Chapter 97 Don't be impatient, don't divide troops, wait for the enemy

(May 6, 1947) Chen Su[1], and sued Liu Deng[2]: You received the telegram on the 3rd and 4th, and immediately replied to put forward a few comments, sorry to have received it.Today I received your 2nd telegram [3], and learned that Qingtuo Temple wiped out 3,000 enemies, but because I went to Ningyang, it was too late to concentrate my forces to fight against the 74th Division and other units, and I missed a chance to wipe out the enemy.In the current situation, the enemy is in a hurry, but our side is not in a hurry.In view of the lessons learned from Qingtuo Temple, it is especially inappropriate to divide the troops. Not only should the first and sixth columns not be separated too early, but the seventh column should also stay in the coastal area for a month or so as restraint, and then go south according to the situation after a month.Therefore, in May, June and February, you divide the seven verticals located outside Binhai, and the rest should be concentrated in the Laiwu and Yishui areas for rest and standby, waiting for the enemy to advance or other changes, and then attack accordingly.First, don't be impatient, and second, don't divide your troops. As long as the main force is in hand, there is always a chance to wipe out the enemy.Every action should not only estimate one possibility, but two possibilities. For example, mobilizing the enemy may or may not be mobilized, most of them may be mobilized, or only a small part may be mobilized.Whenever the situation is uncertain, our main force should be located in a place that can cope with the two possibilities.This time you are focused on dealing with the enemy in the west, but you did not expect the main force of the Tang[4] Corps to go north, and you did not prepare in advance to concentrate the maximum force in a suitable position. From south to north, the 74th Division and other departments.It was too late to concentrate its forces during the battle at Qingtuo Temple, but it didn't matter if it lost an opportunity.When it is difficult to fight, it is right to avoid the enemy's provocation and wait patiently.Also, at the time of the great victory in Tai'an[5] the enemy is deeply panicking, so it is estimated that within five or six months, we may have the opportunity to wipe out the enemy.Even if there is no chance, as long as the enemy's main force advances to the Taian, Laiwu, and Yishui lines, it is best to let them enter the Zibo area, and you retreat to the Zibo line or to the north of Zibo, pretending to retreat to Hebei, so that the enemy will have the illusion .Our main force should be farther away from the enemy. Don't defend the position. Don't shoot at the enemy's front and rear, so that the enemy can move forward with peace of mind, and make the enemy completely unaware of where our main force is. When the main force moves into the enemy's rear, the situation will change.This time Hu Tsung-nan [6] used 31 brigades to attack the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, which has a population of only 1.5 million. He concentrated eleven brigades, sometimes ten brigades, sometimes nine brigades, forming a line of forty to fifty li across. The phalanx, so that I have no chance to attack, we will deal with it in the above-mentioned way.Ignore the concentrated enemy (this time the enemy's nine and a half brigades entered Suide, we did not shoot a single shot), and concentrate on attacking the enemy's rear, so that the enemy will completely fall into a passive position. This can be used as your reference.The difference is that the Shandong area is relatively narrow, and your troops are very large, and it is not easy to move around, so you should adapt your measures to local conditions.Everything depends on the situation.

Military Commission Chenyu Published according to Mao Zedong's manuscript. -------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ note [1] Chen Su, referring to Chen Yi and Su Yu, who were respectively the commander, political commissar and deputy commander of the East China Field Army at that time. [2] Liu Deng, referring to Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, who were the commander and political commissar of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army at that time. [3] Refers to the telegram sent by Chen Yi and Su Yu to the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, the East China Bureau, Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping on May 2, 1947.The telegram said: When the East China Field Army attacked Tai'an, the enemy continued to attack Xintai and Mengyin mountainous areas in an attempt to lure us to attack and fight us decisively.The East China Field Army voluntarily abandoned Xintai and Mengyin. The main force advanced to the area east of the Linmeng Highway, attacked Ningyang with a part, and mobilized the enemy (fifth army) to disperse the enemy westward. enemy.On the night of April 29th to 30th, about two regiments of the enemy's 83rd Division were annihilated by our army in the area south of Qingtuosi, but they failed to launch an attack on the enemy's 74th Division and other units in time.

[4] Tang, referring to Tang Enbo, was the commander of the First Corps of the Xuzhou Command of the Kuomintang Army General Command at that time. [5] Refers to the siege of Tai'an by the Tenth and Third Columns of the East China Field Army from April 22 to 26, 1947.In this battle, Tai'an defended the enemy and reorganized the 72nd Division (one brigade was missing), and the division commander Yang Wenzhen was captured. [6] Hu Zongnan, then the commander-in-chief of the first theater of the Kuomintang army.