Chapter 73 mobilize all forces to win friendly forces

(November 4, 1940) Ye, Xiang, Hu Fu, Yun Yi, Chen Yi, Ke Cheng, Xue Feng, Xiannian[1]: A. According to North China (when the three divisions of Zhu Huaibing [2] were fighting the Eighth Route Army, one of the divisions was neutral due to our united front work on the line of fire), the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region (when the security forces fought with us, due to our liaison work, the pre-planned The anti-friction combat experience of the Third Division [3] and the Yellow Bridge in northern Jiangsu [4] (due to the results of Chen Yi’s united front work, the two Li [5] and Chen Taiyun [6] strictly maintained neutrality) and other anti-friction combat experience, in the anti-friction In the armed struggle against China, it is not only of great significance, but also of great possibility to intensify the work of winning sympathy from friendly forces or strictly maintaining neutrality.

B. Under today's conditions in central China, on the one hand, the Kuomintang army is numerically superior to our army, and on the other hand, there are local and motley armies of various systems gathered there.As a result of our efforts to win over friendly troops, when Tang Enbo, Li Pinxian[7] and other troops attacked me, not only did many miscellaneous troops take neutrality or show sympathy for me, but even Tang and Li's troops There is also a movement of some people who oppose the civil war and sympathize with our army, which will not only have great significance and effect on the anti-friction armed struggle in Central China, but will also deal a serious blow to the national anti-communist surrender conspiracy. Therefore, all possible party, government, military and civilian forces should be mobilized immediately It has become one of your most central tasks today to carry out the work of winning over friendly forces.

C. Immediately select effective representatives to carry earnest letters from Mao and Zhu [8] (some targets can also be named Zhou and Peng [9]), plus your own contact letters, to make friends with the friendly forces around you.If it is inconvenient for us to send representatives directly, we can ask local gentry, celebrities, cultural people, and all those who have relatives, friends, fellow villagers, classmates, and clan relations with each friendly army to clear up contacts on our behalf and explain North Jiangsu in detail to each friendly army. The truth of the incident and the difficulties and reasons why the New Fourth Army and the Eighth Route Army could not go to the north of the Old Yellow River, sincerely explain to them the necessity of the enemy's current unity and defense, and the danger of division and civil war that will lead to the subjugation of the country, and ask them not to participate in the anti-communist war, or they will do it for them. Perfunctory orders and plans to fight and shoot guns into the sky, etc.At the same time, in addition to propagating the principle of unity in the War of Resistance against all kinds of friendly forces, we must emphasize issues of vital interest to them.For example: for the Sichuan Army, special emphasis must be placed on the friendship between the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the Sichuan Army, and on Chiang Kai-shek’s plot to invade Sichuan and eliminate the Sichuan Army; for the Northeast Army, the traditional friendly relationship between the Eighth Route Army and the Northeast Army should be emphasized, and sympathy for the situation of Zhang Hanqing[10] and the Northeast Army should be emphasized , emphasizing the indignation towards a certain party [11] who recognized the puppet Manchukuo as the first condition for surrender; to Feng Zhian, Sun Lianzhong [12], etc., emphasizing the need for us to unite with them in the war of resistance, sharing weal and woe, and so on.All in all, let the local army and miscellaneous army plan for their own interests, don't know how to be fooled by Jiang [13], and avoid fighting with us.For Li Pinxian and his troops, it is also necessary to emphasize the long-term friendship between the Eighth Route and the Fifth Route[14], and they should not be provoked by others to become hostile to each other, which would give Chiang an opportunity to attack the Fifth Route and the Eighth Route.It is also necessary to adopt a friendly attitude towards Tang Enbo and his subordinates in order to promote internal divisions.

D. Based on various experiences, "resist the war to the end and unite to the end", "the great enemy is at present, the Chinese will not fight the Chinese, and the Chinese army will not fight the Chinese army", "all Chinese compatriots and Chinese friendly forces unite to resist Japan and save the country", " Slogans such as "oppose civil war, oppose Chinese people killing each other" are still powerful weapons for ideologically dismantling the anti-communist army and winning the sympathy of friendly troops for me.In the event of frictional wars, please write and post these slogans around our military bases and in the territory where friendly troops are stationed. In particular, we must try to mobilize the people and sympathizers to post and write everywhere in the areas where Tang Enbo, Li Pinxian and other ministries pass. Such slogans.When Tang and Li's troops approached our area of ​​defense, a large-scale reunion campaign was launched. Even after the combat operations began, we should not relax the work of shouting slogans of unity and anti-Japanese and part of the work of negotiating and compromising.At the same time, against traitor troops or recalcitrant troops, such slogans should not be used indiscriminately. According to past experience, using such slogans indiscriminately will increase the anti-Communist army's resentment and unity.

