Chapter 25 4. Chain button and firewall

The final solution to the part-time issue of parliamentarians was on September 3, and a plan with compromise and room for maneuver was formed, that is, federal parliamentarians shall not hold federal civilian positions that are set or raised during their term of office, and federal officials shall not Serve as MP.In other words, MPs are not absolutely not allowed to be officials.Officials of the state (state) governments can be appointed. Officials who are set before the term of office or do not have a salary increase can be appointed.The only thing that is not allowed is a federal civil servant who is set or raised during his term of office.This is to prevent members of parliament from using legislative power to set up a large number of official positions in order to become officials, or to increase the salary of a certain official position first, and then become themselves.In short, it is to prevent them from using power for personal gain.However, once a person becomes an official, he cannot be a member of parliament.When a councilor becomes an official, the seat becomes vacant; if an official wants to become a councilor, he must first resign.It should be said that this is reasonable.As Wilson said, there is nothing shameful about wanting to be an official. This kind of ambition should not be blamed, but corruption must be prevented before it happens.

After the members' problems are resolved, can you rest assured of the parliament?Not yet, because the propensity of Parliament to abuse its power is hard to guard against. On July 21, Madison said that there was a strong tendency in Congress to include all power in his vortex, which was the real source of danger.Mason also said that the legislation of Parliament is unjust and harmful.That is to say, it is possible for the parliament to "abusive government" by "legislating evil laws". This requires that someone can veto the legislation of Congress.This is not much disputed (Bedford objected).Both Gorham and Gowenomorris said on July 21 that they were all in favor of a check on Parliament, and the question was who would exercise this power.One option was to be exercised by the president alone, which Franklin opposed. On June 4, Franklin said that in the colonial era, this veto power was frequently used by governors to plunder money.If you don't flirt with the governor in private, the best legislation won't pass.As a result, it became a practice that the parliament first ordered to fill the governor's treasury, and the governor signed the decree after reaping the benefits.Mason echoed the sentiment, saying the veto would be used by the executive to bargain with Congress.As long as the executive and the legislature can make a deal, such as appointing officials as they like, and keeping all the power in his hands, he will not ask for any veto power, and he will avoid public outrage.

This is visionary.Although at the Constitutional Convention, Wilson and others believed that this power would be used rarely, just in case, the actual situation is difficult to say.Washington used it once, Adams and Jefferson used it once, Madison and Lincoln each used it seven times, and Franklin Roosevelt used it 635 times.Now, that veto has become a bargaining chip between the president and Congress.Whenever legislation is discussed in parliament, the president threatens to veto it if nothing happens.Parliament must weigh the pros and cons and either make concessions or follow through. Parliament can persist because it has the power of veto. On June 4, the committee of the whole voted. As a result, 8 states were in favor and 2 states, Connecticut and Maryland, opposed it. A resolution was passed: the administrator has the right to veto the legislation, but the Senate and the House of Representatives can veto it with a 2/3 majority.This is also stipulated in the Federal Constitution.The issue was discussed three more times on June 6, July 18, and July 21, as arguments for a joint executive and judiciary veto were advocated.But this plan was not accepted in the end. On July 18, a proposal to have exclusive legislative veto power for the executive was passed unanimously. On July 21, Wilson and Madison again raised the issue of judicial participation in the legislative review, but the motion failed.

Wilson and Madison reasoned that it was not enough for the executive to review legislation alone.Madison said that even if the magistrates and judges joined forces, the power of Congress would still overwhelm them.What's more, the joint review is beneficial to all three parties.The executive and judiciary defended themselves, and the legislative branch got help.Guweno Morris also said that an administrator whose term of office is very short (at the time it was set at 6 years, and later changed to 4 years) and who can be impeached during his tenure is simply not enough to constitute an effective constraint on parliament.Even with the power of the judge, it is not enough.Perhaps, the press and publication will be an important means to prevent political ills, but unfortunately we can not be blindly optimistic about this.

It's also extremely insightful.In fact, press publishing and public opinion supervision are powerful weapons for the American people to prevent abuse of power and corruption.But at the time, not many people saw this, so that there was no clause protecting freedom of speech in the Federal Constitution.This led to protests by Mason and others, and later constitutional amendments.We will talk about this later. Wilson and Madison's motion was opposed by many.Gorham said he saw no advantage in asking the judge to do that.There are more judges than administrators, and when it comes to voting, the administrators have no advantage at all, and the power is bound to fall aside.As a result, it is not the administrator's ability to defend himself, but the judge's ability to sacrifice the administrator.It's about turning interpreters of the law into framers, and judges into state activists, Gerry said.He said that judges and administrators must not be allowed to form an improper alliance and use their collusion and offensive and defensive alliances to jointly deal with Congress.Rutledge said the last person to consider for a review meeting is the judge.Legislation and judiciary must be separated, and judges can only have a say when judicature.Luther Martin also believed that this was a dangerous innovation.Judges already have veto power over laws (that is, they judge a law unconstitutional when hearing cases), and if they are allowed to participate in legislative review, judges have double veto power.What's more, it is entirely possible for judges to overrule legislation that is supported by the people during legislative review.This will make the judge lose the trust of the people, which is very inappropriate.

