Chapter 40 Stop attacking the Changchun plan and prepare for the southward advance

(July 22, 1948) Lin Luoliu[1], and reported to the Northeast Bureau: Both the afternoon electricity and the afternoon electricity [2] are known.Fighting in the south has various favorable conditions. The more our army advances to the enemy's rear, the more the enemy's stronghold hanging behind us will be forced to weaken or retreat. proved by combat.Since we are not certain of attacking Changchun, we can and should stop this plan and change it to a plan to fight south in advance.When you are preparing to attack Changchun, we will tell you not to talk too much about the difficult conditions of the southward battle, so that you will mentally restrict yourself and lose your initiative. [3] Now that you have shifted your attention to fighting in the south, study the enemy's situation, terrain, food, etc. in the south, and see the various favorable conditions. This is very good and necessary. Army commanders and fighters are first of all cadres to fully explain these conditions to encourage and strengthen their will to go south and strengthen their determination.But at the same time, it is necessary to explain the various difficult situations that will be encountered and will inevitably be encountered, such as food shortages, the people's welcome may not be as enthusiastic as the people in the place where it is now, the stubborn resistance of certain enemies and sometimes fighting They are not going well, etc., so that they are mentally prepared in this regard, and study methods to overcome various difficulties.These inevitable difficulties, especially the difficulty of food conditions, must be seriously considered by your senior leaders.It is less than a month before mid-August, and your political mobilization and food preparation must be stepped up, otherwise you will not be able to start in Beining, Pingcheng, Pingzhang and other lines in August.Regarding the specific combat plan, I hope you will consider it in detail and draw up a telegram of the general plan.It seems appropriate for your command organization to go south in advance to meet with Cheng Zihua and Luo Ruiqing[4].The Northeast Bureau should quickly strengthen the work in the Jirecha[5] and Liao areas, especially the work on finance and food. There are quite serious contradictions in this area.

Military Commission Yanghai Published according to Mao Zedong's manuscript. -------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ note [1] Lin Luoliu, referring to Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou, who were respectively the commander, political commissar, deputy political commissar, and chief of staff of the Northeast Field Army at that time. [2] Refers to the two telegrams sent by Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou to the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China on July 20 and 22, 1948.The telegram on the 20th stated that after re-discussing the action plan, the Standing Committee of the Northeast Bureau believed that it is better for our army to go south to fight, and it is not appropriate to forcefully and passively attack Changchun.The main force of the Northeast Field Army will start fighting southward in mid-August.The biggest difficulty in going south is the supply of food, but it can be solved.To fight on the Pingsui line, the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei side must be prepared.The telegram on the 22nd stated that if the enemy in North China is really empty, then our army will go south to cooperate with Jinchaji to fight, and there is a great possibility of completely annihilating the enemy and seizing Tianjin and Peiping; The possibility of liberating the Northeast.

[3] On April 18, 1948, Lin Biao and others called Mao Zedong and proposed to concentrate the main force of the Northeast Field Army to attack Changchun in the middle and late May.On April 22, Mao Zedong replied in a telegram agreeing with this opinion, but pointed out: "The reason why we agree with you to attack Changchun first is that it is more advantageous to attack Changchun first than to attack other places first, not because it is particularly disadvantageous to attack other places first, or There are insurmountable difficulties. The difficulties you mentioned about fighting the vicinity of Shenyang, the vicinity of Jinzhou, the difficulty of fighting the Yujin section, and the difficulty of fighting at Renguan, etc., some of them are only imaginary difficulties, and they may not necessarily exist in reality.” "You yourself, especially among the cadres, should only say that under the current circumstances it is more advantageous to attack Changchun first, and you should not emphasize the difficulty of going south to fight, lest you yourself and the cadres will be mentally passive."

[4] Cheng Zihua (1905-1991), born in Xie County, Shanxi Province (now part of Yuncheng City), was the commander of the Jireliao Military Region at that time.Luo Ruiqing was then the director of the Political Department of the North China Military Region and the first political commissar of the Second Corps. [5] Re, referring to Rehe Province, and Cha, referring to Chahar Province, see Note [8] on page 82 of this volume.