Chapter 30 Comments on the strategic plan and future actions

(February 23, 1938) Comrades Zhu Peng, Lin Nie, He Xiaoguan, Liu Xudeng, Hu Yang, Chen Zhouboye [1]: A. Enemy Situation Judgment (1) In order for the enemy to capture Longhai and Pinghan to take Xi'an and Wuhan directly, the decisive points of victory must be at Tongguan and Wushengguan. (2) The enemy captured Tongguan. According to the terrain, it is more difficult to attack from the west of Luoyang, and easier to attack from the south of Linfen. Therefore, the enemy on the Pinghan and Tongpu routes seems to strive to use the northeastern two routes to the southern Shanxi. The purpose is to expel our army in Jin, occupy Linfen and Fenglingdu, and finally capture Tongguan, so as to guarantee the right wing to attack Wushengguan.The enemy advancing westward along Daoqing Road [2] seems to have an attempt to occupy Luoyang first by crossing the river from Mengjin and force our army in Jin to retreat southward.

(3) The enemy's troops attacking Wusheng Pass should mainly come from Jinpu Road.The enemies of the Ping-Han and Tong-Pu routes should mainly be used to capture Tongguan. B. Strategic Plan Part I (1) To fight for the defense of Tongguan and Xi'an, it is not possible to place all our troops on the inner line west of Pinghan and south of the Yellow River. If we do so, we cannot defend Tongguan and Xi'an. Just as in the past, we cannot defend all our troops on the inner line of Yanmen Pass and Niangziguan. Taiyuan is the same. (2) In order to defend Tongguan, we believe that the force must be divided into two divisions: the first division, the armies of Liu Zhi, Song Zheyuan, Shang Zhen, Hu Zongnan, and Fan Songfu[3], will stick to the Zheng, Luo, and Tong lines, and plan for the lines beyond the line. The northern armies fought against the enemy's crossing of the river.In the second part, the armies north of the Yellow River, including Yan, Wei[4] and all the Eighth Route Army, insisted on the battle in the south of Shanxi and the west of Shanxi.Under good conditions, try to annihilate the enemy in the two areas north and east of Linfen, thwart the enemy's attack, and send a force to the north of Daoqing Road to restrain the enemy who is trying to cross the river.In the worst case, imagine that if Linfen is not defended and Luoyang is occupied, our troops in Jin territory must not cross the river, but should turn to the outside line, attack the enemy's back in turn, cut off the enemy's way, and try to Annihilating the enemy will fundamentally destroy the enemy's plan to attack Tongguan.When the enemy has occupied the three points of Jincheng, Huoxian, and Xixian, our army should use no less than half of our troops to move to the outer flank of the three points (transfer to the enemy's rear) in order to control the enemy.

(3) We believe that Tongguan can be defended only when Jiang, Bai[5], Yan, and Wei agree to the above-mentioned plan and encourage all armies to implement it, that is, Wusheng Pass and Wuhan can be defended.Otherwise, once Tongguan is lost, Wushengguan will be in danger. (4) If Yan and Wei are unwilling or unable to implement the above plan and retreat across the river, these troops will not only be unable to participate in the defense of Tongguan, but may affect the Luo and Tong armies. C. Strategic Plan Part II (1) To fight for the defense of Wusheng Pass and Wuhan, we must first ensure that Tong Pass is in my hands, and secondly use frontal positional warfare to coordinate with the mobile warfare on the two wings.

(2) For mobile warfare on the two wings, at least 200,000 troops must be determined, and they must be located east of Ping-Han for a long time. This is equally important as deploying heavy troops in Shanxi. , to effectively defend Wusheng Pass and Wuhan, even if Wuhan is not defended, the enemy will be surrounded by us. D. Future actions of the Eighth Route Army (1) Assuming that it is advantageous to cooperate with Yan and Wei in Shanxi, and achieve the goal of annihilating and restraining the enemy to secure Tongguan and Xi'an, and at the same time there is no danger at Wushengguan, all will continue to fight in Shanxi, and plan to send an additional force to Hebei Establish a strong anti-Japanese fortress in North China to defend the Central Plains, Northwest China and Wuhan.

