Chapter 12 Strategic Opinions on Operations in North China

(September 25, 1937) Zhu, Peng, Ren, and Zhou[1] also sued Lin Biao[2]: Strategic Opinion: A. According to the current enemy's attack on Baoding and Daizhou [3] and towards Shijiazhuang and Taiyuan, it seems that there are not many troops defending the four counties of Ling, Lai, Guang, and Wei [4]. According to the negotiation between Jiang and Yan [5] In order to prevent the enemy from occupying Taiyuan and Shijiazhuang in the south and to support the protracted war in North China, in order to prevent the enemy from occupying Taiyuan and Shijiazhuang in the south, and to support the protracted war in North China, it is proposed that Jiang and Yan send all the cavalry troops of He Zhuguo[6], and send the Guangxi army or the Central Committee. The army has a strong infantry of 15,000 to 20,000 men, all of whom cooperate with our Lin division and under the command of Zhu and Peng. When the enemies of Wei and Lai are advancing towards Baoding, and the enemies of Ling and Guang are advancing deeply into Daizhou, Assault northward between Ling and Lai (central breakthrough of a counter-offensive nature), restore the four counties of Ling, Lai, Guang, and Wei, and then proceed to the Datong, Zhangjiakou, Beiping line, Datong, Taiyuan line, Beiping, Shijiazhuang line, and hold large-scale In the flank and rear raids, bases for the masses and fortresses were established in Ling, Lai, Guang, and Wei.If we succeed in this way, we can still use a considerable portion of our forces to enter and exit the direction of Jehol [7], which may create a new situation in the North China War and support a protracted war for a considerable period of time.Please give Jiang and Yan suggestions after consideration.

B. Regardless of whether Jiang and Yan assist or not, at present the Red Army should not be exposed prematurely, and it is especially inadvisable to dispatch a tactical detachment too early. When the troops in the four counties mentioned above are very few in strength (at this time, the enemy of Zhuozhou should attack near Xushui, and the enemy of Datong should attack near Yanmen Pass), and then use our forestry divisions to project to the north. The situation is further divided into countless small branches or into two or three groups, and they will carry out extensive raids against the enemy's empty side in the vast area east, west and north of the Hengshan Mountains.It would be disadvantageous to expose the Red Army's objectives and attract the enemy's attention when the enemy's main force has not yet concentrated on the main attack point and the enemy's rear is not yet completely empty.It is useless to send only tactical detachments.

C. If you agree with the above opinions, please temporarily hide all our troops and recharge their batteries. This will be done when the necessary conditions are met. At that time, Wang Zhen's [8] department should be located in the area that supports the front and maintains the rear.Master He [9] used the same principle in Northwest Shanxi. D. If you go to the enemy's rear, you must adopt the policy of confiscating the big landlords and mobilize the masses widely, so that the Red Army will not be isolated. E, Jiang, and Yan Baoding decided to fight the decisive battle, and the policy of northern Shanxi (see Jiang's deployment telegram on the 19th) was completely passive and beaten. The above plan can be changed from passive to active.Now there is only this one move left, which should be strongly suggested to Jiang and Yan (not to mention the Red Army acting alone, only requesting to send troops to assist).

If the above-mentioned plan can be realized, even if Baoding and Daizhou fall, they will not be afraid.Without the cost of losing some places, we cannot obtain the convenience of activities in the enemy's rear. G. To carry out the above-mentioned plan, it is necessary to have few enemy troops in Ling, Lai, Guang, and Wei, and there must be terrain conditions where the enemy soldiers behind the enemy are not easy to move, but our infantry is easy to move.Xin, the above is a suggestion, please consider replying by telegram. Mao Zedong twenty-fifth Printed from transcripts kept at the Central Archives.

-------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ note [1] Zhu, refers to Zhu De.Peng, referring to Peng Dehuai, was the deputy commander-in-chief of the Eighth Route Army at the time.Ren refers to Ren Bishi, who was then the director of the Political Department of the Eighth Route Army.Zhou refers to Zhou Enlai. [2] Lin Biao was the commander of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army at that time. [3] Daizhou, now Daixian. [4] Refers to Lingqiu and Guangling in Shanxi and Laiyuan and Yuxian in Hebei. [5] Jiang refers to Chiang Kai-shek.Yan, referring to Yan Xishan, who was then the commander-in-chief of the Second Theater of the Kuomintang Army.

[6] He Zhuguo (1897-1985), a native of Rong County, Guangxi.At that time, he was the commander of the Second Cavalry Army of the Kuomintang Army. [7] Rehe refers to Rehe Province, see note [5] on page 5 of this volume. [8] Wang Zhen was the deputy brigade commander of the 359th Brigade of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army at that time. [9] Master He refers to the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army where He Long was the commander.