirits can lead the masses.The recovery of the Party's combat effectiveness must also be possible under this positive spirit.We feel that the Party has committed a huge mistake of putschism in the past, but now it has a liquidationist tendency in some places.The fighting spirit of the local party headquarters we passed in western Fujian and southern Jiangxi was very weak, and many opportunities for struggle were easily missed.The masses are vast and revolutionary, but the party does nothing to lead them.The example of western Fujian and southern Jiangxi reminds us that this kind of phenomenon may also exist in other places, so we must oppose the bad tendencies of putschism and commandism, but we must try our best to prevent the tendencies of liquidationism and immovability.The leadership of the proletariat is the only key to the revolution. The establishment of the party's proletarian base and the creation of industrial branches in large areas are the greatest organizational tasks of the party at present. Creation and expansion are also the conditions to help the city struggle and promote the upsurge of the revolutionary tide.Therefore, abandoning urban struggle and indulging in rural guerrillaism is the biggest mistake. However, if we fear the development of peasant power and think that it will surpass the leadership of the workers and be harmful to the revolution, if there are such opinions among party members, we think it is also wrong.Because in the revolution in semi-colonial China, only the peasant struggle failed without the leadership of the workers, and no peasant struggle developed beyond the power of the workers and was not conducive to the revolution itself.The Sixth Congress pointed out the mistake of ignoring the peasant revolution.In this letter from the Central Committee, it is correct to say "to develop the vast and widespread struggle in the countryside".

The central government asked us to divide our teams into small groups and disperse them to the countryside. Zhu and Mao left the big teams and concealed the big targets. The purpose was to preserve the Red Army and mobilize the masses. This is an ideal.To act alone with a company or battalion as a unit, disperse in the countryside, use guerrilla tactics to mobilize the masses and avoid targets. We have planned it since the winter of the previous year, and we have failed many times in implementing it.Because: (1) The Red Army is not local, and it is completely different from the local armed Red Guards.Peasants in Ningkang counties on the Hunan-Kiangsi border only wanted to serve in the Red Guards of their own counties and did not want to join the Red Army, so the Red Army could hardly find many farmers on the Hunan-Kiangsi border.The Red Army consisted of the old National Revolutionary Army, Liuping[5] Hunan's peasant army, and captured soldiers from successive battles. (2) If they are separated, the leading organs will not be perfect, and they will not be able to cope with the harsh environment, and they will easily fail. (3) It is easy to be broken by the enemy one by one.The Fifth Army was at Pingliu, and the Fourth Army was at the frontier in southern Hunan. There were as many as five times when the enemy was defeated because of the division of troops. (4) The harsher the environment, the more concentrated the troops must be, and the more the leaders must fight hard to deal with the enemy.Only in a good environment is it possible to divide troops into guerrillas, and it is better for leaders to be inseparable at all times than in a bad environment.This time we left Jinggang Mountains to go to southern Jiangxi and western Fujian. Because our troops were concentrated, and the leadership (front committee) and persons in charge (Zhu and Mao) had an attitude of resolute struggle, not only was the enemy helpless, but the enemy’s losses were greater than ours. Their victories, our victories are greater than our losses.The victories in the Second Battle of Ningdu and Tingzhou[6] completely wiped out the combat effectiveness of the Guoliu Second Brigade, which is a local snake, and made the Qing and Han in the south of Jiangxi and the west of Fujian, and those who have achieved the current achievements in mobilizing the masses will not be able to handle it unless the troops are concentrated and the guiding organs are sound. arrive.The tactics we have learned from the struggle in the past three years are really different from the tactics used in ancient and modern China and abroad.With our tactics, the development of mass struggles is expanding day by day, and any powerful enemy force is beyond our reach.The tactics we use are guerrilla tactics, roughly speaking: "Divide the troops to mobilize the masses, and concentrate to deal with the enemy." "When the enemy advances, we retreat; when the enemy is stationed, we disturb; For the separatist regime in a fixed area, use a wave-like advancing policy." "A strong enemy follows and uses a circle-making policy." "A very short period of time, a good method, mobilizes the masses." This tactic is like netting, It must be opened at any time, but also closed at any time, open to win over the masses, and closed to deal with the enemy.This tactic has been used for three years.On the Hunan-Kiangsi border, after the concentrated forces had once defeated the enemy, they could spread out and work for two to three weeks (the divisions were spent in large numbers, and each large branch was spent in smaller numbers), and when the enemy regrouped, we concentrated again. Then defeat the enemy, and then disperse the work.This time the enemy is chasing after us, we can use the hovering guerrilla to cover a wide area and mobilize a wide crowd.Every time I go to a place, I will stay for half a day at least, and I will stay for five days at most. people, marching on the road and wherever they go, propaganda spreads immediately), followed by distributing property (grain, clothes, utensils of big landlords and reactionaries), and then organizing (party branches, secret trade unions, secret peasant associations) .The technique of mass work is now more adept than ever before.The Red Army at this time was not just a thing for fighting. Its main function was to mobilize the masses, and fighting was only a means.Moreover, the time spent on fighting and the time allocated to mass work is a ratio of one to ten.The current team is very different from the team in Ye He's [7] time. Ye He's team is purely fighting, and it would never exist today.No matter when the Red Army is at any time, the unified command organization of the party and the military is indispensable, otherwise it will fall into anarchy, and it will definitely fail.

