Chapter 83 Policy on Work in Tibet

(April 6, 1952) The Southwest Bureau and the Tibet Working Committee also reported to the Northwest Bureau and the Xinjiang Branch: We basically agree with the Southwest Bureau and the Southwest Military Region’s instruction telegram to the Tibet Working Committee and the Tibet Military Region on April 2nd, and believe that the basic policy (except for the reorganization of the Tibetan Army) and many specific steps adopted in this telegram are correct .Only by doing so can our army remain invincible in Tibet. The situation in Tibet is different from that in Xinjiang. Tibet is far worse than Xinjiang in terms of politics and economy.When I, Wang Zhen[2], entered Xinjiang, I first put all my energy into careful planning, self-reliance, and self-sufficiency in production.Now they have gained a firm foothold and won enthusiastic support from ethnic minorities.We are currently reducing rent and interest, and we will carry out land reform this winter, and the masses will support us even more.Xinjiang and Guanzhong have good access to cars, and have close economic ties with the Soviet Union, which has greatly benefited ethnic minorities in terms of material welfare.Tibet cannot implement rent reduction or land reform for at least two or three years.There are hundreds of thousands of Han people in Xinjiang, and there are almost no Han people in Tibet. Our army is in a completely different ethnic area.We only rely on two basic policies to win over the masses and make ourselves invincible.The first is careful planning, self-sufficiency in production, and influence the masses. This is the most basic link.Even if the road is repaired, it cannot rely on it to transport a large amount of grain.India may agree to exchange food into Tibet, but our standpoint should be that one day in the future our army can survive if India does not give food.We must use all efforts and appropriate means to win over the majority of the Dalai Lama[3] and his upper-level clique, isolate a few bad elements, and achieve the goal of gradually reforming Tibet's economy and politics over many years without bloodshed; but we must also be prepared to deal with Bad elements may lead the Tibetan army to rebel and attack us. At this time, our army can still survive and persevere in Tibet.All of these must rely on careful calculation and self-sufficiency in production.Only on the basis of this most basic policy can we achieve our goals.The second thing that can and must be done is to open up trade relations with India and the interior, so that the import and export of Tibet tend to be balanced, so that the living standards of the Tibetans will not be slightly lowered because of our army's entry into Tibet, and strive to make them have a better life. improved.As long as we cannot solve the two problems of production and trade, we will lose the material basis for our existence, and the bad elements will have capital every day to incite the backward masses and the Tibetan army to oppose us. Our policy of uniting the majority and isolating the minority will be weak and weak. can not achieve.

Among all the opinions in the Southwest Bureau's April 2 telegram, there is only one point worth considering, and that is whether it is possible and feasible to reorganize the Tibetan army and establish a military and political committee in the short term.In our opinion, do not reorganize the Tibetan army at present, and do not formally set up military divisions, nor set up military and political committees.For the time being, everything remains as it is, and we will wait until one or two years later when our army can indeed produce self-sufficiency and gain the support of the masses, then we will discuss these issues.Two situations may occur within one to two years: one is that our upper-level united front policy of uniting the majority and isolating the minority has taken effect, and the Tibetan masses have gradually moved closer to us, thus preventing bad elements and the Tibetan army from carrying out riots; It was the bad elements who believed that we were weak and deceitful, and led the Tibetan army to stage riots, while our army launched a counterattack in self-defense struggle and dealt blows.Either of the above two situations is in our favor.In the view of the Tibetan upper-level group, there are insufficient reasons for the current implementation of the agreement and the reorganization of the Tibetan army.It will be different in a few years. They may feel that they have to implement the agreement completely and have to reorganize the Tibetan army.If the Tibetan army staged a riot, or if they held it not once but several times, and our army counterattacked all of them, then we would have more reasons to reorganize the Tibetan army.It seems that not only the two Siluns[4], but also the majority of the Dalai Lama and his clique felt that the agreement was reluctantly accepted and was unwilling to implement it.At present, we not only do not have the material basis to fully implement the agreement, nor do we have the mass basis to fully implement the agreement, nor do we have the upper-level basis to fully implement the agreement.Since they are unwilling to carry it out, well, let’s not carry it out at the moment and wait until later.The longer the delay, the more reasons we have and the less they have.Procrastination will not do us much harm, or it will be beneficial to us.Let them do all kinds of bad things that harm the people, while we only do good things such as production, trade, road construction, medicine, united front (unity with the majority, patient education) and other good things to win over the masses and wait for the time is right before negotiating the full implementation of the agreement The problem.If they feel that the primary school is not suitable, the primary school can also be closed.

The recent demonstrations in Lhasa should not be seen as the work of the two Siluns and other bad guys, but as a gesture from the majority of the Dalai clique to us.The content of its petition is very strategic and does not indicate a break, but only a concession from us.It implies that the method of restoring the former Qing Dynasty without stationing the People's Liberation Army is not their true intention.They know that this cannot be done, and they are trying to exchange this one for the others.The 14th Dalai Lama was criticized in the petition, making the Dalai Lama politically irresponsible for the demonstration.They appear to protect the interests of the Tibetan nation. They know that they are weaker than us in terms of military power, but stronger than us in terms of social power.We should accept this petition in fact (not in form) and postpone the full implementation of the agreement.They chose to hold this demonstration at a time when the Panchen Lama [5] had not yet arrived, and it was after consideration.After the Panchen Lama arrived in Lhasa, they might have to make a big push to get the Panchen Lama to join their group.If we did our job well and the Panchen Lama did not fall for their tricks and arrived safely in Shigatse, then the situation would become more favorable to us.But the fact that we lack the material foundation cannot be changed for a while, and the fact that they are stronger than us in terms of social power will not change for a while, so the fact that the Dalai clique is unwilling to fully implement the agreement will not change for a while.Formally we are now going to take an offensive, blaming the unreasonableness of this demonstration and petition (breaking the agreement), but in fact we must be prepared to make concessions, wait for the conditions to be ripe, and prepare for future attacks (i.e., implement the agreement).

What do you think about this, please consider sending a telegram. central April 6 Published according to Mao Zedong's manuscript. -------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ note [1] Refers to the basic understanding of the Southwest Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Committee of the Southwest Military Region of the Communist Party of China on April 2, 1952, on several issues such as the current focus of work in Tibet, social reform, and troop supply, to the Tibet Working Committee, the Party Committee of the Tibet Military Region, and China The Logistics Command of the Eighteenth Army of the People's Liberation Army also reported a telegram to the Central Military Commission.

[2] Wang Zhen, then Secretary of the Xinjiang Branch of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.In October 1949, he led his troops to Xinjiang and served as the commander and political commissar of the First Corps of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. [3] The Dalai Lama, the Dalai Lama Tenzin Gyatso, was one of the local religious and political leaders of Tibet at that time. [4] Silun is the highest administrative official under the Dalai Lama.The two Siluns at that time were Lu Kangwa and Luosang Dashi. [5] The Panchen Lama, that is, the Panchen Lama Erdeni Chokyi Gyaltsen, was one of the local religious and political leaders in Tibet at that time.At this time, I was on my way back to Tibet from Qinghai.