What Luther Martin meant was clear: Rather than having a judge participate in legislative review, let him rule a law as unconstitutional while trying a case.In this regard, Mason responded that this has to wait until the law is applied to individual cases. Previously, it could only see that the legislation was unfair and endanger the people and could not oppose it.This of course makes sense.Before the Constituent Assembly, although some judges in various states ruled that a certain law was not adopted by the state constitution, this practice has always been controversial.Therefore, whether this method will work or not, everyone has no idea.

In fact, it was not until 1803 that the fourth Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, John Marshall, set a precedent for "judicial review" at the federal level, and this ruling was directed against Madison. Things went something like this: In the fourth presidential election, Democratic-Republican Jefferson won the election (election in 1800, vote in 1801), and Federalist Adams stepped down.Before stepping down, Adams appointed a group of judges, signed overnight by then-Secretary of State Marshall, who came to be known as the "Midnight Judges."But after signing, Marshall got off work and left.The next day, when the new Secretary of State Madison came to work, he withheld these letters of appointment and refused to issue them.So a "Midnight Judge" named Mably brought Madison to the Federal Supreme Court with a petition.This is the chief justice of the Federal Supreme Court, Marshall who signed overnight; and according to Article 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Supreme Court has the power to order the Secretary of State to serve the commission on the appointee.Marshall, however, did not do so.He declared that although the plaintiff was entitled to the commission, the Supreme Court had no power to order the defendant (the new Secretary of State Madison) to serve it.Because the Judiciary Act of 1789 was unconstitutional.This is a remarkable verdict.Chief Justice Marshall of the Federal Supreme Court used his own knife to maintain the nobility and permanence of the Constitution, and also won power and dignity for the judiciary.Since then, a federal government with separation of powers has been firmly established, and the legislative issue can basically be reassured.Because although the legislative power is exclusively owned by the Congress, it is subject to the supervision and restriction of the executive and judicial departments.If the president thinks the legislation is inappropriate, he can veto it.Although the Supreme Court cannot participate in "legislative review", it can conduct "judicial review", that is, to decide whether a certain legislation is legal by trying cases, which is actually a legislative review.In this way, even if the Senate and the House of Representatives each overrule the president's veto with a 2/3 majority and forcibly pass a certain evil law, the Supreme Court can still rule that it is unconstitutional. Three firewalls have been erected in a down-to-earth manner—one for separate legislation between the two houses, one for presidential legislative review, and another for judicial review by the court.

More importantly, the three departments of legislation, administration and justice are in a chain of relationships.Congress has the power to legislate, but not to enforce or interpret.After the bill is passed, it can do nothing about how it is implemented or explained.The president has the power to enforce the law, but not to legislate or interpret it.He cannot legislate whatever he wants to legislate, or legislate whatever law he wants, nor can he arbitrarily interpret and distort the law as he pleases.A judge has the power of interpretation, but neither the power of legislation nor the power of law enforcement. He cannot participate in legislation and law enforcement, and cannot direct legislation and law enforcement. He can only "govern by doing nothing."If no one complains, he can do nothing.What's more, even if someone sues, he cannot violate the constitution.

There is also a chain of relationships among congressmen, the president, and judges.The president can veto legislation, and judges can rule it unconstitutional, but Congress can impeach the president, and the appointment of judges requires the approval of the Senate, so members are not afraid of them.Moreover, since the appointment of a judge is subject to the consent of the Senate, although the appointment is nominated by the president, the judge is not indebted to the president.The president is nothing to fear.Although the president is in danger of being impeached, the House of Representatives can only initiate impeachment, the Senate can only hear the case, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court presides over the impeachment trial.Those who initiate impeachment cannot be tried, and those who conduct trials cannot be presided over, and they cannot be convicted without the consent of 2/3 of the members present. It is impossible for so many people to deliberately make trouble with the president, right?As for parliamentarians elected by the people and judges for life, of course they are not afraid of the president.What's more, the president's term of office is only four years, and it is still difficult to say whether he can appoint a justice of the Supreme Court during his term of office.

In this way, a firewall has been set up between parliament and parliament, councilors and councilors, officials and judges.The design was largely done at the Constitutional Convention and partly in later practice.The overall spirit is that guarding against officials is like guarding against thieves, guarding against power is like fire prevention, and guarding against abuse of power is like guarding against floods.Therefore, I would rather have a more complicated plan, a little more troublesome work, and a little less efficient work, and never let the people in power work together and do evil.

That's why the 1787 Constitutional Convention lasted so long.