Now the party's leading body is the Front Committee, Mao Zedong is the secretary, the military command body is the army headquarters, and Zhu De is the army commander.If the central government needs Zhu and Mao to change their jobs due to other matters, they will send capable people immediately.In our opinion, Comrade Liu Bocheng[8] can be in charge of the military, and Comrade Yun Daiying[9] can be in charge of the party and politics. If they can be sent, it will be better than us.The Central Committee wrote in a letter last June saying that Comrade He Chang[10] was sent to inspect, but for some reason he did not come. The transportation from Fujian is very convenient now, and I hope to send people to inspect at any time in the future.

Since the defeat of the Liuguo Second Brigade, it can be said that there are no enemies in western Fujian and southern Jiangxi.The troops of Jiang and Gui are approaching each other in the Jiujiang area, and the outbreak of the war is just now. The Kuomintang rule has since collapsed, and the revolutionary climax will soon come.Under this current situation, we feel that among the southern provinces, the comprador landlords in Guangdong and Hunan have too much military strength, and in Hunan Province, due to the mistakes of the party's putschism policy, the masses inside and outside the party are almost wiped out. .The three provinces of Jiangxi, Zhejiang and Fujian are in a different situation.First, the military strength of the three provinces is the weakest.Zhejiang only has a small number of provincial defense forces under Jiang Bocheng[11].Although there are fourteen regiments in Fujian's five divisions, Guo's brigade has already been defeated. Chen Guohui's and Lu Xingbang's [12] divisions are both bandit troops, and their combat power is very low. The two marine brigades are on the coast and have never fought before. Big, only Zhang Zhen[13] is relatively capable of fighting, but according to the analysis of the Fujian Provincial Party Committee, Zhang is also only good at the second regiment, and the five ministries are completely anarchic and not unified.The Jiangxi Zhu Peide and Xiong Shihui[14] 2nd Division has 16 regiments, which are stronger than the troops of Fujian and Zhejiang, but much weaker than those in Hunan. More than half of them fought against us, except for Li Wenbin[15]'s brigade, and the rest are all defeated by us.Second, the three provincial parties made relatively few mistakes.Except for the situation in Zhejiang, which we don't know, the foundation of the party and the masses in Jiangxi and Fujian provinces is better than that of Hunan.De'an, Xiushui, and Tonggu in northern Jiangxi still have a considerable foundation. The forces of the Party and Red Guards in counties such as Ninggang, Yongxin, Lianhua, and Suichuan in western Jiangxi still exist. The hope of southern Jiangxi is even greater. Ji'an The independent second and fourth regiments of the Red Army in the counties of , Yongfeng, Xingguo and other counties are developing day by day, and the third independent regiment of the Red Army[17] of Zhimin[16] in Dongfang, Jiangxi has not been eliminated. Situation of siege.We suggest that in the middle of the long-term struggle of the Kuomintang, we should fight for Jiangxi with the Jianggui faction, and at the same time reach western Fujian and western Zhejiang, expand the number of Red Army in the three provinces, and form a separatist regime among the masses. This plan should be completed within a period of one year.During this year, the foundations for proletarian struggle should be established in Shanghai, Wuxi, Ningbo, Hangzhou, Fuzhou, Xiamen, etc., so as to be able to lead the peasant struggles in the three provinces of Jiangxi, Zhejiang and Fujian.The Jiangxi Provincial Party Committee must be sound, and the staff base in Nanchang, Jiujiang, Ji'an and Nanxun Road must be established diligently.

