Chapter 67 First enter the customs secretly with four columns at night and dawn

(November 20, 1948) Lin Luoliu[1], and told Cheng Huang, Yang Luogeng[2], Northeast Bureau: Telegram [3] at 11:00 on the 19th. (1) The timing of the encirclement of the Tangshan enemy is worth considering. Cheng Huang can prepare to encircle Tangshan between the 25th and 27th to cut off the Tang enemy's retreat, but the implementation must wait for our final order. (2) According to researchers, Fu Zuoyi's [4] command ability is stronger than Wei Lihuang's [5] and others. Cheng Huang's encirclement of Tangshan was too early, and it was two or three weeks before the main force arrived near Tangshan, Ping, and Tianjin. Nei Jiang[6] and Fu must take action.If the enemy's central forces are stationed in the vicinity of Peiping, or even part or most of the Jiafu army advances to the Jintang-Tang line, and the main force is located in Tanggu, then the enemy in Tangshan can be taken out and preparations for retreating by sea can be completed. , it is difficult for our army to annihilate the enemy when it enters the customs.

(3) We believe that our troops on the Jinzhou-Xinmin Line and the Yingkou area should be secretly mobilized first, and four columns of troops and Cheng Huang's existing troops should be used to simultaneously cut off the connection between Tianjin and Beiping, and between Tangshan and Tanggu, so that Beiping The enemies at Tangshan and Tangshan were unable to reach Jin and Gu.To achieve this goal, it is necessary to postpone Cheng Huang's action to encircle Tangshan, and first use four columns to secretly enter the pass at night to carry out the task of separating Ping and Tianjin.As for the troops near Shenyang, it is advisable to postpone the departure time, because there is an enemy radio station in Shenyang, and if we act, the enemy will be alert.

(4) The two columns of Yang Luogeng's troops are now in Quyang, and they can go out near Zhangjiakou to cooperate with Yang Chengwu and Zhan Danan[7] to encircle Zhangjiakou and prevent Fu's westward retreat, and they can also carry out the task of cutting off Ping and Tianjin.However, there are about 40,000 people in the six brigades of the Ministry, and it is insufficient to be responsible for cutting off Ping and Tianjin alone. It is more suitable to cooperate with Yang Chengwu and Zhan Danan to encircle Zhangjiakou. Wang Lin, Luo, and Liu put forward their opinions on how to use the Ministry.Wang Yang, Luo, and Geng will tell you how many miles each is from Quyang to the Pingjin line and to the Pingzhang line, and how much marching time will be required.

(5) In order not to alert Fu's army as soon as possible, we have ordered Nie, Bo, and Teng[8] to order the Seventh Column attacking Baoding to stop the attack and adopt the policy of encirclement and surveillance.There is only one division composed of local troops staying in the city, the purpose of which is to contain part of our army, so that Fu Jun can have more time to implement the plan of retreat or stick to it (Fu is now organizing a large number of local troops, such as Wang Fenggang[9], etc. into Fu , Jiang two lines of regular army. Wang and others are unwilling and are contacting us to surrender).

(6) One of Fu and Jiang's troops in Shanhaiguan has not yet retreated. The purpose is to estimate that your main force will go to this place when entering the pass, so that this unit will block it first, so as to gain time for the main force to escape or stick to it.Therefore, your main force to enter the customs should follow the path of the four verticals and the eleventh verticals, not the Shanhai Pass. (7) The actions of the troops must be very concealed. Jiang and Fu always underestimated the enthusiasm of our army. They have not yet expected that your main force will enter the border immediately.Therefore, in addition to the fact that the operations of the troops should be very concealed, please ask the Northeast Bureau and Lin, Luo, and Tan [10] to order Xinhua News Agency and the radio stations in the Northeast to broadcast more frequently in Shenyang, Xinmin, Yingkou, and Jinzhou in the next two weeks. Meeting news to confuse the enemy.

(8) The above items are expected to be answered. Military Commission Twenty-four o'clock on the 20th Published according to Mao Zedong's manuscript. -------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ note [1] Lin Luoliu refers to Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou, who were respectively the commander, political commissar, and chief of staff of the Northeast Field Army at that time. [2] Cheng Huang, referring to Cheng Zihua and Huang Zhiyong, who were respectively the commander and chief of staff of the Second Corps of the Northeast Field Army at that time.Yang Luogeng refers to Yang Dezhi, Luo Ruiqing, and Geng Biao, who were respectively the commander, political commissar, and chief of staff of the Second Corps of the North China Military Region at the time.

[3] Refers to the telegram sent by Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou to the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China at 11:00 on November 19, 1948.The telegram proposed the combat deployment of Cheng Zihua and Huang Zhiyong's four verticals, eleventh verticals, three independent divisions, and one cavalry division to encircle Tangshan with all their strength on the 24th, and asked the Military Commission for instructions. [4] Fu Zuoyi, was then the commander-in-chief of the North China "bandit suppression" headquarters of the Kuomintang army. [5] Wei Lihuang, former commander-in-chief of the Northeast "Bandit Suppression" Command of the Kuomintang Army, was later placed under house arrest in Nanjing.

[6] Jiang refers to Chiang Kai-shek. [7] Refers to the Third Corps of the North China Military Region under the command of Yang Chengwu and the troops of the Jirecha Military Region under the command of Zhan Danan. [8] Nie, Bo, and Teng refer to Nie Rongzhen, Bo Yibo, and Teng Daiyuan, who were respectively the commander, political commissar, and second deputy commander of the North China Military Region at that time. [9] Wang Fenggang (1914-1966), a native of Xincheng, Hebei (now Gaobeidian City), was the Commissioner and Security Commander of the Tenth Commissioner of the Kuomintang Hebei Province at that time.

[10] Lin and Luo refer to Lin Biao and Luo Ronghuan.Tan, referring to Tan Zheng, who was then the director of the Political Department of the Northeast Field Army.