Home Categories political economy Collected Works of Mao Zedong Volume Four

Chapter 114 Estimation of Liu Deng[1]'s countermeasures against the enemy after dispatching

(August 6, 1947) Liu Deng, also told Chen Sutan, Chen Xie[2]: How do you estimate the enemy's possible countermeasures after dispatching? We think the enemy may adopt two or three methods.The first method is to quickly organize an attack so that you cannot gain a foothold.However, this method is difficult to mobilize a large number of troops. It is estimated that about twelve brigades (or more) can be used by the attacker, that is, two divisions each of the seventh division, the forty-eighth division, the tenth division, the seventy-ninth division, the third division, and the fifty-eighth division. brigade.Except for the Gui family, none of them are very powerful.Its starting point is different, and in the short term, it is bound to be uneven.If I can annihilate four or five brigades during the movement, their offensive will be frustrated, and I can get a chance to rest so as to fight again.The basic disadvantage of the enemy's method is that the offensive force is too small, we have a lot of room for maneuver, and there is a danger of forcing us to cross the south of the Yangtze River (the enemy is very afraid of this).The second method is to give me a chance to gain a foothold, rather than rushing to attack me.In addition to the twelve brigades (or more) mentioned above, more than a dozen brigades were transferred from Shandong, a total of more than 20 brigades. In one to two months, the deployment was first completed from the Yangtze River and Pinghan-Han lines, and then Attack west and north.The basic disadvantage of this method is that it will give us time to gain a foothold, and it will completely destroy the offensive in Shandong, and most of the western Shandong and eastern Henan will be in danger. Destroy each of them in the movement.The third method is to use the above two methods at the same time, to attack quickly with about 12 brigades in separate routes, and to deploy more than a dozen brigades from Shandong to the Yangtze River.You must be prepared to deal with these several methods at the same time, and be prepared mainly to deal with the first method, that is, to devote all your energy to mass annihilation of the enemy during the campaign, and rely on victory in battle.After Chen and Xie left western Henan, Hu Zongnan's[3] offensive to northern Shaanxi was bound to be disrupted. In addition to the two brigades of the Tenth Division, one brigade of the Seventy-ninth Division, and one cavalry brigade that had already been transferred eastward, at least six or seven more brigades would be transferred The brigade is used in Tongguan, Shang, and Luo [4], and it is estimated that it will be difficult to launch a strong offensive within a month.In addition, after our two roads go south, Hefei, Anqing, Edong, Hankou, Pinghan, along the Hanshui River Basin and Nanyang, Tongguan, Luoyang and other places must be guarded. To guard these many places, there must be dozens of brigades. No.The enemy's mobile forces in Shandong, western Shandong, and northern Shaanxi totaled 45 brigades (29 in Shandong, 8 in western Shandong, and 8 in northern Shaanxi), and the garrison force consisted of 96 brigades (including those who were annihilated).In order to allocate dozens of brigades to guard the Yangtze River, Han River, and Ping-Han areas, it is not only possible to greatly reduce the garrison force along the Longhai line and the areas north of it, but also to change part of the mobile force to garrison force.In this way, the global may cause changes.Only when our Southern Expedition Corps was unable to wipe out a large number of enemies, so it could not gain a foothold and was forced to withdraw, it could only play the role of temporarily mobilizing the enemy, but could not change the overall situation, and had to pay heavy casualties and reduce personnel. cost.This kind of price must be prepared to pay no matter what role it plays, but if it can achieve the effect of changing the overall situation, it is more worth paying this kind of price.

Military Commission Miyu Published according to Mao Zedong's manuscript. -------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ note [1] Liu Deng refers to Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, who served as the commander and political commissar of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army at that time. [2] Chen Sutan, referring to Chen Yi, Su Yu, and Tan Zhenlin, who were respectively the commander, political commissar, deputy commander, and deputy political commissar of the East China Field Army at that time.Chen Xie refers to Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi, who were the former secretary and deputy secretary of the Chen Xie Group of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army at that time.

[3] Hu Zongnan, then director of the Xi'an Appeasement Office of the Kuomintang Army. [4] Shang and Luo refer to Shang County (now Shangzhou) and Luonan, Shaanxi.
Press "Left Key ←" to return to the previous chapter; Press "Right Key →" to enter the next chapter; Press "Space Bar" to scroll down.
Chapters
Chapters
Setting
Setting
Add
Return
Book