When we arrived in Tingzhou on March 14, we defeated Guo Brigade and killed Guo Fengming. Only then did we know that Jiang and Gui had broken up and that the Kuomintang melee was coming.As for the arrangement of the current work, it was decided that in the early stage of the KMT's melee, we would use guerrilla tactics to mobilize the masses and openly separate the regimes, go deep into the agrarian revolution, and build a workers' and peasants' regime within the scope of a large area of ​​more than 20 counties in western Fujian and southern Jiangxi. The separatist rule was connected with the separatist rule on the border of Hunan and Jiangxi to form a solid force, which served as the foundation for advancing.Therefore, we will not go to Hangzhou, Yong[18], or Longyan. We will work in Ting for 17 days, arrive in Ruijin on April 1, and will occupy Yudu on April 8. When we arrive in the capital, we will convene an enlarged meeting. Discuss the action plan with Comrade Luo Shounan sent by the Jiangnan Special Committee and the Central Military Department.The people in western Fujian and southern Jiangxi are very good. When working in Changting County, Xinqiao, Hetian and other places, there are thousands of people who seize the poor soil and millet.Twenty secret agricultural associations and five secret trade unions were organized in Tingzhou, and the Federation of Trade Unions was also established.The party organization has grown twice as much as before.Organized a red guard, unable to stand alone, and now came to Ruijin with the army.At the beginning, the political organs were provisional revolutionary committees, appointed by the Political Department, and after trade unions and peasant associations had organized a few, representatives were convened to elect formal revolutionary committees.Both the ad hoc and official revolutionary committees issued political platforms.In Ruijin, a four-day work plan was stipulated, and the troops were dispersed to work in the county seat, Rentian City, Xijiang, and Jiubao. Each place was divided into small branches, and the commanding authority was in the county seat.The people of Ruijin rose up in full swing to welcome us, and they were very brave in fighting against the landlords.It's a pity that there was no organization at all before, no comrades, no local leaders, and the organization work was hasty, so it was difficult to do well, especially in the county.After arriving in Yudu, I will work in the county and its surrounding suburbs for about a week. After that, I will either go to Ningdu and Guangchang, or to Wan'an and Taihe, depending on the situation.After a period of guerrilla warfare in southern Jiangxi, and then going to western Fujian, we must fight the remnants of Guo Fengming, Lu Xingbang, and Chen Guohui, and the Fujian Provincial Party Committee must work hard to prepare.

The situation in the army, except for a small part of the Fourth Army to stay on the border, most of the troops who came out counted 3,600 people and 1,100 guns. They lost about 200 guns in Dayu, Xinfeng, and Xunwu, and 600 people ( Most of them lost contact during the battle, and the ones who were actually taken by the enemy were only dozens of guns, more than a hundred people).The frightening news in the newspapers are all deceitful words of the enemy.After World War II, Tingzhou, the capital of Ningdu, not only returned to its original state, but also increased a little.The whole army is now organized into the first, second, third and third columns, each column administers two detachments (equivalent to battalions), and each detachment governs three brigades (equivalent to companies), each column has about 500 guns and more than 1,200 men.When dividing the troops for a guerrilla attack, the column is used as the unit, and then they are divided into small branches. It is very convenient to separate and assemble.Comrade Peng Dehuai's Fifth Army went to Jinggangshan with 800 men and 500 guns. This time it went to Ruijin with 600 men and 400 guns. It is now organized into the fifth column of the Fourth Army. Comrade Peng commanded it in the name of deputy commander. In the future, he must return to the border of Hunan and Jiangxi, collect the old ministries to restore power, and get in touch with southern Jiangxi. He is still under the command of the former committee.The political department has been established, the military has a military political department, and each column has a column political department.The Political Department has a Secretariat, a Propaganda Section, an Organization Section (divided into workers, peasants, and secret agents), and a Political Security Section.There are party representatives at the two levels of the detachment and brigade.Above the column, the party representatives are abolished, only the director of the political department.The whole army made neat clothes in Ting, and each person was paid 4 yuan for pocket expenses. Supplies were no longer a problem, and morale was very boosted.From the Lichuan area in eastern Jiangxi (closer to Guangchang) there are two units that want to join forces. One is Jin Handing's [19] subordinates who rebelled with more than 500 people and more than 300 guns. The bandit army consisted of more than 300 people and more than 200 guns. They were beaten everywhere and had no way out. They are now organized into an independent battalion, with Hu Zhusheng as the battalion commander.The two parts agreed to open to Ningdu for training after April 14th.The Second and Fourth Regiments of the Jiangxi Red Army are now in the Xingguo area, and they are in good contact with us.After the border between Hunan and Jiangxi was once ruined, it is now time to recover. In addition to Wang Zuo's 200 guns belonging to the Fourth Army of the Red Army, Ning Yonglian and Sui Lingcha's six counties had a total of eight Red Guards. Baiqiang, when the warlords are unable to take care of it, not only can be conservative, but also can develop outward. Comrade Peng led his troops back, there should be more ways.The Secretary of the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Special Committee is Comrade Deng Qianyuan.Since the failure of the uprising in southern Shonan last March, the foundation of the party has been completely destroyed under putschism, the armed forces of the peasant army have been confiscated by the landlords, and the masses have been suppressed.Last August, when the Red Army attacked Chen, three county committees were organized in Zixing, Rucheng, and Guidong, and three red guards armed with peasants were organized, and a special committee was organized to govern them, with Du Xiujing as secretary.It was reported closely that they were again sacrificed to putschism.After the spring riots in Liling last spring, the party organization was broken up and the armed forces were wiped out. Seventy guns were taken from the Fourth Army in the summer, and they were all wiped out in Huangtuling at the junction of Yau and Li[22]. This shows that the small number of armed forces existed alone. not easy.

