Chapter 81 Current Kuomintang-Communist Relations and Our Strategy

(February 14, 1941) Comrade Enlai: All electricity are known. (1) Estimates are consistent.Anti-communism will not change, the climax may decline, and "suppression of communism" may stop (only possible). (2) As long as the current upsurge drops and the "suppression of communism" stops, it will be difficult to carry out "suppression of communism" again in the future (unless they surrender), so now is the juncture of changing the situation. (3) The enemy is bound to attack Chiang [1], and Mr. [2] is right in guessing that taking advantage of the contradiction between Japan and Chiang is still the center of our policy.

(4) But it is dangerous to make concessions to Chiang (as you said). Now is the time to force Chiang to make concessions to me, not the time for me to make concessions to Chiang. (5) Jiang has never been criticized so much from inside and outside as he is now, and I have never won such a large number of people (at home and abroad) as now. (6) Chiang will not launch a counterattack against the enemy, his idea is still to preserve strength.However, the possibility of Japan attacking Chiang was very high, and Chiang had to be forced to fight, and his strength could not be preserved. (7) The Kuomintang and the Communist Party are currently in a stalemate, but it will not last long. The day when the enemy makes a big attack is the time when the stalemate will change (but if the enemy does not attack, the stalemate will continue).

(8) Only at that time can I show peace of mind if Jiang shows peace of mind to me, but this is not the right time.At present, it is beneficial to let the deadlock exist. The more deadlocked, the better for me, and the worse for Jiang. (9) The current deadlock is only political (the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party is deadlocked), and the military is not deadlocked to me, because I did not go to beat him. (10) If Chiang ordered the Tang Group[3] to attack Huaibei again, he would have created a stalemate himself, and if the enemy attacked again in the future, his failure would be even greater.If Chiang does not attack Huaibei, his own military stalemate can be resolved for now, leaving only a political stalemate, and Chiang, as smart as he is, should do so.

(11) Our political offensive (Twelve Articles [4]) overwhelmed Jiang's offensive (Hao Dian, Qi Dian, [5] Southern Anhui Incident, 17th Order [6], deadline to move north, disciplinary order, Central China attack, etc.), my offensive has achieved results and will continue to be effective. (12) Our purpose is not that Jiang recognizes the Twelve Articles or part of them, he will not recognize them (of course, we should not say this to the masses inside and outside the party, we still ask Jiang to recognize them), but to fight back with an offensive offensive. (13) The current situation has changed. Before January 17th he was on the offensive and I was on the defensive. After the 17th the situation is reversed and he is already on the defensive. This is where my greatest victory lies.

(14) Only a military offensive can hinder Chiang's resistance to Japan, which is an extremely wrong policy.The political offensive is the opposite, it will only force Chiang to resist Japan, and will not prevent Chiang from resisting Japan.Therefore, the eight characters of military defensive and political offensive are completely correct, and the opposite of the two is complementary. (15) With regard to the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, the military defensive and political offensive will only win over the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, but will not break up the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. For a strong attacker who puts him on the defensive and prevents him from attacking again, there is a possibility that the Kuomintang and the Communist Party will relax temporarily. up.

(16) The gap between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party that was broken by Chiang Kai-shek's hands can only be sewn up with our hands. Our hands are political offensives, that is, the twelve points, and there is no other magic method. (17) Please explain the above points to a certain gentleman and ask his opinion. (18) Announcement as soon as the strength and equipment of the enemy and the enemy in North China and Central China are ready. Mao Zedong Han Chen Printed from manuscript. -------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ note [1] Jiang refers to Chiang Kai-shek.

[2] A certain gentleman refers to Cui Kefu (1900-1982), who was the military attache of the Soviet embassy in China and the general military adviser of the Kuomintang government at that time. [3] Refers to the 31st Group Army of the Kuomintang Army under the command of Tang Enbo. [4] Article 12, see note [2] on page 326 of this volume. [5] Hao Telegram refers to the telegram sent to Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, and Ye Ting on October 19, 1940 (Hao) by Chief of Staff He Yingqin and Deputy Chief of Staff of the Military Commission of the Kuomintang Government.This telegram categorically rejected the three measures proposed by the Chinese Communist Party to adjust the combat area and guerrilla forces and forced the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army south of the Yellow River to withdraw to the north of the Yellow River within one month.November 9th (good) Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, Ye Ting, and Xiang Ying replied to He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi, refusing the order to withdraw the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army to the north of the Yellow River, but said that for the sake of the overall situation, the troops of the New Fourth Army in the south of the Yangtze River could be moved to the north of the Yangtze River .The Qi telegram was He Yingqin's and Bai Chongxi's reply telegram to Zhu, Peng, Ye, and Xiang Jia on December 8 (Qi), again forcing the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army to withdraw all troops south of the Yellow River to the north of the Yellow River.

[6] Order on the 17th, see note [3] on page 326 of this volume.