Chapter 125 Combat Experience in the Northwest Battlefield[1]

(October 11, 1947) Under the command of Deputy Commander Peng[2], our army in the Northwest has only ten brigades, including the three local brigades, and each brigade has more than 5,000 men in large and 3,000 in small ones. people.The border region has a population of 1.5 million, about one-third of which were occupied by the enemy. All county towns and most of the villages were once occupied by the enemy, and eleven cities are still in the enemy's hands.There has been a drought this year, and food has been extremely difficult in recent months.After seven months of fighting, the recruits in the Liberated Areas were not recruited, and the recruits were all prisoners.In seven months, there was no formal training for more than two weeks, and most of the time was spent in marching and combat.However, our army's fighting will is extremely strong, its morale is extremely high, its equipment and firepower have been greatly enhanced, and its personnel have increased slightly compared to when it started fighting in March due to the replenishment of prisoners.Taking advantage of the vastness of the border area and the support of the people, within seven months the offensive of Hu Zongnan's [3] central group's 24 infantry and cavalry brigades and 10 brigades of other brands was defeated, and 11 brigades were annihilated by me and suffered annihilated blows. Coupled with the enemy's exhaustion and hunger, I turned to the counterattack.Although the people were devastated by the enemy, their consciousness was greatly raised.Although our army is several times smaller than the enemy in number, it is superior to the enemy in combat effectiveness, especially in overwhelming the enemy in spirit. The enemy is extremely afraid of us, but we are not afraid of the enemy.At present, the main force of our army is preparing to fight inside the enemy's rear for a short period of time.It is estimated that in another year or so, most of the Hu army will be wiped out and many places in the northwest will be captured.I hope that the leaders will pass on this experience to their subordinates and study it.Some cadres seem to think that there must be regular rest and reorganization, a sufficient large army of two to three thousand people per regiment, a large number of militiamen and carts accompanying the army, and a sufficient supply of food and ammunition in the rear, in order to win big battles , a little tiredness and downsizing will lead to endless suffering, and it has been transformed into taking everything from the enemy, not relying on the rear, greatly reducing militias, carts, saving food and ammunition, advocating not being afraid of casualties, fighting continuously, and being good at using two battles or between battles Take a short-term rest (seven days, ten days, or half a month) in the gaps between them, be good at capturing fighters, always maintain strong morale, win more battles, and ensure victory in each battle. All problems are solved from winning battles.This latter idea must be firmly established in all armies, especially in all armies within the pass.Even if there is support from the rear, there must be no need to rely on it. The focus must be on relying on the front line and relying on the field army to solve problems from the front line.Not only the Northwest has this experience, but all the districts themselves must have this experience. We hope to sum it up, deepen the lessons learned by the troops, and strive for victory in the major counter-offensive.

Published according to Mao Zedong's manuscript. -------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ note [1] This is part of a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China to the heads of the strategic regions. [2] Deputy Commander Peng refers to Peng Dehuai, who was then Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, Commander and Political Commissar of the Northwest Field Army. [3] Hu Zongnan, then director of the Xi'an Appeasement Office of the Kuomintang Army.