The leading body of the Red Army Party is the front committee appointed by the Central Committee.A letter from the Central Committee on June 4 last year stated: Regarding the former enemy’s guidance organ, the Central Committee considers it necessary to have an organized committee, and the list of members is designated as follows: Mao Zedong, Zhu De, a worker comrade, a peasant comrade, and the secretary of the party department where the former committee is located. , Mao Zedong as secretary.In addition, it is necessary to organize a workers' committee, with the worker comrades of the front committee as the secretary, and a military committee, with Zhu De as the secretary, and the list of the military committee and the work committee is determined by the front committee.The scope of all jurisdictions is determined according to the environment, and the work in all jurisdictions is completely under the command of the former committee.When the former committee was in Jiangxi, it was guided by the Jiangxi Provincial Committee, and in Hunan by the Hunan Provincial Committee.The provincial party committee in charge must immediately respond to the report of the former party committee, and immediately send the report of the former party committee and the reply of the provincial party committee to the central government.Our instructions to the central organization are considered very appropriate and in line with the needs of the struggle.The Red Army, which is superlocal in nature, is not only inappropriate to be under the command of the county party committee and the special committee, but it is also not suitable to be limited to the command of a certain provincial party committee.The Fifth Army in Ping and Liu, and the Fourth Army in southern Hunan and the Hunan-Kiangsi border, have repeatedly failed under the command of localism.The supra-local Red Army must be under the direct command of the central government in order to meet the needs of the revolutionary environment and not suffer from localism.

Since August last year, there have been three reports to the central government.One is a long letter written by Mao Zedong last August when he was defeated at the border, discussing the issue of separatist regimes and the policies of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee. The original manuscript has been lost.One is a report by the Front Committee when it received a letter from the Central Committee in June last year when the Red Army had to return to the Hunan-Jiangxi border[23], which historically described the process of the Hunan-Jiangxi border struggle and the policy plan for the separatist regime. The provincial party committee pays, the original manuscript of this letter still exists, and it is specially rewritten and paid.The central government has not received any of the above two important reports, so it is no wonder that we are completely alienated from our situation.One is a letter sent by the committee in Changting before March 20, forwarded by the Fujian Provincial Party Committee. I don't know if it will be achieved? It is also reposted today.In the past three years, we have not received any publications from the Central Committee. Only when we arrived in Tingzhou did we read the third and fourth issues of "Youth Pioneer", the third issue of "Chinese Workers", and the second issue of "Renyan" published in Beijing. The second issue of "Qianxiang" published by Comrade Zhou Liuhu.When we were on the border of Hunan and Jiangxi, due to the enemy's blockade, we could not read newspapers for two or three months.After September last year, I could go to Ji'an and Changsha to buy newspapers, but it was very difficult to get them.Since arriving in southern Jiangxi and western Fujian, the postal route has been very convenient. Every day, you can read newspapers from Nanjing, Shanghai, Fuzhou, Xiamen, Zhangzhou, Nanchang, and Ganzhou. ", it is really indescribable to see the blue sky after clearing the clouds and mist.In the future, we hope that the Central Committee will send us a letter every month, and we will also report to the Central Committee at least once a month.The publications of the central government do not want to try to send them.

former committee 1929, April, and Friday in Ruijin Printed from transcripts kept at the Central Archives. -------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ note [1] This is a letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China drafted by Mao Zedong. [2] Refers to the letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Front Committee of the Fourth Army of the Red Army of the Communist Party of China dated February 7, 1929. [3] Refers to the third "conference to suppress" the Jinggangshan revolutionary base by the Kuomintang troops in Hunan and Jiangxi provinces in early 1929.