E. Chen Yi has rich and valuable experience in the united front work of Liang Li and Chen Taiyun. I hope everyone will study it in detail, carry it forward, and use it extensively, so that all parts can achieve the greatest results in the work of winning friendly forces. In the past, many troops did this. Very little work has been done. Mao, Zhu, Wang[15] Printed from transcripts kept at the Central Archives. -------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ note [1] Ye, refers to Ye Ting, who was then the commander of the New Fourth Army.Xiang, refers to Xiang Ying, who was then secretary of the New Fourth Army Branch of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China and deputy commander of the New Fourth Army.Hu Fu, namely Liu Shaoqi.Yun Yi, that is, Zhang Yunyi (1892-1974), a native of Wenchang, Guangdong (now part of Hainan Province), was the chief of staff of the New Fourth Army and the commander of the Jiangbei Command.Chen Yi was the commander and political commissar of the North Jiangsu Command of the New Fourth Army at that time.Kecheng, namely Huang Kecheng, was the commander and political commissar of the Fifth Column of the Eighth Route Army at that time.Xuefeng, also known as Peng Xuefeng, was the commander and political commissar of the Fourth Column of the Eighth Route Army at that time.Xiannian, that is, Li Xiannian, was the commander and political commissar of the Henan Hubei Advancement Column of the New Fourth Army at that time.

[2] Zhu Huaibing was the commander of the Ninety-seventh Army of the Kuomintang Army at that time. [3] The third pre-division refers to the third preparatory division of the 16th Army of the Kuomintang Army under the command of Chen Ju's brigade. [4] Refers to the Battle of Huangqiao, also known as the North Jiangsu Incident, see note [4] on page 301 of this volume. [5] Two Lis, referring to Li Mingyang and Li Changjiang, who were respectively the commander-in-chief and deputy commander-in-chief of the guerrilla army in the Sulu-Anhui border area of ​​the Kuomintang Army's Lusu theater.

[6] Chen Taiyun, then commander of the northern Jiangsu guerrilla column in the Lusu war zone of the Kuomintang army. [7] Tang Enbo, then commander-in-chief of the 31st Army of the Kuomintang Army.Li Pinxian was then the deputy commander-in-chief of the 5th Theater of the Kuomintang Army, the commander-in-chief of the 21st Group Army, and the chairman of the Anhui Provincial Government of the Kuomintang. [8] Mao, refers to Mao Zedong.Zhu, refers to Zhu De. [9] Zhou refers to Zhou Enlai.Peng, referring to Peng Dehuai, was the deputy commander-in-chief of the Eighth Route Army at the time.

[10] Zhang Hanqing, namely Zhang Xueliang.On December 12, 1936, he and Yang Hucheng launched the Xi'an Incident, demanding that Chiang Kai-shek stop the civil war and unite in the resistance against Japan.After the Xi'an Incident was resolved peacefully, Zhang was imprisoned by Chiang Kai-shek for a long time. [11] Refers to Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang government. [12] Feng Zhi'an, then commander-in-chief of the 33rd Army of the Kuomintang Army.Sun Lianzhong was then the deputy commander-in-chief of the Fifth Theater of the Kuomintang Army and the commander-in-chief of the Second Army.

[13] Jiang refers to Chiang Kai-shek. [14] In January 1938, the Kuomintang government formed the Commander-in-Chief of the Fifth War Zone with the Fifth Route Army of Li Zongren of the Guangxi Clan. Li Pinxian's 21st Group Army was stationed in the Dabie Mountains.In the same year, after the Fourth Detachment of the New Fourth Army (many of which were transferred from the North China Eighth Route Army) arrived in central Anhui, it established a friendly relationship with Li Pinxian's department.Therefore, this friendly relationship is called the friendship between the Eighth Route Army and the Fifth Route Army.

[15] Zhu, refers to Zhu De.Wang, refers to Wang Jiaxiang, who was then vice chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China and director of the General Political Department.