Chapter 43 Preliminary idea of ​​attacking economic aid

(August 12, 1948) Su Chen, Tang Zhang[1], and sued Xu Wangtan[2], East China Bureau, Central Plains Bureau: Telegram [3] at four o'clock on the gray day.We are considering the three proposals you raised, and we will formally reply to you after you have discussed with Xu, Wang, and Tan and put forward more practical opinions.Now we only put forward some preliminary impressions, as your reference materials during the consultation. (1) In the battle in September, there are three possibilities for the expected outcome.First, fight a huge war of annihilation.This is what you said that you not only captured Jinan, but also wiped out most of the Fifth Army and other departments to aid the enemy.Second, fight a big but not huge war of annihilation.This means conquering Jinan and annihilating some but not most of the reinforcements.Third, Jinan has not been conquered, and it is not easy to fight to aid the enemy, resulting in a stalemate, so we have to find another opportunity.

(2) The purpose of your third plan is to strive for the first result.Its weakness is that it only occupies the airfield with two columns, and neither really fights against Jinan, but concentrates eleven columns to fight for aid, and the aid will inevitably be carefully assembled and slowly advanced, and there will be no real aid.The reason why the Qiu and District [4] Corps really aided Kaifeng was because we really opened Kaifeng, and the enemy clearly knew that we were blocking aid, not fighting aid, so we arrived in Kaifeng in ten days.If your plan this time is not to really attack Jinan, but to focus on aid, then after the district corps are wiped out and the Qiuhuang[5] two corps are severely damaged, the aid enemy will inevitably adopt (won’t not) take this kind of careful assembly and slow down advance method.At that time, our army is bound to change its plan midway and focus on the real fight against Jinan.Although there is nothing very bad about changing the plan midway, it loses part of the time and allows the enemy to advance a certain distance, which may affect the battle situation.

(3) Under the condition that we use Xu Tan's full strength and don't want the other columns to participate, or even if they participate, only individual divisions, at most no more than one column, we are currently inclined to divide and cooperate in siege and aid, so as to achieve The purpose of not only conquering Jinan, but also annihilating a part of the army to aid the enemy is to adopt your second plan to achieve the second result above.We feel that doing so is more secure and more likely to achieve results.This is because the main force of the District Corps was wiped out, Qiu and Huang were severely injured, and the 25th Division retreated. Although the 8th and 64th Divisions arrived, they could only reach the Upper District Corps at most. When the main force is wiped out and the 25th Division is withdrawn, your concentration of six to seven columns can not only block the enemy's reinforcements in appropriate areas, but also annihilate part of them, at least ensuring the capture of Tsinan.This is what we think of the siege and aid division and cooperation plan.

(4) Regardless of whether you adopt the second plan or the third plan, in terms of troop deployment, the three columns under the command of Ye Fei[6] should complete their training at the end of this month and move northward to the Jia and Ju[7] areas.The columns already in the north and the third column in motion should be located in Yan, Ji [8] or the areas to the south in due course.That is to say, except for the five brigades of Wei Ji[9] who can temporarily decide where to participate in the battle (this unit seems to be in charge of attacking the Xubeng section), all regular troops should be located in the front, first seeking to block the attack, and then looking for opportunities to annihilate them several.And don't try to use Ye Fei's three columns to lead Qiu and Huang's queens to make arrangements to attack Qiu and Huang.If you are trying to fight for aid, then Qiu and Huang will never split up and let you attack the other side.At that time, the enemy's deployment was most likely to be located west of the canal (such as Jinxiang) to contain a part of our army, and the main force would march northward along the Jinpu Road for relief.Or on the contrary, use a part to harass Jinpu Road, and use the main force to go northwest along the transport to aid.Therefore, our army must move in advance and build several fortifications in order to transfer troops to the east or west at any time to block and annihilate enemy aid.

(5) Food is a huge problem. When you go to Yan and Ji for meetings, the East China Bureau and Hebei, Shandong and Henan should send responsible cadres to participate in coordinating food and other issues. Military Commission nineteen o'clock on the twelfth Published according to Mao Zedong's manuscript. -------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ note [1] Su Chen, Tang Zhang, refers to Su Yu, Chen Shiju, Tang Liang, and Zhang Zhen, who were acting commander, acting political commissar, chief of staff, director of the political department, and deputy chief of staff of the East China Field Army at that time.

[2] Xu Wangtan refers to Xu Shiyou, Wang Jianan, and Tan Zhenlin.Xu and Tan were respectively the commander and political commissar of the Shandong Corps of the East China Field Army at that time.Wang Jian'an (1908-1980), a native of Huang'an (now Hong'an), Hubei, was the deputy commander of the Shandong Corps of the East China Field Army at that time. [3] Refers to the telegram sent by Su Yu, Chen Shiju, Tang Liang, Zhang Zhen, and Zhong Qiguang to the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China at 4:00 on August 10, 1948.The telegram proposed three combat plans for the East China Field Army after the rainy season was over.The first plan is to concentrate all efforts to fight in the Henan, Anhui, Jiangsu and Huaibei Road East areas, cut off the Xubeng section of the railway, isolate Xuzhou, focus on fighting aid, and obtain the first annihilation of the five armies during the movement, and then expand the results of the battle and wipe out the other regiments.The second plan is to concentrate the main force to capture Jinan and only use the necessary forces to block the enemy who may be aided by the north.The third option is to capture Jinan and aid at the same time, and coordinate and use troops in a focused manner.In the first stage of the campaign, two columns seized Jinan Airport, and at the same time used the remaining eleven columns to fight for reinforcements, annihilating one or two reinforcements.In the second stage, the main force was transferred to attack Jinan with a blocking force.Telegram believes that it is best to implement the third plan.

[4] Qiu, refers to Qiu Qingquan (1902-1949), a native of Yongjia, Zhejiang Province, who was then the commander of the Fifth Army of the Kuomintang Reorganization (expanded into the Second Corps in September 1948).District, referring to Qu Shounian (1902-1957), a native of Luoding, Guangdong, former commander of the Seventh Corps of the Kuomintang Army, was captured in the Battle of Eastern Henan in July 1948. [5] Qiu refers to Qiu Qingquan.Huang, referring to Huang Baitao (1900-1948), originally from Meixian, Guangdong, was born in Tianjin. At that time, he was the commander of the Seventh Corps of the Kuomintang Army. He was killed in the Battle of Huaihai in November 1948.

[6] Ye Fei, born in 1914, is from Nan'an, Fujian.At that time, he was the commander of the first column of the East China Field Army. [7] Jia and Ju refer to Jiaxiang and Juye in Shandong. [8] Yan and Ji refer to Yanzhou and Jining in Shandong. [9] Wei, refers to Wei Guoqing, who was the commander of the North Jiangsu Corps of the East China Field Army at that time.Ji refers to Ji Luo, that is, Ji Pengfei, born in 1910 in Linyi, Shanxi Province, and served as the deputy political commissar of the North Jiangsu Corps of the East China Field Army at that time.