[4] Refers to the Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of China held from June 18 to July 11, 1928. [5] Liuping refers to Liuyang and Pingjiang in Hunan. [6] Refers to the Dabaidi battle and the Changting battle.From February 10 to 11, 1929, the Fourth Army of the Red Army ambushed Liu Shiyi, the 15th Brigade of the 5th Division of the 1st Group Army of the Kuomintang Army, who was chasing the Red Army in Dabaidi (later changed to Ruijin), Ningdu, Jiangxi. Annihilated most of the brigade, captured more than 800 people below the head of the enemy regiment, and surrendered more than 800 guns.From March 13th to 14th, 1929, the Fourth Army of the Red Army and the Guo Fengming Division of the 2nd Temporary Mixed Brigade of the Fujian Provincial Defense Army of the Kuomintang fought fiercely in the Yuxi and Changlingzhai areas of Changting, Fujian Province, completely annihilating the enemy With more than 2,000 troops, they killed the brigade commander Guo Fengming and took advantage of the victory to occupy Changting City.

[7] Ye refers to Ye Ting (1896-1946), a native of Huiyang, Guangdong.During the Northern Expedition, he served as the commander of the 24th Division of the National Revolutionary Army and the commander of the Wuchang Garrison.In August 1927, he led his troops to participate in the Nanchang Uprising, serving as the acting commander-in-chief of the former enemy and the commander of the 11th Army of the uprising army.He, refers to He Long (1896-1969), a native of Sangzhi, Hunan.During the Northern Expedition, he served as the commander of the 20th Army of the National Revolutionary Army.In August 1927, he led his troops to participate in the Nanchang Uprising, and served as the commander-in-chief of the Second Front Army and the commander of the 20th Army of the uprising army. [8] Liu Bocheng (1892-1986), a native of Kaixian, Sichuan.At that time, he was studying at the Frunze Military Academy of the Soviet Union.On August 1, 1927, during the Nanchang Uprising, he was the Chief of Staff of the Staff Group of the Front Enemy Committee of the Communist Party of China. [9] Yun Daiying (1895-1931), a native of Wujin, Jiangsu.At that time, he was Secretary-General of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. [10] He Chang (1906-1935), a native of Liulin Town (now Liulin County), Lishi County, Shanxi.He was a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. [11] Jiang Bocheng (?——1951), born in Zhuji, Zhejiang.At that time, he was the commander of the Zhejiang Provincial Defense Force of the Kuomintang. [12] Chen Guohui (1898-1932), a native of Nan'an, Fujian.At that time, he was the commander of the First Mixed Brigade of the Fujian Provincial Defense Army of the Kuomintang.Lu Xingbang (1880-1945) was born in Youxi, Fujian.At that time, he was the commander of the second division of the new Kuomintang army. [13] Zhang Zhen (1884-1963), a native of Zhao'an, Fujian.At that time, he was the commander of the first division of the Kuomintang army. [14] Zhu Peide (1889-1937), born in Yanxing, Yunnan (now Lufeng County).At that time, he was the commander-in-chief of the Fifth Front Army of the Kuomintang Army and the chairman of the Jiangxi Provincial Government.Xiong Shihui (1893-1974), a native of Anyi, Jiangxi.At that time, he was the commander of the Fifth Division of the Kuomintang Army's First Group Army. [15] Li Wenbin, a native of Yanxing, Yunnan (now Lufeng County).At that time, he was the commander of the 21st Brigade of the First Group Army of the Kuomintang Army. [16] Fang Zhimin (1899-1935), born in Yiyang, Jiangxi.The main founder of the Northeast Jiangxi Revolutionary Base and the Tenth Army of the Red Army. [17] The Third Independent Regiment seems to be the First Independent Regiment. [18] Hang and Yong refer to Shanghang and Yongding in Fujian. [19] Jin Handing (1891-1967), born in Li County, Yunnan (now Huaning).At that time, he was the commander of the 12th Division of the First Group Army of the Kuomintang Army. [20] Wang Zuo (1898-1930), a native of Suichuan, Jiangxi.At that time, he was the head of the First Independent Regiment of the Red Army on the border between Hunan and Jiangxi. [21] Ningyonglian Suiping tea refers to Ninggang, Yongxin, Lianhua, Suichuan in Jiangxi and Lingxian and Chaling in Hunan. [22] You and Li refer to You County and Liling in Hunan. [23] That is, the article "The Struggle in Jinggangshan" in "Selected Works of Mao Zedong". [24] He Jian (1887-1956), a native of Liling, Hunan.At that time, he was the chairman of the Hunan Provincial Government of the Kuomintang.