(2) Assuming that Yan and Wei can implement the aforementioned plan, Tongguan and Xi'an are consolidated, but Wushengguan and Wuhan are in danger, then a division should be transferred to the east of Wushengguan to cooperate with friendly forces. (3) Assuming that Yan and Wei cannot implement the aforementioned plan, Tongguan and Xi'an are in danger, but Wushengguan and Wuhan are not yet in danger, and a division should be transferred to the Tongguan and Western Fronts to cooperate with friendly forces. (4) Assuming that both Tongguan and Wushengguan are dangerous, two divisions should be selected to go south, one to the east of Pinghan and the other to the west of Pinghan, to cooperate with friendly forces.There is still one division left, active in Shanxi and Hebei, and will not withdraw until a certain necessary period.

(5) The left-behind troops in the border area are responsible for the tasks of Shaanxi and Gansu. E. We think it is necessary to tell the Kuomintang that if nearly one million troops retreat to the inner line south of the Yellow River and west of Ping-Han, while Longhai and Ping-Han are completely occupied by the enemy, great difficulties will arise.Therefore, the general policy is that under the conditions of the enemy's deep attack, we must deploy sufficient forces on the outer lines so that we can cooperate with the main force on the inner lines to increase the enemy's difficulties and reduce our own difficulties, creating a military and political situation conducive to protracted warfare.

Myself, the above is our opinion, what do you think, I hope to tell you. Mao Zedong Ren Bishi[6] Twenty-four o'clock on February 23 Published according to Mao Zedong's manuscript. -------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ note [1] Zhu, refers to Zhu De.Peng, referring to Peng Dehuai, was the deputy commander-in-chief of the Eighth Route Army at the time.Lin, referring to Lin Biao, was the commander of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army at the time.Nie, referring to Nie Rongzhen, was then the commander and political commissar of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region of the Eighth Route Army.He Xiaoguan refers to He Long, Xiao Ke, and Guan Xiangying, who were respectively the commander, deputy division commander and political commissar of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army at that time.Liu refers to Liu Bocheng, who was then the commander of the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army.Xu, referring to Xu Qianqian, who was then the deputy commander of the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army.Deng, referring to Deng Xiaoping, born in 1904 in Guang'an, Sichuan, was a political commissar of the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army at that time.Hu, referring to Hu Fu, that is, Liu Shaoqi.Yang, referring to Yang Shangkun, then deputy secretary of the Northern Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.Chen, referring to Chen Shaoyu, that is, Wang Ming (1904-1974), a native of Jinzhai, Anhui, who was then Secretary of the Yangtze River Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.Zhou refers to Zhou Enlai.Bo, referring to Bogu, that is, Qin Bangxian, who was a member of the Yangtze River Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China at that time.Ye, referring to Ye Jianying, who was then a member of the Yangtze River Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and chief of staff of the Eighth Route Army.

[2] Daoqing Road refers to a section of railway from Daokou Town, Huaxian County, Henan Province to Qinghua Town, Boai County. [3] Liu Zhi (1892-1971), a native of Ji'an, Jiangxi Province, former commander-in-chief of the Second Army in the First Theater of the Kuomintang Army, was dismissed on September 30, 1937. On March 9, 1938, he was appointed as the deputy commander-in-chief of the first theater.Song Zheyuan (1885-1940), a native of Leling, Shandong, was the deputy commander-in-chief of the first theater of the Kuomintang army and the commander-in-chief of the first group army at that time.Shang Zhen (1887-1978), a native of Shaoxing, Zhejiang, was the commander-in-chief of the 20th Army of the Kuomintang Army and the commander of the 32nd Army at that time.Hu Zongnan (1896-1962), a native of Xiaofeng (now Anji), Zhejiang, was the commander of the 17th Army Corps and the First Army of the Kuomintang Army at that time.Fan Songfu (1894-1979), a native of Jinyun, Zhejiang, was the commander of the 46th Army of the Kuomintang Army at that time.

[4] Yan, referring to Yan Xishan, who was then the commander-in-chief of the Second Theater of the Kuomintang Army.Wei, referring to Wei Lihuang, was the deputy commander-in-chief of the Second Theater of the Kuomintang Army and the commander-in-chief of the Fourteenth Group Army at that time. [5] Jiang refers to Chiang Kai-shek.Bai, refers to Bai Chongxi (1893-1966), a native of Guilin, Guangxi, who was then the deputy chief of staff of the Military Commission of the Kuomintang government. [6] Ren Bishi was the director of the Political Department of the Eighth Route Army at that time.